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Abstract 
The motivation for this thesis is the investigation of the socioeconomic determinants 
of health in Taiwan. When considering the variations in socioeconomic status, income is an 
indicator much discussed in the literature because it is a complex issue and yet easily 
measured. Many different economists investigate income issue from the perspective of their 
own particular expertise. For health economists, the influence of income on health outcome is 
primary. Therefore, many health income hypotheses have been advanced and the debate is 
ongoing.  
Among these hypotheses, the absolute income hypothesis, the relative income 
hypothesis, and the income inequality hypothesis are discussed primarily. The argument of 
these hypotheses is straightforward. The debates of these different hypotheses are based on 
two main dimensions, economic development and data. The advocates of the absolute income 
hypothesis claim that absolute income affects health significantly. The advocates of the 
relative income hypothesis or the income inequality hypothesis, however, argue that the 
absolute income hypothesis holds principally before a society moves to an affluent stage. 
After economic transition, the relative income or income inequality hypothesis becomes more 
influential. 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) summarize the conclusions of 169 papers relevant 
to the relative income hypothesis and income inequality hypothesis and find a 
phenomenon that the studies using large area data are more likely supportive than those 
using small area data. They argue that income inequality in large area is a good measure 
of the scale of social stratification or the degree of social hierarchy rather than in a small 
area. Another argument to explain this phenomenon is aggregate bias proposed by 
Gravelle et al. (2002). 
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The thesis tries to find the answers for the following questions. What income 
hypotheses hold for Taiwanese society? Do these hypotheses coexist or are they mutually 
exclusive? Is aggregate bias a negligible issue in Taiwan when aggregate data are used to 
infer individuals’ health income relationship?  
Chapter 3 combines aggregate data and individual data and creates a panel dataset 
to examine the absolute income hypothesis and the income inequality hypothesis. The 
motivation is to avoid aggregate bias. Chapter 4 employs nonparametric estimations to 
describe the relationship between health outcome and income and compares the results of 
parametric estimations and of nonparametric estimations. Chapter 5 utilizes the quasi-
experimental methods to identify the absolute income effect on health outcome.  
The nonlinear relationship between a) self-assessed health, b) depression, c) life 
satisfaction and income is found in chapter 4. This finding implies that in the Taiwanese 
studies the aggregate bias needs to be considered when aggregate data are used to infer 
individual health income relationship and it is consistent with the motivation of the 
proposed approach of combining aggregate data and individual data in Chapter 3. The 
difference between parametric estimations and nonparametric estimations is not only 
shown in the figures but the model specification test also shows that the parametric linear, 
quadratic, and cubic forms in terms of income are a misspecification in the estimations of 
depression and life satisfaction.  
The absolute income hypothesis and the income inequality hypothesis are 
supportive in this thesis when long-run income and long-run Gini coefficient are the 
regressors under the assumption of health social gradient. This finding shows that health 
income hypotheses are not contradictory. Chapter 5 also provides evidence to support that 
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long-term income has a significant effect on mental health. Thus, the absolute income 
hypothesis is also supported after taking causality into consideration.      
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Health constitutes a cornerstone of economic growth and as such it has an 
enormous impact on labour productivity and on the accumulation of human resources. For 
instance, healthy individuals would probably receive more education and achieve higher 
productivity than sick individuals. Health is at once a broad and complex issue. Social 
scientists investigate health from multiple angles, for example, health promotion, public 
health, sociology, and psychology. Economists are interested in all factors affecting health 
and use theoretical models and econometric methods to analyse the determinants of health. 
Among various determinants, socioeconomic status is an accepted determinant affecting 
health whether through direct ways or indirect ways. Among numerous socioeconomic 
status, income and wealth relevant determinants attract considerably interest of 
researchers.  
Income and wealth influence health through several pathways, for example, 
health care service, financial stress, and social comparison. Income can facilitate access to 
better health service and increase health investment to improve physical health as well as 
relieving the financial stress to improve mental health. On the other hand, income and 
wealth are typical symbols of socioeconomic status so they are also a tool for social 
comparison. Social comparison is not always negative but an invidious comparison may 
cause the mental stress and further, harms the mental health. These pathways might 
coexist no matter at what stage of economic development. At the developing stage, people 
are struggling to escape from poverty so that the pathway of social comparison might not 
be as significant as the other pathways. Income is a main determinant of health at this 
stage. Thus, absolute income might have a significant effect on improving physical health 
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(through health care service and health investment) and mental health (through health care 
service and the relief of financial stress).  
At the developed stage, the cost of utilizing health care service is relatively low 
because of the high average income level and the implementation of social schemes 
relevant to health which have covered most medical expense. The basic health care 
service is secured, and thus, health care service might not be the most essential factor of 
health outcome.  In an affluent society where the media is flourishing, the pathway 
of social comparison might have more influence on health.  For example, media 
broadcasting luxury goods changes people’s values.  The commercial media encourages 
people to pursue anything representing their socioeconomic status. This might cause 
stronger comparison behaviour.  Clark and Oswald (1998) and Clark and Senik (2010) 
have the theoretical discussion of social comparison. Though the pathway of social 
comparison is stressed at this stage, income level still possesses the function of relieving 
stress but this stress might come from pursuing high quality life instead of financial 
embarrassment.          
Three main health income hypotheses discussing the relationship between income 
and health are 1. the absolute income hypothesis; 2. the relative income hypothesis; 3. the 
income inequality hypothesis. Money can not only buy nutritious food and good quality 
health services but can also bring a sense of security and, further, reduce depression or 
other mental stress. This is the argument of the absolute income hypothesis - income is 
able to improve health status. The relative income hypothesis claims that individuals tend 
to emphasize their relative income more than absolute income amount due to the 
comparison when a society reaches an affluent stage. Finally, the argument of income 
inequality is income inequality becomes a more important determinant of health than 
absolute income when a society has higher average income (after epidemiological 
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transition). Income inequality influences health through social environment. Apart from 
three main hypotheses, there are other health income hypotheses such as the deprivation 
hypothesis and the relative position hypothesis but the aforementioned three health 
income hypotheses are the subject of most discussion and the conclusions are not 
consistent.  
The data used in the analysis are one of the reasons causing the mixed results. 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) sort out 169 studies relevant to income distribution and find 
that the Gini coefficient measured at different regional levels affects the result of the 
income inequality hypothesis test. The Gini coefficient measured over a large area tends 
to support the income inequality hypothesis. Conclusions drawn from a small area do not 
yield much evidence to support it. They claim that the Gini coefficient is a good measure 
of the scale of social stratification over a large area rather than small area. However, 
Gravelle et al. (2002) think this circumstance results from aggregate bias caused by 
nonlinear individual health income risk and improper aggregate variables replacing 
individual variables. Understanding the real individual health income relationship can 
produce a clear conclusion in terms of different income hypotheses and at once explain 
income related health inequality. 
This thesis uses Taiwanese survey data to test two main health income hypotheses, 
the absolute income hypothesis and the income inequality hypothesis, and to draw the 
individual health income relationship. Taiwan has been categorized as a developed 
country by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 1990s. Taiwanese government 
has implemented several social insurances such as Labour Insurance, Military Insurance, 
Government Employee Insurance, and Farmer Health Insurance for decades.  Those 
occupational insurances also cover medical expenditure so the basic health access is 
secured.  In 1995, the government carried out the National Health Insurance (NHI) which 
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integrated the medical payment of occupational insurances and included the people who 
were not covered by those occupational insurances.  There were 96.2% of population 
covered in 1998 and it achieved 99% in May 2010.  The satisfaction of NHI approximated 
to 80% recently. Comparing Taiwanese health policies to other advanced countries’ 
health policies, it is largely identical but with minor differences.  However, in the process 
of development, Taiwan is different from western countries in two aspects. Firstly, fast 
development comes with low income inequality. In 1980s, Taiwan’s economy highly 
developed and the Gini coefficient was lower than that of western countries though it 
went up rapidly.  To date, Taiwan’s income inequality is still low compared to the other 
advanced countries.  Secondly, Taiwan has higher savings ratio than the other advanced 
countries.  Even when the real income decreases, the savings ratio still keeps at the same 
level.  High savings ratio implies the lack of sense of security and uncertainty for the 
future such as macroeconomic and politic situations, job markets, and inflation.  When 
people are pessimistic about their future, money is the means offering the sense of 
security. 
Chiang (1999) uses Taiwanese survey data to test the absolute income hypothesis 
and the income inequality hypothesis by regression analysis of mortality on income and 
income inequality for three index years, 1976, 1985, and 1995. The data used in his article 
is Family and Expenditure Survey and Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book which 
reports various mortality rates annually. He claims that the population health is affected 
by income inequality more than by absolute income after Taiwan past the epidemiological 
transition. This thesis is based on the argument of aggregate bias and starts from refining 
Chiang’s analysis with the same socioeconomic data but different mortality data. Chapter 
3 tests the absolute income hypothesis and the income inequality hypothesis by 
combining aggregate mortality data and individual socioeconomic status data. The panel 
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dataset is created at county level. This approach allows use of the county panel dataset to 
avoid aggregation bias. Chapter 4 utilizes nonparametric methods to estimate individual’s 
health income relationship for two reasons. First, nonparametric methods can avoid the 
potential problem of misspecification. Secondly, these methods display clearly the 
variation of health across different income levels to figure out income related health 
inequality. If the relationship is nonlinear, it will support the analysing strategy in Chapter 
3 and produce more precise results because it avoids the problem of aggregate bias 
whereas, if the relationship is linear, this will imply that aggregate bias is not an issue in 
the hypotheses test when one uses aggregate data and the result obtained from Chapter 3 
will be theoretically the same as that obtained from analysis of aggregate data. Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 discuss health income relationship under the assumption of health social 
gradient – a negative relationship between health indicators and socioeconomic status and 
the direction goes from socioeconomic status to health.  Given potential reverse causality, 
Chapter 5 uses an explicit identification strategy to identify the effect of absolute income 
on health by evaluating the policy effect of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim 
Regulation on health as the robust evidence for the test of absolute income hypothesis.  
Before proceeding to the main points of discussion, the following sections in this 
chapter introduce the Taiwanese background, especially, the development of the economy, 
the education system, and the social welfare for several reasons. First, the relative income 
hypothesis and the income inequality hypothesis claim that people are concerned about 
their relative income more than their absolute income after economic transition. To 
describe the economic development can help readers to understand at what economic 
stage Taiwan is in the period of analysis. Second, education is one of the measures of 
socioeconomic status and the positive association between education and health is well 
established (Feldman et al., 1989; Morris, 1990; Winkleby et al., 1992). The introduction 
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of measures of education transition can reveal partially the variation of socioeconomic 
status and the circumstance of social mobility in Taiwan. Finally, the introduction of 
social welfare policies is useful as background to a detailed picture of Taiwan’s social 
welfare system for the investigation of chapter 5. 
 
1.2 Economic Transition 
After World War II (WWII), economic depression spread to the Far East 
including Japan, China, Korea Republic, and Taiwan. The subsequent economic 
development of Japan and Taiwan has attracted the interest of researchers because of the 
fast growth in the 50 years after WWII. Hence, there is a lot of literature investigating the 
Japanese and Taiwanese economies. After WWII, Taiwan’s economic development can 
be roughly partitioned into four periods, the economic recovery period (1949-1952), the 
period of agriculture supporting industry (1950s), the period of export-oriented economic 
development (1960s-1980s), and the economic transformation period (1980s-present). 
1.2.1 Economic Recovery Period (1949-1952) 
In this period, booming population, soaring prices, stoppages in industrial and 
agricultural production and military expenditure which accounted for more than half of 
government expenditure resulting in severe social problems and economic collapse. To 
address these problems, the Taiwanese government adopted a series of policies and 
measures, for example, land reform, currency reform, foreign trade control, the first 
priority to develop electricity, fertilizer and textile industries, to stabilize the society and 
economy. In the 1950s, the growth rate of agricultural industry achieved approximately 
4.7% every year. Further, in 1950, economic aid from United States injected substantial 
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funds. For these two reasons, the economy of Taiwan was restored and it recovered to the 
highest level before WWII.  
1.2.2 Period of Agriculture Supporting Industry (1952-1960) 
Taiwan's economy was largely based on agriculture so that there was an excess 
labour force. Meanwhile, the foreign trade deficit was serious and foreign exchange was 
in short supply. The import of industrial products was not affordable because of low 
income levels. Hence, the government established policies whereby agriculture supported 
industry and industry improved agriculture. Land reform improved agricultural 
productivity so that agricultural products and processed products constituted a very high 
proportion of total exports and became the main source of foreign exchange 1 . The 
Government also used the profit acquired from compulsory acquisition and other means, 
for instance, unequal exchange, to inject into industrial development. In industry, the 
focus was on livelihood industries based on less capital requirement and lower technology 
to replace imports. On the other hand, the government curtailed foreign exchange 
spending and created more employment opportunities to alleviate employment pressure.  
1.2.3 Period of Export-Oriented Economic Development (1960s-1980s) 
Due to the small market, the market for import substitution industries was at 
saturation point. Meanwhile, the greater specialization as an industrial rating was 
advocated. Taiwan seized the advantage to develop export processing industries by using 
a low-wage labour force to promote economic development. On the other hand, the 
government also formulated or amended policies such as the reform of foreign exchange 
and trade, implemented investment incentive regulations, encouraged private savings, tax 
and financing benefit for exporters, and established export processing zones and bonded 
warehouses to promote exports. Foreign investment during this period of industrialization 
                                                   
1
 For example, it achieved 71.5% in 1957. 
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and export expansion in Taiwan played an important role. The private sector industries 
changed from import substitution to export. This was the main force of economic growth. 
Japan, the United States, and Taiwan had triangular trade relations, importing raw 
material from Japan and exporting products to the United States. During the decade from 
1963, the average annual growth rate of industry was 18.3% while the average annual 
growth rate of the manufacturing sector achieved 20.1%. Industrial output in GDP 
increased from 26.9% in 1960 to 43.8% in 1973. The proportion of industrial production 
in exports increased from 32.3% in 1960 to 84.6% in 1973. Taiwan's industry was based 
on export processing zones and used textiles, home appliances and other processing 
industries as the core to drive economic development. 
1.2.4 Economic Transformation Period (1980s-present) 
In the 1980s, Taiwan’s internal and external economic environment changed. The 
NT dollar exchange rate appreciated and wages rose sharply. Labour-intensive export 
processing industries lost their comparative advantage which lead to a drop in private 
investment. The economy suffered from hardship. For these reasons, in 1986, the 
government started economic transformation with liberalization, internationalization, and 
institutionalization to improve and perfect the market economic mechanism. Meanwhile, 
industrial upgrading and expansion of foreign markets outside the U.S. underwent a major 
adjustment. After a decade of economic transformation, capital and technology-intensive 
industries account for 61.5%.of manufacturing industry. The information industry was 
particularly prominent and its output ranked highly in the world. Taiwan's foreign export 
market focus had gradually shifted from Europe and the United States to Asia. The 
proportion of exports to the U.S. sank from 48.8% in 1984 to 23.7% in 1995 and exports 
to Asia increased from 32.8% in 1988 to 52.6% in 1995. Export structures also had 
changed greatly. Electronics, information, mechanical, electrical and transport products 
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accounted for more than 50% of total exports. Due to the substantial growth of foreign 
investment, Taiwan had become a net capital exporter. The accumulation of Taiwanese 
foreign investment was approximately 30 billion U.S. dollars in 1995.   
Taiwan’s so-called economic miracle has resulted in not only faster growth but 
also less income inequality than elsewhere especially before 1980. Figure 1.1 displays the 
economic growth rate over the years and the historical Gini coefficient. After 1980, the 
Gini coefficient went up continuously and it crossed 0.3 in 1988 whereas the economic 
growth rate dropped gradually after 1994. Although the variation of Gini went up, it was 
still under 0.4.  
1.3 The Transition of Education 
General education and vocational education are the two main components in the 
Taiwanese education system. The duration of schooling from primary school to university 
Figure 1.1 Economic Growth Rate and Gini Coefficient 
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is 16 years in total. The primary school and junior high school which are 9 years in total 
have become compulsory education since 1968. Before 1968, only primary school was 
compulsory. After the period of compulsory education, students have to take the joint 
entrance examination for further education.  
Before 2001, students had to take the joint entrance examination after they 
graduated from junior high school if they wanted to continue their study. Students had 
three options which are the general senior high school (3 years), five-year junior college, 
and vocational senior high school (3 years). The latter two options belonged to vocational 
education. The entrance examinations for these three kinds of school were separated and 
held in July every year. After senior high school, students who had graduated from 
general senior high school had to pass the joint entrance examination for enrolling at 
university (4 years) if they wanted to accept high education. Another option for these 
students was three-year junior colleges but it was abolished step by step in 1980s. The 
students graduating from vocational senior high school had to pass the joint entrance 
examination for going to the four-year institute of technology or two-year junior colleges. 
The options for students after five-year junior college included two-year vocational 
college and university. After university or equivalent degrees, students had to pass the 
entrance examination for postgraduate study. At least two years are for master and at least 
4 years are for Ph. D. Figure 1.2 illustrates the education system in Taiwan 
Due to the complicated processes of entering further education, education policies 
for high schools were changed in 2001. After 2001, the basic competence test replaced the 
aforementioned entrance exams and this exam is more standardized2. This exam is now 
held twice per year. Students get one more opportunity to pass the exam. High schools 
                                                   
2
 Before 2001, the exams of entrance for three kinds of school were different and each exam was 
also different from region and region.  
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including general and vocational school and five-year junior colleges can admit students 
according to the result of basic competence test and other criteria made by individual 
school. The purpose of this change is to simplify the entry process.  
After 2002, the multi-route promotion programme replaced the conventional 
united exam of entrance of university in order to provide more routes for high school 
students to access higher education. On the other hand, several five-year junior colleges 
were promoted to four-year institutes of technology in 1996 and further, were promoted to 
universities of technology gradually after 1996. The universities of technology can not 
only admit students from vocational senior high school but also general students.  
The most critical thing in the previous education policies is that students had only 
one route which was the joint entrance exam held once every year to access higher 
education. Thus, broadening the entrance route is the purpose for the policy change. Not 
only the entrance exam but also application and promotion are the routes to enter further 
education in the new education polices. 
 Higher education was an elite sector before the policy change, especially before 
the 1980s. Less than 20 percent students could enrol in universities. The enrolment rate 
increased gradually. It achieved 50% in 1997 and it is 100% now. The 100% enrolment 
rate results from the increasing number of universities and from the falling fertility rate. 
The total number of institutes classed as university or equivalent level in Taiwan is 1643. 
                                                   
3
 The population in Taiwan is 23 million and the territory is around 1/7 of Great Britain.   
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The rising university enrolment rate causes a few problems, for example, 
distorting the allocation of human resource and reducing the return of education. However, 
it guarantees the human right of education and improves social justice. In a word, the 
changes of education policy in the late 1990s make education more available. Higher 
education becomes general education rather than elite education. 
 
1.4 The Historical Perspective of Social Welfare Policies 
Social welfare is provided by government whether directly or indirectly and it 
covers three dimensions, economic status, health, and mental status. Social welfare can 
not only provide security in people’s lives but also be an indicator of development. 
Developed countries usually have more comprehensive social welfare because it needs a 
large budget to support. In social welfare, social insurance is the main structure in the 
system because it nearly covers three dimensions mentioned above. On the other hand, 
Figure 1.2 Education System of Taiwan 
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benefit and social assistance are auxiliary tools to support the inadequacy of social 
insurance or achieve social justice. The following paragraphs introduce the social 
insurance and benefit policy in Taiwan.  
Medical payments and retirement pension are two main components in social 
insurance. Before the implementation of National Health Insurance (NHI), there were five 
comprehensive and several health insurance schemes. The five comprehensive schemes 
comprise labour insurance (LI), government employee insurance (GEI), farmer insurance 
(FI), teacher insurance for private school (TIPS), and retirement insurance (RI). LI, 
implemented in 1950, was the first insurance scheme. In the same year, military insurance 
(MI) was also implemented. GEI, RI, and TIPS were introduced in 1958, 1965, and 1980, 
respectively. However, RI is part of GEI because it is provided for retired government 
employees but it is not compulsory. The government selected a few areas to implement FI 
in 1985 and it was implemented in the country in 1988. However, this was just an 
experimental scheme. Due to the favourable effect, FI was formally implemented in 1989. 
Even though there were many health insurances before implementation of NHI, some 
people were still not covered. NHI was enacted in 1995. It merged the section related to 
medical payments of social insurance schemes and, at the same time, it also provided a 
medical security for those who were not covered by any social insurance.  
Apart from the comprehensive insurance schemes, the other programmes were 
abolished after the government implemented NHI. In 1999, GEI and TIPS were merged 
into the government employee and teacher insurance scheme (GETI). Generally speaking, 
the three main comprehensive insurances (LI, GETI, and FI) only do the business of 
retirement pension and other non-medical payments after NHI. In 1999, the government 
implemented a regulation of unemployment payment of labour insurance to provide 
economic security for unemployed labours in the first 6 months. However, this regulation 
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was abolished in 2003 and replaced by the Employment Insurance Act (EIA). Further 
securities and assistances are included in this Act.  
The pension, especially the retirement pension, provides senior citizens with basic 
security to avoid suffering from extreme poverty. However, FI is the only job-related 
insurance without a retirement pension. In view of this, the government granted senior 
farmer benefit in 1995 to compensate the inadequacy of retirement pensions in the FI. 
This will be discussed further in Chapter 5. However, the idea of benefit is different from 
the concept of pension. Despite the three job-related insurances covering the majority of 
the population, the unemployed and those outside the labour force are not covered by any 
pension scheme. For this reason, the government enacted the National Pension Scheme 
(NPS) in 2008. The National Pension Scheme is also a compulsory scheme. An individual 
who is at age 25 and older and is not included by three job-related insurances has to 
participate in the national pension scheme until 65 years old if they are not covered by 
any other job-related insurance during this period.   
With respect to benefits, they are usually provided for senior citizens. Apart from 
the senior farmer benefit, the government granted benefit in 1998 to senior citizens in the 
low or middle income quantiles. The Government also introduced the Senior Welfare 
Benefit Interim Regulation (SWBIR) in 2002. However, not every senior citizen is 
eligible to claim this benefit. One has to meet some qualifications to receive the benefit. 
In 2003, it covered 30% of senior citizens. The Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim 
Regulation was abolished after National Pension Scheme was implemented. People who 
participate or had ever participated in National Pension Scheme are eligible to claim this 
pension no matter that they claim retirement pension from other insurance schemes. In 
order to look after disabled senior citizens in low or middle income families, the 
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government introduced regulations on special care benefit to grant the benefit in 2007. 
Again, these issues will be important for the discussion in Chapter 5. 
As for social assistance, the government implemented the Public Assistance Act 
in 1980. The target of this Act is people in the lowest income quantile or with disabilities. 
It provides mainly economic assistance. There are many other regulations allowing the 
disabled to secure job opportunities and provide them with other forms of assistance.  
Social insurance, the benefits system, and social assistance constitute a 
comprehensive programme of economic social security. They provide security to people 
suffering from extreme poverty and maintain basic human rights. Table 1-1 illustrates the 
development of social welfare in Taiwan. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the previous literature 
related to health income hypotheses. Chapter 3 tests the absolute income hypothesis and 
the income inequality hypothesis by combining aggregate and individual data. Chapter 4 
investigates the health income relationship with nonparametric estimations. Chapter 5 
retests the absolute income hypothesis with quasi-experimental methods. Finally, Chapter 
6 is the conclusion.   
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Table 1-1 The Development of Social Scheme in Taiwan 
Year Scheme Notes 
1950. 3 Labour Insurance Labour Insurance Regulation of Taiwan 
Province was the source of law. 
Act of Labour Insurance was 
formulated in 1958. 
1950. 6 Military Insurance Regulation of Military Insurance was 
formulated in March of 1950. 
1958. 9 Government Employee Insurance Act of Government Employee 
Insurance was announced in January of 
1958. 
1965. 8 Retirement Insurance Regulation of retirement insurance was 
announced in March of 1964. 
1980. 6 Low and Middle Income Family 
Living Allowance 
Public Assistance Act was the source of 
law and announced at the same time. 
1980. 10 Private School Teacher and Staff 
Insurance 
Regulation of private school teacher 
and staff insurance was announced in 
August of 1980. 
1984. 1 Retirement Insurance for Private 
School Teacher and Staff 
 
1985. 10 Pilot Farmer health Insurance Farmer health insurance temporary pilot 
points was the source of law 
1989. 7 Farmer Health Insurance Farmer Health Insurance Act was 
announced in June of 1989 
1995. 3 National Health Insurance National Health Insurance Act was 
announced in August of 1994 
1995. 5 Senior Farmer Benefit Interim Regulation of Senior Farmer 
Welfare was the source of law 
1999. 1 Unemployment Labour Benefit Regulation of Unemployment Labour 
Benefit was announced in December of 
1998 
1999. 5 Government Employee and 
Teacher Insurance 
Government Employee and Teacher 
Insurance Act was announced in May 
of 1999. 
This Act merged Government 
Employee Insurance and Private School 
Teacher and Staff Insurance 
2002. 5 Senior Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation of Senior Welfare 
Benefit was announced at the same 
time. 
2003. 1 Employment Insurance Employment Insurance Act was 
announced in May of 2002 
2007. 7 Special Care Benefit for Middle 
or Low-Income Senior Citizens 
Regulations on Special Care Benefit 
For Middle or Low-income Senior 
Citizens was announced at the same 
time 
2008. 10 National Pension Scheme National Pension Act was announced in 
August of 2007 
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Chapter 2. Income Hypotheses 
2.1 Literature review 
Understanding the determinants of health is a crucial issue in many countries 
because health affects the accumulation of human capital and labour productivity through 
education. Furthermore, it affects a country’s economic growth. The vast majority of 
empirical papers in health economics investigate the topic of what causes the health 
difference between countries. Among the primary determinants, socioeconomic status is 
of interest to many researchers and policy makers; and income and wealth are widely 
discussed as former among those socioeconomic determinants. In recent decades, many 
health income hypotheses have appeared to explain how income affects health status. 
Wagstaff and Doorslaer (2000) categorize previous papers into five income 
hypotheses: 1. the absolute income hypothesis (AIH); 2. the relative income hypothesis 
(RIH); 3. the income inequality hypothesis (IIH); 4. the deprivation hypothesis (DH) and 
5. the relative position hypothesis (RPH). The latter two hypotheses are the derivatives of 
the relative income hypothesis. Thus, the following discussion concentrates on AIH, RIH, 
and IIH.  
The absolute income hypothesis claims that income affects health on both 
physical and psychological levels. On the physical level, income increases one’s ability to 
purchase nutritious food and to acquire better quality health service. On a psychological 
level, income provides a sense of economic security which results in significantly lower 
levels of existential stress. People who encounter financial insecurity, debt, job insecurity, 
and unemployment have worse health status (Bartley, 1994; White, 1991; Wilson and 
Walker, 1993; McGrown, 1994; Iversen and Klausen, 1981; Ferris et al., 1995; Cobb and 
Kasl, 1997; Mattiasson et al., 1990). Some of these papers explain that the worst health 
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results from those factors due to the mediation of health risky behaviours, such as obesity, 
smoking and excessive drinking (Cameron and Jones, 1985; Wilkinson, 1996; Li and Zhu, 
2006), and restricted social contact (House et al., 1998; Broadhead et al., 1983; Berkman 
and Syme, 1979; Whelan, 1993; Rosengren et al., 1993).  
Wilkinson (1996), however, says ‘income per se does not affect health’. Income 
affects health through other ways, for instance, the tendency to compare income. The 
relative income hypothesis claims that people emphasize their relative income to others 
rather than their own absolute income amount after society achieves its affluent stage. The 
income inequality hypothesis claims that income inequality harms health through an 
unstable society, for example, strike, violence, crime, and even coups, which results from 
collapsed social cohesion and trust, and harmful psychosocial effects of invidious social 
comparison (Durkeim, 1951; Berkman and Syme, 1979; Muller, 1985; Kawachi et al., 
1996, 1997; Kawachi and Kennedy, 1999).  
Generally speaking, RIH and IIH share the common idea that the individual 
compares his or her own situation to others similar individuals. Relative income and 
income inequality influence health through comparison.  From an economic viewpoint, 
comparison influences health directly in terms of the relative income hypothesis. People, 
whose income is above a specific level, have a positive health effect. People have a 
negative health effect when their income is below a specific level. As to income 
inequality hypothesis, in a society with high income inequality, invidious social 
comparison brings harmful psychological effects and, at the same time, erodes social 
capital which will cause an unstable society. For example, income inequality causes 
unfair allocation of resource. The resource is allocated more in affluent area or 
advantaged groups than poor area or disadvantaged groups. The disadvantaged people 
would feel deprived when they compare the benefit of resource allocation or their income 
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to that of advantaged people. In this circumstance, social cohesion will collapse and 
people might lose trust in government. Furthermore, social destabilization is generated. 
An unstable society brings high pressure and causes uncertainty in the environment which 
affects health. 
In the econometric approach, the definition of the different hypotheses depends 
on the measured variable of relative position in the analysis. For instance, if an index of 
income inequality is used in the analysis, the income inequality hypothesis is tested. If a 
relative deprivation measure is used in the analysis, it will test the relative income 
hypothesis.   
The other hypotheses are based on the same concept of comparison, for example, 
comparison of socioeconomic characteristics comparison apart from income such as type 
of job, education, or difference in capital assets.   
It is fitting at this point to question whether the tendency to self-compare 
constitutes is an innate trait of human cognition? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then relative 
inequality should not just hold in affluent countries (or in countries that have experienced 
economic transition) but in every country. If the answer is ‘No’, what drives human 
beings to compare themselves one another? Two social influences can explain somewhat 
motivation for such comparison. One is Informational Social Influence and the other one 
is Normative Social Influence. When people do not know how to behave, they copy other 
people’s behaviour. This pattern of behaviour is named Informational Social Influence. It 
provides a safe course of action. At least, other people cannot criticize practitioners of 
such behaviour for their action. In the case of Normative Social Influence, the 
fundamental factor is the human need to belong to social groups. Common beliefs, values, 
attitudes, and behaviour are needed. People go along with the others to avoid being 
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perceived as a fool or a loser. Social influence might have different effect in different 
cultures. Collective cultures, for instance, most Asian culture, will tend to be influenced 
by normative social influence more than individualistic cultures.  
Social comparison is a theory to model the relationship between comparison and 
well-being and it also provides a theoretical fundamental for the relative income 
hypothesis. Helson (1964) and Parducci (1968) argue that all judgments and satisfaction 
are relative values instead of absolute values. Hagerty (2000) analyses individual and 
aggregate data and concludes that subjective well-being is affected by the social 
comparison effect of the subject’s income. He also explains that some literature does not 
support social comparison because the researchers only emphasize the average effect and 
ignore the characteristics of income distribution, such as its range and. Yngwe et al. (2003) 
suggest that social comparison is a mechanism in the relationship between income and 
health. Clark and Oswald (1998) establish an economic model to describe the relationship 
between the individual utility function and comparison behaviour.  
In addition to the aforementioned discussion, there are a few papers discussing 
the relationship between other factors such as social mobility, occupation, consumer 
culture, and genes, life events and health (Bartley and Plewis, 1997; Karasek and Theorell, 
1990; Marmot et al., 1991; Kawachi and Kennedy, 2002; Rosengren, 1993; Helsing and 
Szklo, 1981; Brown, 1978; Hayakawa et al., 1992a).  
 
2.2 The Measure of Empirical Variables 
2.2.1 The measure of health status                
The majority of empirical literature uses death rate, life expectancy, and self-
assessed health as the indicators of measuring the health status because they are the 
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primary available indicators in most health reports and surveys. Infant mortality rate and 
population mortality rate are the two most used indicators in the literature. The advantage 
of death rate is that it is accurate and objective whereas its weakness is that it is not 
sensitive to detect the prevalence of everyday illness and diseases.  
Life expectancy overcomes this weak point. It is computed from cardinal 
mortality rates and it reveals the average expected life span at every age. The flaw of life 
expectancy is that it is not sensitive to death rate when the death rate is small.  
Self-assessed health is a direct way to understand individual’s health status. 
Several measures such as Short Form 12 (SF-12), Short Form 36 (SF-36), and other 
general questions are used in the literature. The difference between these measures is the 
number of questions in the questionnaire. SF12 questionnaire composes 12 questions and 
SF36 questionnaire comprises 36 questions. In the process of dealing with SF12 and SF36, 
each question has a score and the total score of all questions is converted to a final score 
in physical and mental dimensions respectively.  Another question measuring general 
health is: would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor in general?  
The drawback of self-assessed health indicators is that it is too hard to know exactly what 
the respondents mean which is very subjective. When people think their health is good, it 
is difficult to know the difference from those who say their health is very good. Although 
this weakness exists, many studies such as Wilkinson (1996), Idler and Benyamini (1997), 
McGee et al. (1998), and Contoyannis and Jones (2004) suggest that self-assessed health 
is a good predictor of subsequent mortality which does not systematically vary by 
socioeconomic characteristics. 
Death rate and life expectancy are the national or ecological data. Many studies 
analysing the cross-country or cross-state data use these two indicators whereas self-
 22 
 
assessed health is observed at the micro-level data so that it is utilized in a number of 
studies whose interest is on the association between health status and income at individual 
level.     
2.2.2 The Measure of Income Inequality or Relative Deprivation of Income   
How to measure income inequality or the relative deprivation of income might 
affect the conclusion of health income hypotheses test. Income inequality is an aggregate 
concept. Hence, it cannot be a measure on an individual basis.   
Champernowne (1974) suggests seven criteria for a good indicator of inequality.4 
The more criteria an indicator meets, the better indicator it is. The Gini coefficient, 
variance, standard deviation and the ratio of upper quantile and lower quantile are 
frequently used as the measure of income inequality in literature. However, do different 
measures result in different conclusions? Kawachi and Kennedy (1997) examine 6 
different measures of income inequality including the Gini coefficient, the decile ratio, the 
proportions of total income earned by the bottom 50%, 60%, 70% of households 
respectively, the Robin Hood index, the Atkinson index, and Theil’s entropy and conclude 
that the choice of income distribution measure does not apparently alter the result that 
income inequality is linked to higher mortality.   
According to Runciman (1996), the definition of relative deprivation refers to ‘the 
extent of the difference between [some] desired situation and that of the person desiring 
                                                   
4
 1. Familiarity and convenience for computation or estimation from statistics in a readily available 
form. 2. Impartiality between persons, in the sense that they depend only on the frequency 
distribution of income and not at all on the order in which individuals are ranked within the 
distribution, and thus not at all on the association of income with other characteristics such as 
wealth, power, political advantage, race or health. 3. Invariance with respect to the number of 
persons receiving income. 4. Invariance with respect to uniform increase (or decrease) of the size 
of income. 5. Pigou-Dalton efficiency. 6. Range from zero to one. 7. Suitability as a specialist 
measure of one particular aspect of inequality. 
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it’ 5 . Eibner and Evans (2005) develop an indicator named RD to measure relative 
deprivation based on Runciman’s definition and subsequent theory developed by Yitzhaki 
(1979). The equation is  = 1 ⁄ ∑ (
 − 
)∀
 > 
 . This measure posits that the 
relative deprivation of individual i is driven by the income of individual j who earns more 
than yi in a reference group with N individuals. Li and Zhu (2006) construct three relative 
deprivation indices following Eibner and Evans (2005) as the indicator for relative 
income. The indices are relative deprivation of absolute income (RDA), relative 
deprivation of log income (RDL), relative deprivation over individual income (RDI), and 
individual rank. The definition of RDA is the same as RD defined by Eibner and Evans. 
RDL replaces income with log income in the definition of RDA. RDI is defined by 
 
⁄ . The index of individual rank is defined by the individual’s centile rank with in 
a reference group (where the income is sorted in the ascending order).    
2.2.3 Other Characteristics 
Demographic variables usually controlled for in the research are age, gender, 
education, marital status, and occupation. Educational attainment is a proxy for 
investment in human capital. The accumulation of human capital plausibly has a positive 
relationship with income. Education is not only a prediction of future earning but it also 
increases people’s knowledge of avoiding health risk factors. Elo and Preston (1996) use 
US data and reveal the significant difference in mortality rather across educational 
attainment groups among men and women in the early 1980s. Mortality rates according to 
educational differences are larger for men than for women and larger for people at 
working age than for people of retired age. Winkleby et al. (1992) suggest that adult 
                                                   
5
 A person can be said to in the situation of relative deprivation of X when (i) he does not have X, 
(ii) he sees the other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or expected 
time, as having X (whether or not this is in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as 
feasible that he should have X. 
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health behaviours such as smoking and exercise more closely associate with educational 
attainment than with income or occupation. Meanwhile, educational attainment is also a 
reflection of both family background and personal traits.  
With respect to occupation, the relationship reflects a more complicated 
interaction of not only social classes but also income and psychosocial pathways such as 
stress and social networks etc. Besides these variables, geographical or ecological 
variables should also be taken into consideration to control for environmental effects.  
 
2.3 Theory 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) summarize the conclusions of 169 papers relevant 
to the relative income hypothesis and income inequality hypothesis and sort out those 
papers into three categories: wholly supportive, partially supportive and unsupportive (see 
Table 2-1). For example, in cross-national studies, Legrand (1987), Waldmann (1992) and 
Wilkinson (1992) are wholly supportive to the hypotheses whereas Judge (1995), 
Gravelle et al. (2002) and Wildman et al. (2003) do not find evidence in support of the 
hypothesis.  
At the level of states, regions and metropolitan areas, the wholly supporting 
studies are, for example, Blakely et al. (2001), Kawachi and Kennedy (1997) and Chiang 
(1999). The unsupportive studies are, for example, Mellor and Milyo (2002), Deaton and 
Lubotsky (2003) and Henderson et al. (2004).  
The wholly supporting studies using the data of small areas such as counties and 
neighbourhood are, for example, Soobader and LeClere (1999) and Gold et al. (2001). 
The opposite studies are such as Franzini and Spears (2003) and Hou and Myles (2005). 
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They find that majority of studies (approximately 70 per cent) suggest that 
income inequality worsens average health status. However, there is a phenomenon that 
the studies using large area data are more likely supportive than those using small area 
data. They argue that income inequality in large area is a good measure of the scale of 
social stratification or the degree of social hierarchy rather than in a small area. Another 
argument to explain this phenomenon is aggregate bias proposed by Gravelle et al. (2002). 
This thesis follows this argument.  
 
Table 2-1 Summary of results of 169 analyses of the relation between income distribution 
and population health contained in 155 papers (In parentheses: homicide studies) 
 
Wholly 
Supportive 
Partially 
Supportive Unsupportive Total 
Wholly 
supportive as per 
cent of all 
excluding 
partially 
supportive (%) 
 
Only sig. + 
findings 
Some sig. + 
and some null 
No sig. + 
findings All studies 
Level 1 30 (11) 9 6 45 (11) 83 
Level 2 45 (13) 21 17 83 (13) 73 
Level 3 12(2) 14 14 (1) 40 (3) 45 
Total 87 (26) 44 37 (1) 168 (27) 70 
ˆLevel 1: nations; Level 2: states, regions and cities; Level 3: counties, tracts and parishes 
Ref: Wilkinson and Pickett (2006). 
           
The aggregation bias might be generated if one uses aggregate data to investigate 
the individual health income relationship. Gravelle et al. (2002) say that ‘there are serious 
conceptual difficulties in using aggregate cross-sections as a means of testing hypotheses 
about the effect of income, and its distribution, on the health of individuals’ (p. 577). 
Consider the individual model: 
(2.1)				 =  + 
 + 

 +  +  +     
where mik is the mortality risk of individual i in country k, yik is his/her income, 
and eik is an error term. Rik is a variable reflecting the relative income hypothesis that an 
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individual’s health depends on the income of others as well as his own income. zik is a 
vector of non-income variables affecting health.  
Average Eq. (2.1) by the population in county k denoted by Nk and Eq. (2.2) is 
obtained: 
(2.2)				 =  + 
 +  +  +  +                    
where k
i
ikk Nmm ∑=  is population mortality in country k, k
i
ikk Nyy ∑=  
is average income, k
i
ikk Nys ∑= 2  is the mean of square average income. Likewise,
k
i
ikk NRR ∑= , k
i
ikk Nzz ∑=  and .k
i
ikk Nee ∑=  
However, an aggregate model typically looks like Eq. (2.3): 
(2.3)				 = ! + !
 + !

 + !∀ + #                                      
In Eq. (2.3) mk is population mortality rate, yk is per capita income, 
	is the 
square of average income and Gk is the measure of income inequality in country k. Since, 
the coefficients in Eq. (2.2) are of interest instead of these in Eq. (2.3); the question is 
whether we can recover the parameter of Eq. (2.2) from Eq. (2.3).  
To recover the parameters for Eq. (2.2) from a specification such as Eq. (2.3): let 
αjo denote the coefficient obtained from regressing the variable o on the variable j. 
Gravelle et al. regress sk, Rk, and zk on the explanatory variables in Eq. (2.3), respectively.             
 
(2.4)				 = % + &∋(
 + &∋)(

 + &∗(∀ + + 
 
(2.5)				 = & + &∋−
 + &∋)−

 + &∗−∀ + .
 
              
(2.6)				 = 0 + &∋1
 + &∋)1

 + &∗1∀ + 2 
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Substitute Eq. (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) for sk, Rk, and zk respectively, and the Eq. (2.7) 
is obtained.  
 
(2.7)				 = ( + % + & + 0) + 4 + &∋( + &∋− + &∋15
 
																																+4&∋)( + &∋)− + &∋)15

 + (&∗( + &∗− + &∗1)∀					 
                 +(. + 2 + + + ) 
Rearranging Eq. (2.7), we obtain Eq (2.8). 
 
(2.8)				! =  +&∋( +&∋− + &∋1			 
            	! = &∋)( + &∋)− + &∋)1		 
             ! = &∗( + &∗− + &∗1 
Assume Rk and Gk are the same variables (αGR=1) and ignore the variable zk to 
simplify the processor of analysis. The Eq. (2.8) becomes Eq. (2.9).  
 
(2.9)				! =  + &∋( + &∋−			 
             		! = &∋)( + &∋)−		 
            			! = &∗( +  
 
The b1 and b3 will be unbiased only under some conditions. For example, b1 will 
be equal to β1 when β2=0 or  αys=0 and one of both coefficients, β3=0 or αyR=0. According 
to the previous studies, it is a little implausible that αys and αyR are equal to 0. It should be 
a positive association. Thus, the b1 will be unbiased only when the individual mortality 
risk-income relationship is linear and when the relative income hypothesis does not hold.  
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The coefficient of interest, b3, will be unbiased when either β2 or αGS is equal to 0. 
It is a little implausible that there is no association between the indicators of the income 
inequality index and the average of square income. This relationship is positive 
theoretically. Hence, b3 is only unbiased when the association between income and 
individual mortality risk is linear. When the individual mortality risk-income association 
is nonlinear (β2 ≠ 0), the estimated coefficient of income inequality is not identical to the 
coefficient of relative income on individual mortality risk, even if the inequality index is 
perfectly identical to the index of relative income (αGR =1).   
Putting these restrictions together, it is unlikely that an equation like (2.2) be 
recovered from (2.3). Gravelle et al. (2002) suggest that disentangling the individual 
health income relationship is the first step to test the relative income hypothesis. If this 
relationship is nonlinear, attempts to test the relative income hypothesis with aggregate 
level data are unlikely to be fruitful. Meanwhile, the estimates of the effect of absolute 
income on health are also likely biased. The individual health income relationship may 
contaminate the results of testing the income inequality hypothesis with aggregate data if 
it is nonlinear. They also say ‘Even in the absence of confounding by omitted health 
affecting variables, and with much more accurate data than are currently available, 
aggregate level studies are incapable of distinguishing between the direct effect of income 
inequality on individual health and the artificial effects of nonlinearity in the individual 
health income relationship.’ 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Compared to the absolute income hypothesis, the relative income and income 
inequality hypotheses have attracted more attention recently. The key point of the relative 
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income hypothesis and the income inequality hypothesis is economic transition. People 
emphasize their relative income rather than the absolute income when the country 
becomes affluent. Social comparison provides a theoretical explanation for the relative 
income hypothesis and income inequality hypothesis. However, Wilkinson and Pickett 
(2006) show that the papers using small area data or individual level data do not tend to 
support the income inequality hypothesis. This conclusion is consistent with the argument 
of aggregate bias (Gravelle et al., 2002).  
Two questions therefore motivate the rest of this thesis. First, is the evidence in 
Taiwanese case supporting the income inequality hypothesis a truth or an artefact and are 
the absolute income hypothesis and the income inequality hypothesis coexistent or 
exclusionary? Secondly, does the absolute income still significantly affect health status 
even if Taiwan has passed the stage of economic transition?  Chapter 3 combining the 
mortality data and family income and expenditure survey data avoids the aggregation bias 
to test the absolute income hypothesis and the income inequality hypothesis under the 
assumption of health social gradient. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 use another data set whose 
sample is elder citizens to investigate the relationship between income and self- assessed 
health, the measurement of depression, and life satisfaction. Chapter 4 reveals at once the 
individual’s health income risky relationship and the income related health inequality. 
Chapter 5 attempts to provide a robust result for the test of absolute income hypothesis by 
using the strategies of identification. 
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Chapter 3. Socioeconomic determinants of mortality in Taiwan: 
Combining individual data and aggregate data6 
3.1 Introduction 
With the increase of health expenditure in many countries, there has been an 
increase in health related research. Prevention and treatment are the two substantial 
approaches in this area. The investigation of a relationship between health and income is 
one part of the former topic because it proposes methods of prevention through social 
phenomena. There is no doubt that mental health affects physical health. Many factors 
might have impacts on mental health and further affect physical health through several 
mediators. Stress is a mediator discussed in a vast literature. On the other hand, there are 
also factors that affect physical health directly. In other words, socio-economic factors 
might affect physical health by direct and indirect pathways.  
A lot of literature has been devoted to the investigation of social phenomena 
affecting health status. According to Wilkinson (1996), the phenomena can be 
summarized as follows: 1. Financial insecurity; 2. Unemployment; 3. Social contact; 4. 
Social mobility; 5. Occupational class; 6. Consumer culture; 7. Other factors. The 
aforementioned phenomena are potential determinants of health. These determinants 
affect health status through stress or other psychological responses. However, those 
determinants are also relevant to socioeconomic status. Thus, appropriate policies can not 
only improve these phenomena to accumulate social capital but also promote the health 
status of the whole society while reducing somewhat health expenditure in the future. 
                                                   
6
 This chapter is collaborated with Dr. Leon-Gonzalez and has been published on Health Policy 99 
(2011) 23-36.  
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Many empirical studies have investigated the relationship between income and 
health and two important hypotheses are the absolute income hypothesis and the income 
inequality hypothesis (for excellent reviews of this wide literature see chapter 2).  
Numerous studies using aggregate data have found support for the income 
inequality hypothesis (see Table 2-1). However, they have been criticized by some 
authors who argued that only individual level data can be used to discriminate between 
the competing hypotheses (e.g. Gravelle, 1998; Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2000; Gravelle et 
al., 2002; Wildman et al., 2003; Jen et al., 2008). On the other hand, studies that analyze 
individual-level data often use self-reported measures of health, which are more prone to 
measurement error than mortality data. There are studies that analysed individual data on 
income and mortality (e.g. Fiscella and Franks, 1997; Daly et al., 1998; Fiscella and 
Franks, 2000; Lochner et al., 2001; Fritjers, Haisken-DeNew and Shields, 2005). 
However, individual data on mortality is not available in many countries. Furthermore, 
since mortality is a low probability event at the individual level, individual data on 
mortality provides a limited amount of information, due to the small number of people 
who die in each wave of the dataset.  
In this chapter aggregate mortality data is used, but following a recent strand of 
epidemiological literature (Prentice and Sheppard, 1995; Salway and Wakefield, 2005), 
individual level data on income and other socio-economic characteristics are also used to 
ameliorate aggregation bias. The econometric approach is similar also to the econometric 
methods proposed for repeated cross-sections by Deaton (1985) and Browning, Deaton 
and Irish (1985) (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 (p.p. 770-773) for a summary of the 
econometric methods and Salway and Wakefield (2001) for a review of the related 
epidemiological literature). The approach consists on first defining a model at the 
individual level, and then estimating the econometric model that results from aggregating 
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the individual level model over individuals in a county. This approach is made feasible by 
using individual level data to estimate county averages of regressors.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the characteristics of 
income inequality and mortality in Taiwan. Section 3 briefly discusses the concept of 
aggregation bias. Section 4 explains the econometric approach followed in this paper to 
avoid the aggregation bias and explains the limitations of our econometric approach with 
respect to using individual-level data for both the dependent and the independent 
variables. Section 5 describes the data and section 6 presents the results. Section 7 
concludes. 
      
3.2 Income distribution and mortality in Taiwan 
Taiwan’s income distribution attracts many researchers’ attention because the 
rapid development and limited changes in the income distribution in the past decades. 
After Taiwan government implemented an array of reforms such as land reform and a 
vigorous industrialization process, the society had drastic evolution. The agricultural 
share of labour force went down from slightly less than 30 percent in 1979 to 10 percent 
in 1995. The labour force in service sector replaced that in the industrial sector gradually 
and now it is almost half of labour force. Due to the change of social structure, the labour 
force participation increased significantly. Meanwhile, the other changes, for example, the 
fall of family size and increase of schooling level of population also contributed to the 
rapid development. However, the income inequality did not expand with the development. 
This process of development is different from the process of most western countries, 
especially the US and the UK. Table 3-1 shows the comparison of Gini coefficient in the 
selected countries.     
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A large literature has investigated Taiwan’s income inequality. These studies7 
investigate the causes of income inequality from different points of view. For brevity 
these studies are not summarized in detail here.  
According to the life statistics from the Department of Health, at the beginning of 
20th century Taiwan’s crude mortality rate was 33.7‰. In the middle century, it dropped 
down to 11.5‰ and it became less than 10‰ after 1951. After 1963, the crude mortality 
in Taiwan was maintained at approximately 5‰. Figure 3.1 shows the crude mortality and 
Gini coefficient data. The trends of Gini coefficient and mortality are both going up over 
time. Mortality has changed from 4.7‰ to 6‰ (in the period 1979 - 2005), whereas the 
Gini coefficient has gone from 0.278 to 0.345 (in the same period). 
 
                                                   
7
 Fei et al (1979), Kuo et al. (1983), Jiang (1992), Gindling et al. (1995), Fields and O’Hara (1996), 
Hung (1996), Chu (1997), Fields and Leary (1997), Fournier (1997), and Bourguignon et al (1998a, 
1998b), etc. 
Figure 3.1 Crude Mortality Rate and Gini Coefficient 
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Table 3-1 Income Distribution in selected countries   
Country Year 
Percentage share of 
household income, by 
percentile groups of 
households (%) 
Ratio of 
income share of 
highest 20% 
and lowest 20% 
households 
Gini 
coefficient 
Lowest 
20% Highest 20% 
1.Low-income countries      
Vietnam 2002** 7.5 45.4 6.05 0.370 
India 1999** 8.9 43.3 4.87 0.325 
Indonesia 2002** 8.4 43.3 5.15 0.343 
2. Mid-income countries      
China 2001** 4.7 50.0 10.64 0.447 
Philippines 2000** 5.4 52.3 9.69 0.461 
Bulgaria 2001* 6.7 38.9 5.77 0.319 
Thailand 2000** 6.1 50.0 8.20 .0432 
Colombia 1999* 2.7 61.8 22.89 0.576 
Romania 2002** 7.9 41.0 5.19 0.303 
Brazil 2001* 2.4 63.2 26.33 0.593 
Russian Federation 2002** 8.2 39.3 4.79 0.310 
Malaysia 1997* 4.4 54.3 12.43 0.492 
Mexico 2000* 3.1 59.1 19.06 0.546 
3.High-income countries      
Taiwan 1980 8.8 36.8 4.17 0.277 
 1994 7.3 39.2 5.38 0.318 
 2004 6.7 40.2 6.03 0.338 
Korea, Rep 2000 6.2 42.6 6.84 0.352 
New Zealand 1997* 6.4 43.8 6.84 0.362 
Italy 2000* 6.5 42.0 6.46 0.360 
Singapore 2000 2.4 51.0 20.91 0.481 
Canada 1998* 7.0 40.4 5.77 0.331 
Germany 2000* 8.5 36.9 4.34 0.283 
Finland 2000* 9.6 36.7 3.82 0.269 
Hong Kong 2001 3.2 56.5 17.66 0.525 
Sweden 2000* 9.1 36.6 4.02 0.250 
United Kingdom 1999* 6.1 44.0 7.21 0.360 
Japan 1999 8.0 38.9 4.84 0.301 
U.S.A. 2003 4.5 44.4 9.83 0.394 
Norway 2000* 9.6 37.2 3.88 0.258 
Luxembourg 2000* 8.4 38.9 4.63 0.308 
Note: 1. * refers to income shares by percentiles of population and ranked by per capita income. ** 
refers to consumption share by percentiles of population and ranked by per capita consumption. 2. 
Source: World Development Report, 2005 (the World Bank). Korea, Rep.: Social statistics Survey, 
2000. Japan: National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure, 1999. U.S.A Alternative Income 
Estimates in the United States, 2003. Hong Kong: Population Census Main Report, 
2001.Singapore: Singapore Census of Population, 2000. 
Source: the Report of FIES, 2004 
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3.3 Discussion of bias  
To discuss further the concept of aggregation bias mentioned in Chapter 2, 
consider the following individual level model for the relationship between a measure of 
health (hitk) and some regressors Xitk: 
),()1.3( itkitkkitk Xfh εβα +=  
where i refers to the individual, t refers to time, k refers to county, εitk is an unobserved 
error term and f(.) is a known function. Suppose a researcher does not have observations 
on individual data for hitk and Xitk, but observes instead the county level variables Xtk and 
htk: 
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where Ntk is the population size in the kth county in period t. The aggregation bias is likely 
to arise if the researcher attempts to estimate the following aggregate level model: 
),()2.3( ** tktkktk Xfh εβα +=  
Note that the true relationship between Xtk and htk, implied by Eq. (3.1), is: 
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In general, Eq. (3.2) and Eq. (3.3) are very different. Hence, estimation of Eq. 
(3.2) will give biased estimates of αk and β. However, if f was a linear function, then Eq. 
(3.2) and Eq. (3.3) would be identical, and hence the aggregation bias would not arise.  
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Gravelle (1998) and Gravelle, Wildman and Sutton (2002) note a typical example 
in which aggregation bias does arise. Assume that the individual level model is given by: 
itkitkitkkitk IIh εββα +++= 221)4.3(   
where I represents income and I2 is square income. Some cross-country studies might use 
GDP per capita as a measure of average income, but would not have a measure of the 
average value of I2itk . Hence, if Eq. (3.4) defines the true relationship between health and 
income, a regression of mortality on GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared would 
suffer from the problem of omitted variable bias (Maddala, 2001(p.p. 159-163)), because 
GDP per capita squared is often not a good approximation of 
tk
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i
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3.4 Econometric Approach 
3.4.1 Model 
The individual-level model is as follows: 
Yitk = 1      the individual dies with probability Pitk 
Yitk = 0     the individual survives with probability 1- Pitk  
where  
kitkitk XP αβ +=)5.3(  
i, t, k denote the ith individual, tth year, and kth county, respectively, and Xitk is a vector of 
regressors. The constant αk captures the effect of time-invariant county specific 
characteristics that affect the probability of dying. To simplify the process of estimation, it 
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is assumed that the probability of dying depends linearly on the regressors8, but note that 
the regressors might include powers of income, age and other variables. Hence, this 
approach does not rule out the possibility that health and income might be related non-
linearly, as argued by previous studies (e.g. Gravelle, 1998; Gravelle et al., 2002).  
The expected value of Yitk, expressed as E(Yitk), is equal to 
1*Pr(Yitk=1)+0*Pr(Yitk=0)= Pr(Yitk=1). Therefore, the model can be defined as  
 itkkitkitk XY εαβ ++=)6.3(   
where εitk is an error with zero mean. Furthermore, the average value of Yitk in county k in 
year t is  
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where Ntk is the population size in the kth county and tth period. Note that Ytk is the 
mortality rate in county k in period t. Hence, Eq. (3.6) implies that Yitk can be expressed as: 
tkktktk XY εαβ ++=)7.3(     
where Xtk is a vector containing the average values of the regressors in Xitk: 
∑
=
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and: 
                                                   
8
 Non-linear links between the probability and the set of regressors could also be considered 
following the approach in Prentice and Sheppard (1995).  
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In this study, the data on Ytk (mortality data) are available and the sample averages 
of Xitk, ∑
=
=
tkN
i
itk
tk
tk XN
X
~
1
)(
~
1
ˆ
, with tktk NN <
~
, are used to proxy for Xtk. Given the large 
sample size used to calculate these averages (see Table 3-2), the bias introduced because 
of measurement error is negligible (Prentice and Sheppard, 1995; Salway and Wakefield, 
2008). Prentice and Sheppard (1995) by means of a Monte Carlo experiment found that 
when 100~ =tkN , the bias was about -2.0%, with a 95% confidence interval of (-3.8%, -
0.1%). Moreover, they found that the correction they proposed in order to reduce the 
measurement bias, which is superior asymptotically, in practice was not effective when 
tkN
~
 was at least 100. The Monte Carlo experiment carried out by Salway and Wakefield 
confirms that the measurement error bias would be negligible in our case. They found that 
even when tkN
~
  is as small as 25, the bias is only about 6%.  
Note that the main difference in practice of our approach with other aggregate 
data studies is that the latter implicitly assume that E(X2) can be approximated with 
(E(X))2, where X denotes an explanatory variable, and E(.) is the expected value operator. 
However, this assumption is not necessary here, while the aggregate level model Eq. (3.7) 
is still consistent with the individual level model Eq. (3.5), which allows for non-linear 
links between health and other variables.  
With respect to identification of the parameters, note that in our case the vector of 
regressors Xitk will contain a measure of income (e.g. )ln( itkI ), squared income (e.g. 
2)][ln( itkI ) and a measure of inequality (e.g. tkG ). Hence in the aggregate level model 
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(3.7) Xtk will contain ))]([ln()),(ln( 2itkitk IEIE  and tkG . Given that 
( ) [ ]22 ))(ln()ln(var))]([ln( itkitkitk IEIIE +=  is expressed, the aggregate level model 
(3.7) can be written as: 
 [ ] ( ) tkktktkGitkIitkIitkI
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From this expression it is clear that the parameters are identified even if one chooses 
( ))ln(var itkI  as a measure of inequality (i.e. ( ))ln(var itktk IG = , but in such a case high 
correlation between the regressors might be encountered, and hence tests of individual 
significance might have low power. In this chapter Gtk is a Gini coefficient, whose 
correlation with ))]([ln( 2itkIE  is only 0.12. One could also use other measures of 
inequality such as the 90/10 ratio, which is likely to have smaller correlation with 
))]([ln( 2itkIE  and )][ln( itkIE . 
Fixed effects and random effects models are used to estimate the parameters and 
the results are compared. However, it is possible that the error term εtk has 
heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation. Hence, robust fixed effects estimation is used to 
correct this bias. As for random effects models, the robust population averaged estimation 
is used to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 3-2 Number of values to calculate county averages of regressors: Minimum value, 
5% percentile, Mean, 95% percentile and Maximum value. 
Year Minimum 5% Mean 95% Maximum 
1 291 896 2357 5637 6755 
2 286 850 2342 5211 6740 
3 453 1110 3344 8155 9590 
4 457 1077 3269 8474 9555 
5 458 1089 3392 9165 10037 
6 449 1113 3490 9902 9957 
7 444 981 3249 10050 10465 
8 449 989 3364 10976 10989 
9 407 969 3349 11011 11042 
10 400 895 3283 10795 11143 
11 359 941 3236 10695 11139 
12 381 871 3155 8778 10718 
13 331 840 3061 8576 10091 
14 338 828 3038 8420 10155 
15 294 752 2993 8509 9853 
16 289 830 2975 8358 10001 
17 288 760 2930 8386 9845 
18 235 728 2922 8438 9959 
19 258 682 2868 8153 9929 
20 399 788 2508 7459 9332 
21 425 711 2328 6891 9470 
22 374 817 2282 5771 9468 
23 371 843 2287 5782 9036 
24 379 873 2170 5582 8981 
25 367 815 2164 5278 9145 
26 353 805 2104 5477 7169 
27 595 839 2152 5504 6889 
28 617 743 2085 5302 6744 
29 628 800 2061 5323 6437 
 
3.4.2 Scope and Limitations 
The aggregate approach proposed in Prentice and Sheppard (1995) produces 
consistent estimates of the parameters of the individual-level model under a set of 
assumptions which is more restrictive than would be necessary if individual-level data 
were available. The crucial extra assumption is that the error term in the individual-level 
model is uncorrelated with the regressors. This assumption could be relaxed to some 
extent by using fixed effects and individual-level data. That is, individual-level data are 
able to effectively control for all individual characteristics that are time-invariant, even for 
those that are not observed.  In the aggregate approach described here, however, only the 
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observed individual characteristics (e.g. income, age, education, occupation, gender, 
etcetera) can be controlled.  
Another assumption is that tkXˆ  is a consistent estimator of Xtk and that tkN
~
 is 
sufficiently large. This requires that the sample used to calculate tkXˆ  is representative of 
the population in that county and year. Since this sample is taken at a particular date 
within the year, it is necessary to assume that  tkXˆ  is roughly constant during the year. 
Note that in this chapter income adjusted by the number of household members is used as 
one of the regressors. Thus, if Xtk represents the yearly average, it is implicitly assumed 
that the probabilities of death and birth do not vary over the year as much as to make the 
estimator tkXˆ  inconsistent.   
 
3.5 Data 
This chapter combines the crude mortality rate of district obtained from Life 
Statistic of Department of Health of Taiwan and the individual socioeconomic data 
obtained from Family Income and Expenditure Survey to create a panel data set at district 
level. The definition of crude mortality rate is the proportion of total deaths per 1000 
people in a year. It is accurate statistic data reported by hospitals. Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey is a large survey which has been conducted every year since 1974. 
The purpose of Family Income and Expenditure Survey is to analyse family’s income and 
consumption structure. It comprises detailed information: 1. the socioeconomic status of 
the head of household; 2. the socioeconomic status of income earners; 3. income pattern; 
4. distributions of disposable income, final consumption, expenditure, and saving; 5. the 
 42 
 
changes in financial assets and liabilities; 6. fixed capital consumption and gross capital 
formations of family and small scale unincorporated enterprise operated by family.  
The number of household samples drawn from each district was proportional to 
its population size. The number of households in the survey varies from year to year. The 
smallest total sample size, in terms of households, is 9033 in 1977 and the largest one is 
16435 in every year from 1983 to 1994. The Family Income Expenditure Survey contains 
data on the members of each household. The smallest total sample size, in terms of 
number of individuals, is 47411 in 2004 and the largest one is 77393 in 1983. 
Total districts in Taiwan now are twenty three. These twenty-three districts 
include sixteen counties, five cities, and two municipalities governed directly under the 
jurisdiction of the Central Government (Taipei city and Kaohsiung city). However, the 
created panel data set is unbalanced because there were only twenty-one counties before 
1982.9  
The created panel data set comprises 29 years from 1976 to 2004 and 23 counties. 
The total observations are 655 (23 districts multiplied by 29 years but subtracting 12 
observations which are missing because two districts have no data from 1976 to 1981). 
The dependent variable is the number of deaths per 1000 people so that it ranges between 
0 and 1000 instead of between 0 and 1. The econometric approach here does not take 
explicitly into account that the dependent variable is bounded. However, it is not a 
problem because none of fitted values violated this restriction (the fitted values for the 
regression shown in Table 3-6 varied between 4.48 and 7.92, with mean 5.827). Two 
explanatory variables, the mean of log of disposable income and the long-run mean of log 
                                                   
9
 These two extra districts are Hsinchu city and Chiayi city, which were two towns that belonged to 
Hsinchu county and Chiayi county originally. Because the population in these two cities grew, they 
were upgraded to the same level as county. Roughly, Hsinchu county and Chiayi county maintain 
the same scale of territory. 
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disposable income, are concerned in testing the absolute income hypothesis and Gini 
coefficient is used to test the income inequality hypothesis10 . If the mean of log of 
disposable income or the long-run mean of log disposable income has a negative and 
significant effect on crude mortality rate, the absolute income hypothesis will be 
supported. Similarly, the income inequality hypothesis will be supported if Gini 
coefficient has a positive and significant effect on crude mortality rate. The three 
concerned explanatory variables in the panel data set are produced from individual data. 
Income refers to disposable household income at individual level divided by two income 
equivalent scales. One is the number of members in the household, named income 
equivalent scale 1, and the other one is as the formula: ,)5.0( 9.0childrenadult ×+  
named income equivalent scale 2.  
The other explanatory variables in the created panel data set are: age, age squared, 
gender, 5 variables of educational achievement, and 7 variables for occupation. Those 
variables are the districts’ means which are computed from individual data. Therefore, the 
dummy variables of gender, education achievement, and occupation in individual data 
transform into the numerical variables in the created panel data set.  
In the individual data, education is categorized into 5 groups according to the 
number of years enrolled at school and occupation into 7 groups according to the type of 
job. The five groups in education are less than 1 (illiteracy), 1-6 (primary school), 7-9 
(junior high school), 10-12 (senior high school), and more than 12 (university and 
postgraduate). Note that these variables enter the individual level Eq. (3.5) as dummy 
variables, which imply that they enter Eq. (3.7) as proportions. Because the sum of these 
proportions equals one, only four of them are included in the model. With respect to 
                                                   
10
 Gini coefficient at county level is not available in Family Income and Expenditure Survey. It is 
computed in stata according to the formula of Gini coefficient.   
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occupation, the seven groups are: 1. Professionals, 2. Clerks, 3. Technicians and associate 
professionals, 4. Service workers, shop and market sales workers, 5. Agricultural, animal, 
husbandry, forestry, and fishing workers, 6. Product machine operators and related 
workers, 7. Unemployed.  
These occupation variables are denoted from occu1 to occu7. Of course, the sum 
of these seven variables equals to one too, so only 6 of them enter the regression. The 
definition of household disposable income is total receipts minus non-consumption 
expenditure. 11  Further, the household disposable income is divided by two 
aforementioned income scales to obtain the individual disposable income. We then 
calculate the average of individual disposable income and individual disposable income 
squared as explained near to Eq. (3.7).  
Table 3-3 is a statistical description of created panel data set. The definition of 
variables is displayed in Table A-1. The average mortality rate at county level is 0.58%. 
The average log income of all counties across 29 years is between 11.46 and 11.74 which 
approximate to NT$94,700 and NT$125,300 respectively. The Gini coefficient is between 
0.258 and 0.282. The average log income of county divided by equivalence scale 2 is 
bigger than by equivalence scale 1 whereas Gini coefficient calculated by scale 2 is 
smaller than by scale 1. This is different from the argument of some literature that average 
income has a positive relationship with Gini coefficient. The reason causing this 
circumstance is the weight of children in the equivalence scale. In scale 1 the weight of 
children is 1 which is the same as that of adults whereas it is 0.5 in scale 2. Meanwhile, 
this circumstance reflects that high income households might have fewer children than 
low income households.     
                                                   
11
 Total receipts include six terms. They are compensation of employees, entrepreneurial income, 
property income, imputed rent income, current transfer receipts, and miscellaneous receipts. The 
non-consumption is composed of interest and current transfer expenditures. 
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Table 3-3 Summary Statistics (N=23, T=29) 
Variable Mean         Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Deaths per 1000 people 5.827 1.39 1.88 10.2 
Mean of log disposable 
income 1† 11.457 0.745 9.672 12.755 
Mean of square log 
disposable income 1† 132.093 16.797 93.855 162.932 
Gini coefficient 1† 0.282 0.026 0.218 0.388 
Mean of log disposable 
income 2†† 11.74 0.702 10.021 12.948 
Mean of square log 
disposable income 2†† 138.577 16.232 100.65 167.879 
Gini coefficient 2†† 0.258 0.028 0.189 0.375 
Age  30.894 4.211 21.065 41.513 
Gender 0.505 0.01 0.46 0.562 
Edu 1(less than 1 year) 0.186 0.044 0.081 0.303 
Edu 2(1 - 6 years) 0.346 0.068 0.189 0.533 
Edu 3(7 – 9 years) 0.166 0.018 0.117 0.25 
Edu 4(10 – 12 years) 0.197 0.051 0.065 0.299 
Edu 5(More than 12 years) 0.104 0.063 0.018 0.366 
Occu1 0.026 0.011 0.005 0.071 
Occu2 0.031 0.029 0 0.14 
Occu3 0.049 0.02 0.011 0.128 
Occu4 0.079 0.019 0.036 0.148 
Occu5 0.09 0.076 0.0002 0.304 
Occu6 0.146 0.04 0.024 0.244 
Occu7 0.58 0.042 0.46 0.719 
Long-run mean of Gini 
coefficient 1† 0.282 0.015 0.263 0.3 
Long-run mean of Gini 
coefficient 2†† 0.258 0.017 0.236 0.32 
Long-run mean of log 
disposable income 1† 11.457 0.174 11.251 11.856 
Long-run mean of log 
disposable income 2†† 11.74 0.172 11.525 12.129 
† Variables are generated by income equivalent scale 1 
†† Variables are generated by income equivalent scale 2. 
 
Table 3-4 shows the average Gini coefficient in each district over 29 years. The 
variation in each district over 29 years is small. The range of standard deviation is 
between 0.012 and 0.035. Kaohsiung city and Taipei city which are the only two 
municipalities directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Government have the smallest 
and the largest fluctuation of Gini coefficient. Table 3-5 shows the county Gini coefficient 
and country Gini coefficient in each year.  
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One thing worth to mention is the correlation between the average income and 
Gini coefficient. If both variables have a high correlation, the tests of the absolute income 
effect and the income inequality effect would have low power. It may not be possible to 
disentangle the two income hypotheses separately. However, this problem does not arise 
here because the correlation coefficients are 0.1 and 0.2 for the two alternative 
equivalence scales use in this chapter. 
 
Table 3-4 The mean of Gini coefficient in each district 
District Mean [Std. Dev.] District Mean [Std. Dev.] 
Taipei County 0.275 [0.017] Pingtung County 0.274 [0.02] 
Yilan County 0.278 [0.024] Taitung County 0.306 [0.033] 
Taoyuan County 0.267 [0.013] Hualien County 0.317 [0.022] 
Hsinchu County 0.265 [0.015] Penghu County 0.304 [0.032] 
Miaoli County 0.267 [0.05] Keelung City 0.271 [0.022] 
Taichung County 0.269 [0.02] Taichung City 0.287 [0.021] 
Changhua County 0.28 [0.014] Tainan City 0.277 [0.015] 
Natou County 0.298 [0.019] Kaohsiung City 0.278 [0.012] 
Yunlin County 0.276 [0.024] Taipei City 0.294 [0.035] 
Chiayi County 0.289 [0.017] Hsinchu City 0.321 [0.027] 
Tainan County 0.28 [0.02] Chiayi City 0.307 [0.02] 
Kaohsiung County 0.273 [0.014]   
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12
 The county Gini coefficient is computed using the individual disposable income whereas the country Gini coefficient is computed using the 
household disposable income. 
Table 3-5 The county Gini coefficient and Country Gini coefficient in each year12 
          Year 
Gini 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Max 0.335 0.337 0.334 0.312 0.323 0.356 0.342 0.341 0.347 0.355 
Min 0.237 0.219 0.252 0.25 0.233 0.238 0.235 0.254 0.245 0.254 
Mean 
(S.D) 
0.264 
(0.025) 
0.27 
(0.026) 
0.283 
(0.022) 
0.281 
(0.019) 
0.272 
(0.019) 
0.276 
(0.023) 
0.284 
(0.024) 
0.28 
(0.021) 
0.287 
(0.023) 
0.292 
(0.025) 
County 
sample 21 21 21 21 21 21 23 23 23 23 
Country 
Gini 0.28 0.284 0.287 0.285 0.278 0.281 0.283 0.287 0.287 0.291 
           
           Year 
Gini 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Max 0.373 0.345 0.351 0.345 0.363 0.342 0.329 0.338 0.355 0.324 
Min 0.246 0.247 0.253 0.251 0.25 0.257 0.257 0.261 0.259 0.242 
Mean 
(S.D) 
0.292 
(0.033) 
0.287 
(0.022) 
0.291 
(0.027) 
0.294 
(0.026) 
0.29 
(0.03) 
0.291 
(0.024) 
0.292 
(0.022) 
0.298 
(0.022) 
0.29 
(0.023) 
0.278 
(0.024) 
County 
sample 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Country 
Gini 0.296 0.299 0.303 0.303 0.312 0.308 0.312 0.315 0.318 0.317 
           
           Year 
Gini 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  
Max 0.331 0.33 0.322 0.344 0.352 0.35 0.367 0.376 0.375  
Min 0.248 0.246 0.231 0.233 0.241 0.261 0.259 0.239 0.242  
Mean 
(S.D) 
0.279 
(0.024) 
0.277 
(0.021) 
0.277 
(0.023) 
0.277 
(0.028) 
0.28 
(0.032) 
0.297 
(0.026) 
0.294 
(0.028) 
0.289 
(0.033) 
0.283 
(0.033)  
County 
sample 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23  
Country 
Gini 0.317 0.32 0.324 0.325 0.326 0.35 0.345 0.343 0.338  
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3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Fixed effects and random effects 
Robust fixed effect estimation (Wooldridge, 2002 (Section 10.5.4)) allows for 
heteroskedasticity and (intra-group) autocorrelation in the error term13. Meanwhile, a 
random-effects type estimation, using a robust population averaged method 
(Wooldridge, 2002 (Section 10.4.2)) which assumes, unlike the fixed effects, that the 
time-invariant unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables is 
also presented. The robust fixed effects estimation allows for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the error term. Results are shown in Table 3-6. The results with 
random and fixed effects are similar except for the occupational variable. This 
similarity implies that time-invariant omitted determinants of health, which are 
captured in the individual effect, are not much correlated with the included regressors.  
None of the income variables are individually significant. The joint F-test of 
mean of log disposable income and its square term is also insignificant at the 5% level. 
Neither is the F-test significant which is implemented on the three income variables: 
mean of log disposable income, its square term, and Gini coefficient. Thus, no 
evidence is found for either the absolute or income inequality hypotheses.  However, 
an education variable (Edu5) is significant at a 5% level. This is individuals with more 
than 12 years of education have a lower probability of dying (holding other things 
constant). 
                                                   
13
 The residuals from the regressions in Table 3-7 do indeed show positive and significant 
autocorrelation. A negative correlation coefficient might be indicative of selective mortality. 
This implies that after negative shock to the health of a county (i.e. a strong flu epidemic) only 
the stronger individuals remain. If so, the mortality rate in the following period will be smaller, 
because the remaining individuals are stronger. However, I can rule out that there is significant 
selective mortality because the first autoregressive coefficient is estimated to be 0.17 (not 
negative). The positive autocorrelation might be interpreted as omitted regressors that are 
positively correlated over time. For example, one could think of health care infrastructure such 
as number of hospitals or doctors.  
 49 
 
In particular, the probability of dying for an individual with more than 12 
years of education is between 0.56% and 0.59% smaller than the probability for an 
individual whose education level is less than one year. However, in the random effect 
model, individuals who are professionals have a higher probability of dying and the 
probability of dying is 0.68% higher for professionals compared to individuals who 
are unemployed when the other variables are held constant. 
 
Table 3-6 Robust estimation with income equivalent scale 1†. 
 
Fixed Effects Population Averaged 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. 
Mean of log disposable income -1.591 1.276 -1.639 1.242 
Mean of square log disposable 
income 0.089 0.064 0.092 0.063 
Gini coefficient 0.246 0.213 0.193 0.957 
     
Age  -0.394 0.213 -0.393 0.204 
Square of age  0.007* 0.003 0.007** 0.003 
Gender 1.617 2.498 1.627 2.482 
Education     
Edu 2(1 - 6 years) -1.646 1.278 -1.552 1.187 
Edu 3(7 – 9 years) 1.049 2.397 1.336 2.226 
Edu 4(10 – 12 years) -0.346 1.969 -0.104 1.878 
Edu 5(More than 12 years) -5.729** 1.806 -6.044** 1.761 
Occupation††     
Occu1 6.512 3.295 6.706* 3.149 
Occu2 -0.915 2.587 -1.351 2.527 
Occu3 0.145 3.144 -0.416 3.05 
Occu4 -1.616 1.771 -1.887 1.725 
Occu5 -1.03 1.339 -0.586 1.292 
Occu6 2.378 2.048 1.67 1.871 
     
Constant 14.841 7.387 14.896* 7.229 
R2 0.47 - 
N 655 
† The equivalent scale is the number of household members. 
†† Occu1: professionals; Occu2: clerks; Occu3: technicians and associate professionals; 
Occu4: service workers, shop and market sales workers; Occu5: agricultural, animal, 
husbandry, forestry, and fishing workers; Occu6: product machine operators and related 
workers. The comparative group is unemployment. 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
As expected, age appears as a significant determinant of the probability of 
dying. The relationship is nonlinear and the turning point of age is 28. An increase of 
age induces a decrease in the individual probability of dying before the age of 28. 
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After this age, the relationship becomes positive. However, there is no significant 
evidence for the effect of gender. Table 3-7 shows that results are similar when the 
income equivalent scale 1 is replaced by income equivalent scale 2. 
 
Table 3-7 Robust estimation with income equivalent scale 2†. 
 
Fixed Effects Population Averaged 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. 
Mean of log disposable income -1.251 1.389 -1.291 1.354 
Mean of square log disposable 
income 0.071 0.067 0.073 0.066 
Gini coefficient 0.036 1.055 -0.007 0.991 
     
Age  -0.394 0.214 -0.393 0.204 
Square of age  0.007* 0.003 0.007** 0.003 
Gender 1.703 2.485 1.714 2.47 
Education     
Edu 2(1 - 6 years) -1.627 1.313 -1.534 1.213 
Edu 3(7 – 9 years) 1.029 2.395 1.309 2.227 
Edu 4(10 – 12 years) -0.31 2.018 -0.066 1.927 
Edu 5(More than 12 years) -5.562** 1.824 -5.874** 1.778 
Occupation††     
Occu1 6.574 3.319 6.767* 3.171 
Occu2 -0.525 2.565 -0.948 2.513 
Occu3 0.195 3.126 -0.366 3.032 
Occu4 -1.518 1.754 -1.789 1.711 
Occu5 -0.991 1.335 -0.546 1.291 
Occu6 2.312 2.065 1.607 1.883 
     
Constant 13.081 8.119 13.087 7.969 
R2 0.47 - 
N 655 
† The formula of equivalent scale is (number of adult + 0.5* number of children)0.9. 
†† Occu1: professionals; Occu2: clerks; Occu3: technicians and associate professionals; 
Occu4: service workers, shop and market sales workers; Occu5: agricultural, animal, 
husbandry, forestry, and fishing workers; Occu6: product machine operators and related 
workers. The comparative group is unemployment. 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
The results presented in fix-effects and random-effects estimation are similar 
and the Hausman test14 indicates that two estimations are consistent, which implies the 
omitted variables are uncorrelated to the regressors in the estimation. It means the 
unobserved county characteristics are uncorrelated to average income level, average 
                                                   
14
 The Hausman test is implemented under fixed-effects and population averaged estimations 
without robust standard error. The null hypothesis is two estimations are all consistent 
estimations whereas the alternative is only fixed-effects estimation is consistent.  
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age of residence, Gini coefficient, gender proportion, average education level, and 
industrial property.   
Finally, the estimated coefficient on the Gini is sensitive to the different 
equivalence scales as can be seen in Table 3-6 and Table 3-7. Evidence that the Gini 
coefficient is sensitive to income equivalence scales has also been found in other 
studies (Buhmann et al., 1988; Coulter et al., 1992; Pascual et al., 2005). The main 
difference between the two equivalence scales used in this chapter is the financial 
weight placed on children in the household. In general, a good equivalence scale 
should reflect both economies of size and differences in household characteristics 
such as location and age and health of members (Coulter et al, 1992). Coulter et al. 
(1992) also suggest that a household with three adults does not have the same 
financial demands as a household with one mother and two children. It may be 
preferable to use an equivalence scale that treats adults and children differently, thus, 
the results presented in Table 3-7 may be more appropriate than those shown in Table 
3-6.   
3.6.2 Robustness checks 
3.6.2.1 The effect of long-run income and long-run income inequality 
It is plausible that income and income inequality have a lagged effect on 
health. For example, people being poor during childhood might have a higher 
probability to suffer from worse health status in their adulthood because of 
malnutrition and other reasons. Income inequality may affect the health in the 
following periods through social status, for example, social stability. Taking these 
factors into consideration, the long-run log income variable and long-run Gini 
coefficient which are the mean of log income and Gini coefficient across the time 
span of the data15 are created. Since these two created variables are time in-variant, the 
                                                   
15
 There are 23 districts in the data set. Hence, the observations of long-run log income 
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Hausman and Taylor (HT) estimation16 is used and the result is shown in Table 3-8. 
The HT method allows us to estimate the impact of time-invariant regressors that are 
correlated with the individual effect. This contrasts with fixed effect estimation, which 
does not allow for time-invariant regressors. To be able to carry out HT estimation, 
we need to decide which regressors are potentially correlated with the individual 
effect (these are called endogenous) and which ones are not (these are called 
exogenous). In the HT method, several instruments can be created from each 
exogenous regressor, by exploiting the time variation (Wooldridge, 2002 (Section 
11.4)). Here the emphasis is in allowing long-run and short-run disposable income to 
be correlated with the individual effect (i.e. endogenous). Table 3-8 presents the 
results for all types of regressors.  
For both equivalence scales, age, age square term, Edu5, and Occu1 are all 
individually significant at 1% and 5% respectively whereas the log income and its 
square term are not significant at 5% level. This result is similar to those in Table 3-6 
and Table 3-7. However, long-run Gini has a significantly positive effect on crude 
mortality but long-run income has a significantly negative effect. When the long-run 
mean of Gini coefficient increases 1 unit, the probability of dying will increase 3.6% 
for 4.1%, holding other variables constant. When the long-run mean of log disposable 
income increases 1 unit, the probability of dying will reduce 0.26% for 0.27%, 
holding other variables constant. Furthermore, log disposable income and its square 
term are jointly significant, though their separate z- test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
variable are 655 but they only have 23 values.  
16
 Hausman and Taylor estimation requests that all panels must start at the same period. There 
are two countries in the dataset which start from the 7th period. I drop these two counties from 
the dataset because only 46 observations are removed. If the initial 6 periods of 21 counties 
were removed instead, the number of removed observations would amount to 126.    
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Table 3-8 Hausman and Taylor Estimation 
 
Income equivalent scale 1 Income equivalent scale 2 
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err 
Time variant exogenous     
Gini coefficient 0.394 0.814 0.235   0.816 
Age  -0.342** 0.117 -0.346** 0.117 
Square of age  0.006** 0.001 0.007** 0.001 
Gender 1.593 1.715 1.671 1.718 
Education     
Edu 2(1 - 6 years) -1.21 1.166 -1.154 1.168 
Edu 3(7 – 9 years) 0.84 1.622 0.838 1.626 
Edu 4(10 – 12 years) 0.167 1.579 0.289 1.601 
Edu 5(More than 12 years) -5.071** 1.698 -4.906** 1.694 
Occupation†     
Occu1 7.429* 3.014 7.408* 3.022 
Occu2 -2.524 2.073 -2.053 2.064   
Occu3 -2.824 2.271 -2.677   2.273   
Occu4 -1.778 1.601 -1.664 1.603 
Occu5 -1.003 0.874 -1.011 0.876 
Occu6 1.245 1.311 1.25 1.316 
Time variant endogenous     
Mean of log disposable 
income -1.388 1.046 -1.039 1.157 
Mean of square log disposable 
income 0.077 0.049 0.059 0.052 
Time invariant exogenous     
Long-run mean of Gini 41.146** 9.707 35.618** 9.091 
Time invariant endogenous     
Long-run mean of log 
disposable income -2.57** 0.904 -2.744** 0.923 
     
Constant 30.94 12.465 34.345 13.091 
Wald  chi2 1863.9 1856.39 
N 609 
† Occu1: professionals; Occu2: clerks; Occu3: technicians and associate professionals; Occu4: 
service workers, shop and market sales workers; Occu5: agricultural, animal, husbandry, 
forestry, and fishing workers; Occu6: product machine operators and related workers. The 
comparative group is unemployment. 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
 
3.6.2.2 The transmission channel from income and income inequality to health. 
Education is always a factor considered in the literature of income inequality. 
Education is a determinant of the earning distribution and the earning distribution is 
one of the components in the income distribution (Lam and Levison, 1992; De 
Gregorio and Lee, 1999; Checchi, 2001). Thus, education has a direct effect on 
income and income inequality. On the other hands, education also correlates with 
occupation. Martins and Pereira (2004) find that in the higher skilled worker group, 
individuals with higher education attainment get higher educational returns. 
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Furthermore, it is possible that education and occupation are the main channels 
through which income and income inequality affect health. In addition, although 
income shocks will lead to changes in education, the latter is likely to have only a 
long-run impact on regional incomes. Thus, on the assumption that the fixed effects 
will capture the long-run effect of education, one could consider leaving the 
educational variables out of the regression. This is shown in Table 3-9. 
Table 3-9 shows that age and its square term are significant at 1% level. The 
mean of log disposable income and its square term are still not significant at 5% level 
respectively. However, the collinearity between these two variables might affect the 
precision of estimates. Thus, the joint test equalling zero is credible as the evidence 
against the absolute income hypothesis. The F-test for joint significant of both 
variables rejects the null hypothesis at 5% confident level.  
After the robustness checks we can confirm that the effects of age and Edu5 
on crude mortality are significant. Age has a nonlinear association with crude 
mortality rate and the effect of education is coherent with a large body of literature 
which supports that the educational attendance has a positive association with health.  
However, even though we found before that the three income-related 
variables were jointly non-significant, we now find that they are significant. The 
Hausman-Taylor estimation shows that not only long-run income is significant, but 
also current income and its square are jointly significant (although not individually). 
The Gini coefficient does not appear to be significant in any of these estimations, and 
the reason for this might be the low power of the significance test due to high 
correlation between the income-related variables. However, the pairwise correlation 
coefficient of income relevant variables is not large17. Thus, this reason could be 
excluded. Finally, the occupational effect is ambiguous. 
                                                   
17
 The correlation coefficient between Gini and ln(income) and [ln(income)]2 calculated by 
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Table 3-9 Robust estimation with fixed effects 
 
Equivalent Scale 1 Equivalent Scale 2 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
Mean of log disposable income -0.618 1.269 -0.319 1.378 
Mean of square log disposable 
income 0.047 0.063 0.032 0.066 
Gini coefficient 0.314 1.131 0.053 1.176 
     
Age  -0.511** 0.16 -0.505** 0.159 
Square of age  0.008** 0.002 0.008** 0.002 
Gender 1.561 2.321 1.654 2.301 
Occupation††     
Occu1 0.745 3.394 0.95 3.41 
Occu2 -3.143 2.475 -2.833 2.399 
Occu3 -2.366 2.967 -2.27 2.936 
Occu4 -1.283 1.834 -1.215 1.807 
Occu5 -0.757 1.237 -0.736 1.223 
Occu6 4.519 2.364 4.387 2.388 
     
Constant 10.205 7.51 8.431 8.248 
R2 0.367 0.369 
N 655 
† The equivalent scale is the number of household members. Equivalent scale 2 is (number of 
adult + 0.5* number of children) 0.9. 
†† Occu1: professionals; Occu2: clerks; Occu3: technicians and associate professionals; 
Occu4: service workers, shop and market sales workers; Occu5: agricultural, animal, 
husbandry, forestry, and fishing workers; Occu6: product machine operators and related 
workers. The comparative group is unemployment. 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
3.6.2.3 Nonlinear check of income inequality on mortality 
Some literature has provided the evidence that the relationship between health 
outcome and income is nonlinear. The same argument can be applied in the case of 
income inequality. After taking the possible nonlinear effect of income inequality on 
mortality into consideration, I cut Gini variable into 4 quartiles according to the 
ranking of Gini coefficient. Gini1 is assigned to 1 if the county’s Gini coefficient is in 
bottom quartile and 0, otherwise. Gini2 is assigned to 1 if the county’s Gini 
coefficient is in the range between 25% and 50%; 0 otherwise. Gini3 is assigned to 1 
                                                                                                                                      
equivalent scale 1is 0.1226 and 0.1248, respectively. The correlation coefficient is 0.312 and 
0.3156, respectively, when the three variables are calculated by equivalent scale 2. Meanwhile, 
we also drop [ln(income)]2 from regression, and the Gini coefficient is positive but not 
significant at 5% level. Further, we drop ln(income) and its square term from regression, Gini 
still remains positive but not significant at 5% level. 
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if the county’s Gini coefficient is in the range between 50% and 75%; 0 otherwise. 
Gini4 is assigned to 1 if the county’s Gini coefficient is in upper quartile and 0, 
otherwise. Only Gini2, Gini3, and Gini4 enter the regressions. The results are shown 
in Table 3-10 and Table 3-11. In both tables, the Gini dummies are not significant at 
5% level and the other results are similar to those in Table 3-6 and Table 3-7.    
 
Table 3-10 Robust estimation with income equivalent scale 1† 
 
Fixed Effects Population Averaged 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. 
Mean of log disposable income -1.542 1.193 -1.576 1.182 
Mean of square log disposable 
income 0.087 0.06 0.09 0.059 
Gini dummy     
Gini2 -0.064 0.039 -0.068 0.038 
Gini3 0.063 0.06 0.06 0.058 
Gini4 0.031 0.068 0.03 0.065 
Age  -0.397 0.211 -0.396 0.205 
Square of age  0.007* 0.003 0.007** 0.003 
Gender 1.515 2.45 1.511 2.467 
Education     
Edu 2(1 - 6 years) -1.587 1.159 -1.497 1.087 
Edu 3(7 – 9 years) 0.856 2.329 1.13 2.203 
Edu 4(10 – 12 years) -0.154 1.901 0.087 1.839 
Edu 5(More than 12 years) -5.698** 1.642 -6.017** 1.619 
Occupation††     
Occu1 6.411 3.135 6.606* 3.04 
Occu2 -1.135 2.413 -1.551 2.406 
Occu3 -0.219 2.998 -0.778 2.97 
Occu4 -1.969 1.734 -2.248 1.721 
Occu5 -0.985 1.314 -0.545 1.291 
Occu6 2.409 2.031 1.707 1.888 
     
Constant 14.66 7.035 14.633 6.991 
R2 0.48 - 
N 655 
† The formula of equivalent scale is (number of adult + 0.5* number of children)0.9. 
†† Occu1: professionals; Occu2: clerks; Occu3: technicians and associate professionals; 
Occu4: service workers, shop and market sales workers; Occu5: agricultural, animal, 
husbandry, forestry, and fishing workers; Occu6: product machine operators and related 
workers. The comparative group is unemployment. 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 3-11 Robust estimation with income equivalent scale 2† 
 
Fixed Effects Population Averaged 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. 
Mean of log disposable income -1.173 1.334 -1.197 1.323 
Mean of square log disposable 
income 0.067 0.065 0.069 0.064 
Gini dummy     
Gini2 -0.037 0.039 -0.043 0.037 
Gini3 0.059 0.066 0.056 0.063 
Gini4 0.06 0.079 0.057 0.075 
Age  -0.406 0.216 -0.404 0.209 
Square of age  0.007* 0.003 0.007** 0.003 
Gender 1.545 2.454 1.545 2.476 
Education     
Edu 2(1 - 6 years) -1.688 1.225 -1.603 1.154 
Edu 3(7 – 9 years) 1.097 2.34 1.373 2.215 
Edu 4(10 – 12 years) -0.194 1.949 0.056 1.885 
Edu 5(More than 12 years) -5.59** 1.769 -5.924** 1.751 
Occupation††     
Occu1 6.55 3.218 6.769* 3.115 
Occu2 -0.583 2.415 -0.993 2.409 
Occu3 0.152 3.003 -0.404 2.966 
Occu4 -1.725 1.704 -2.006 1.683 
Occu5 -0.934 1.333 -0.482 1.307 
Occu6 2.534 2.101 1.819 1.955 
     
Constant 12.891 7.848 12.798 7.827 
R2 0.48 - 
N 655 
† The formula of equivalent scale is (number of adult + 0.5* number of children)0.9. 
†† Occu1: professionals; Occu2: clerks; Occu3: technicians and associate professionals; 
Occu4: service workers, shop and market sales workers; Occu5: agricultural, animal, 
husbandry, forestry, and fishing workers; Occu6: product machine operators and related 
workers. The comparative group is unemployment. 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter concerns the socioeconomic determinants of mortality, with a 
particular focus on the absolute income and income inequality hypotheses, using a 
novel approach to avoid aggregation bias. Following a recent strand of 
epidemiological literature (Sheppard and Prentice, 1995; Salway and Wakefield, 
2005), I combined individual level data on income and other socio-economic 
characteristics with aggregate data on mortality. When compared with using 
individual-level data for both mortality and regressors, the proposed approach has the 
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disadvantage that it cannot control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics. 
However, it has an advantage over the aggregate studies that have neglected non-
linear links at the individual-level data model. The evidence is found to support the 
absolute income hypothesis and the income inequality hypotheses in Taiwan. This 
result is partially consistent with the findings of Chiang (1999). However, the long-
run Gini and long-run income has a significantly effect on health rather than current 
Gini coefficient and income. One plausible explanation for this result is little cross-
section variation in income variable and Gini coefficient at county level. The results 
also confirm the positive effects of education on the health of individuals whereas the 
evidence on occupational effects on health is ambiguous. In addition, I also use 
different income equivalent scales and find that it is not a sensitive factor in our 
analysis.  
An important issue which is not dealt with in this chapter due to data 
limitation is age factor because detrended age is surely correlated with life expectancy 
and other health measures. I will leave this issue in the future research. Future 
research might also estimate the impact of income inequality on groups of different 
income or educational level. 
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Chapter 4. The health income relationship of the elderly population in 
Taiwan 
4.1 Introduction 
The influence of income on health status attracts the interest of some 
researchers. However, there are no consistent conclusions concerning the income 
hypotheses, especially the absolute income hypothesis and the income inequality 
hypothesis. A large literature claims income inequality replaces absolute income as 
the significant determinant of health in the developed countries. Absolute income is 
only more influential in the developing countries. Although the nonlinear association 
between income and health is usually presumed in the regression analyses, very few 
studies delve into the relationship between income and health and the conclusions are 
mixed. The studies which do not provide the evidence for the absolute income 
hypothesis usually ignore the relationship between income and health. However, it is 
also the case even with studies that support the absolute income hypothesis.  
Understanding the relationship between income and health can not only shed 
light on income-related health inequality, but also provide a strong basis for the test of 
health income hypotheses. Furthermore, it is able to provide a blueprint for policy 
makers. For instance, if the relationship is linear, the policy of income redistribution 
would not have a significant effect on improving the average health status of society. 
The average health status of a whole society remains constant when the income flows 
from high tail to low tail of income distribution. However, if the relationship is 
nonlinear, policies can focus on the disadvantaged groups to promote the average 
health status. On the other hand, the relationship between income and health can 
disentangle whether the conclusions of the health income hypotheses test are artificial 
owing to the aggregate bias (Gravelle et al., 2002) or convincing. 
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The literature investigating the health income relationship usually employs 
parametric estimations, particularly, Probit form and the quadratic form. It will 
produce exact estimators if the functional form of the conditional mean is known. If 
the function form of the conditional mean is not manifest, misspecification will 
generate incorrect estimators. In practice, the functional form is usually unknown. 
Nonparametric estimations are another option for overcoming the problem of 
misspecification, they can help detect subtle changes in the health income relationship 
as income varies, which reveals more detailed information of income related health 
inequality. Though in this case there does not appear to be systematic changes 
in the relationship across income levels. 
Nonparametric kernel regression and two semi-parametric estimations, 
partially linear regression and single index regression, are used in this chapter to 
investigate the health income relationship using micro (household) data. Meanwhile, 
the health income relationship in the top quartile, bottom quartile, and middle two 
quartiles of income distribution is estimated to understand the relationship at different 
income levels. Finally, the model specification test proposed by Li and Racine is 
implemented to diagnose whether the parametric quadratic form and cubic form in 
terms of income are a properly parametric model to describe the nonlinear health 
income relationship. The average derivative estimators produced only by semi-
parametric single index model are directly comparable to those produced by 
parametric Probit and Ordinary Least Square estimations.   
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 covers the literature review 
and motivation. Section 3 provides the data introduction. Section 4 implements 
nonparametric kernel regression and section 5 is devoted to semi-parametric 
regression. Section 6 constitutes the conclusion.   
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4.2 Previous Studies and Motivation 
4.2.1 Previous Studies 
In previous studies, different methods were used to estimate the relationship 
between health and income whether with macro-level data or with micro-level data. 
The measures of health and income also influence the results. Preston (1975) shows 
the concave pattern between life expectancy at birth and national income per head 
using international analysis. The life expectancy curve rises more steeply in the lower 
range of national income than in the higher range. National income does not seem a 
determinant of life expectancy in developed countries. A number of later studies using 
aggregate data claim income distribution becomes a more crucial determinant than 
income once countries become affluent. Hence, the relative income hypothesis attracts 
more attention than the absolute income hypothesis. The studies advocating the 
relative income hypothesis or income inequality hypothesis claim that countries with 
more egalitarian income distributions have lower death rates (Rodgers, 1979; 
Wilkinson, 1986, 1992a). However, Gravelle et al. (2002) mathematically 
demonstrate that it cannot be inferred that income inequality or relative deprivation 
affects individual mortality risk when the individual mortality risk-income association 
is nonlinear. At the time of writing, the debates around these income hypotheses are 
still going on.  
In the past two decades, researchers turned to using micro-data to analyse the 
relationship between health and income rather than macro-data. The advantage of the 
micro-level research is that it is able to avoid the aggregate problem caused by macro-
level data, especially income variables. Backlund et al. (1996) use the National 
Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS) as well as the Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
to estimate the income-mortality gradient which assumes income is a determinant of 
mortality and it has a negative relationship with mortality. Their conclusion posits that 
the gradient is much smaller at high income levels than at low to moderate income 
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levels amongst subjects of working age (25 to 64 years). This circumstance also holds 
in elderly populations even if the other socioeconomic variables have been controlled 
for. However, the gradient is greater in the case of working-age women at extreme 
poverty levels compared with women in other income levels. The gradient is much 
smaller in the elderly than in the working-age population. However, Martikainen et al., 
(2001) using household income and the socio-demographic factors from the Finnish 
tax authorities and from the 1990 census, find the association between mortality and 
income is nearly linear.  
With respect to other health measures, Blaxter (1990) investigates the 
association between health and income and concludes that the relationship between 
income and health becomes apparent along three different gradients. One is at levels 
of extreme poverty; another is at low to moderate income levels; and the other is at 
high income levels. Fritzell et al. (2004) use the Swedish Living Condition Survey 
and logistic regression including polynomial terms of income. The curvilinear 
association between self-rated health and income is revealed in their analyses. Ecob 
and Smith (1999) use the Health and Lifestyle Survey (HALS) conducted in England, 
Scotland and Wales and the procedures generalized linear model and logistic model to 
estimate the association. They find that the association between health and income is 
approximately linear within the 10th and 90th percentile distribution of income 
whether or not controlling for socioeconomic variables. Rahkonen et al. (2000) and 
Rahkonen et al. (2002) use Finnish data and also support the more linear association 
between health and income. Mackenbach et al. (2005) use the data from nationally 
representative health, level of living or similar surveys from Belgium, Denmark, 
England, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Norway as well as the techniques of 
LOESS-function which is a locally weighted regression smoother and spline 
regressions to conduct their analysis. They find that a higher household equivalent 
income is associated with better self-rated health among men and women in all 
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countries. In four countries (Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and Norway) the 
gradient at the lower income level is steeper than at a higher income level. In 
summary, the conclusion concerning the nature of the health income relationship is 
different from country to country. Difference in data sets is also a determinant of the 
conclusion. More and more studies tend to indicate that micro-level data produces a 
more precise health income relationship.  
4.2.2 Motivation 
Understanding the shape of the individual-level association between income 
and health is important for several reasons. First, it can shed light on income-related 
health inequality.  If the association is strongly curvilinear, it is in the sense that health 
declines much more rapidly at a lower income level than that at a higher income level. 
It implies that income has a direct correlation with health. However, if the association 
is more linear in nature, then health declines at a constant rate with declining income. 
Income may not have a direct correlation, but rather an indirect one with health 
through subtle mechanisms, for example, behavioural and psychosocial factors. 
Income may be just a proxy for other characteristics such as education levels and 
occupational classes. The Whitehall study is a typical example. Whitehall II Study 
(2004) reveals the impact of socioeconomic status after controlling for social class. 
Senior civil servants have better health status than junior civil servants due to 
decreased stress or greater achievements, instead of income per se.  The correlation 
also provides an insight for policy makers. When the association at individual levels is 
strongly curvilinear, the problem of how to make income distribution more equal is a 
task for policy makers. A more equal distribution of income will raise the average 
health status of the population in a given region.18 However, when the association is 
                                                   
18
 If the association between income and health is strongly curvilinear, the marginal health 
status at lower income levels is higher than that at higher income levels. Moving some income 
from higher income levels to lower income levels will increase the average health status 
because the marginal health status reducing at higher income levels is less than that increasing 
at lower income levels.  
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more linear, the income related health status of individuals in a region is like a zero-
sum game. The magnitude of health reduced by taking income from the individuals at 
high income level is equal to the magnitude of health increased by giving the income 
to the individuals at lower income level. Under this circumstance, the aggregate health 
status will not change if income redistribution policies are implemented. Hence, the 
question of how to break down the boundary between social or occupational classes, 
how to increase income mobility, or how to relieve mental stress is a goal for policy 
makers. Second, the association between health and income at individual level can 
also provide an indication of whether the conclusions made by previous related 
studies in the Taiwanese case in testing the relative hypothesis (or income inequality 
hypothesis) are correct in terms of  the aggregate bias.  
In the above studies, the authors use parametric estimation to examine the 
relationship between health and income. Under parametric estimation, the functional 
form of the conditional mean is supposed to be known. Unfortunately, it is usually 
unknown in practice. Nonparametric estimation relaxes the assumption that the 
conditional mean function is known to avoid misspecification and it also can avoid 
unobserved heterogeneity. Jones and Wildman (2008) employ parametric and semi-
parametric estimation to test the income effect on health using the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). They produce evidence that income has a strong impact on 
self-reported health for men and women in their parametric estimation. They use a 
semi-parametric partially-linear model which relaxes the assumption of a specific 
functional form of income and obtain robust evidence to support the relative 
deprivation hypothesis.  
This chapter estimates the shape of the relationship between income and 
health by using nonparametric and semi-parametric methods applied to the Health and 
Living Status of the Elderly in Taiwan (SHLE) conducted in 1989 and 1996. The 
average derivative estimator (ADE) is also estimated to acquire the coefficient of 
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income variable. Finally, the modelling test for nonparametric and parametric 
estimations is implemented to understand which method is appropriate to fit the real 
relationship. Understanding the relationship between health and income can not only 
provide insight for policy makers, but can also clarify the conclusions of related 
studies using aggregate data.  
 
4.3 Data 
The data used in this chapter is from the Survey of Health and Living Status 
of the Elderly in Taiwan. This survey is designed to be a benchmark to measure the 
future changes in health and living status of the elderly and provide a resource for a 
number of descriptive and analytic studies of the elderly. Furthermore, it also sheds 
light on health status of elderly people for policy makers.  
This survey comprises eight sections as follows: 1. Marital history and other 
characteristics of background; 2. Household schedule, social and economic exchanges; 
3. Health, health care utilization and behaviour; 4. Occupational history; 5. Activities 
and general attitudes; 6. Residence history; 7. Economic/financial wellbeing; 8. 
Emotional and instrumental support. It contains not only the significant historical 
information with respect to marital status, employment and retirement, and living 
arrangement/residence, but also the information of the exchanges in material and 
emotional support between the elderly and other family members or friends. To this 
end, detailed characteristics of all household members and of close relations living 
elsewhere are available. With respect to health information, in addition to the level of 
disability and illness, the questionnaire also concerns health care utilization in Taiwan 
as well as a series of questions on health care behaviour including consumption of 
alcoholic beverages, smoking and aspects of diet. A section is devoted to the financial 
status of the elderly, the source of their income and its adequacy, their asset structure, 
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management of finances and whether the degree of control over property and its 
disposition is affected by concern about future support.  
This survey is a panel survey including six waves conducted in 1989, 1993, 
1996, 1999, 2003, and 2007. The samples are based on individuals aged 60 and older 
and the 4,049 observations are included in the first wave.  In 1996, this survey added a 
cohort of 50-66 year-olds to replenish in the light of attrition within the original 
samples and added a further cohort of 50-56 year-olds in 2003. This data set possesses 
the properties of cohort and panel data. In this chapter, the first wave (1989) and the 
third wave (1996) data are used because of data consistency with the next chapter. In 
this chapter, the focus is on the health income relationship in the elderly group. 
Therefore, the age range of the samples in both years in the analysis is between 60 and 
80 years old. The total samples in both years are 3235 and 2170, respectively; the two 
waves are pooled because the property of nonparametric estimation requires a large 
sample to achieve a more precise result.  
The chapter focuses on the relationships between self-assessed health status 
(SAH), the mental health measurement designed by CES-D (Centre for 
Epidemiological Studies – Depression), and life satisfaction (LS) and income 
respectively. In the health status questionnaire, the question ‘In general, would you 
say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?’ is used to determine self-
assessed health status and it converts to a dichotomous variable which is assigned 1 if 
the responses are excellent and very good and 0, otherwise. Although the 
measurement of self-assessed health status in the Survey of Health and Living Status 
of the Elderly is not as detailed as that in Short Form 36 (SF-36), it is still a good 
indicator of mortality and used in many studies (Shibuya et al., 2002; Soobader and 
LeClere, 1999; Kennedy et al., 1998 and Kahn et al., 2000).  
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CES-D measures the degree of depression symptoms and uses a numerical 
scale between 0 and 30. There are 17 questions in CES-D in the survey of 1989 and 
10 questions in the survey of 1996. In order to make it comparable, ten identical 
questions are selected from two waves. CES-D comprises four domains, depressed 
affect, somatic symptoms, positive effect and interpersonal difficulties. Each question 
has four options, never, barely, sometimes and frequently and they are assigned the 
score for 0, 1, 2 and 3 respectively (see Table A-4). After these questions are 
summarized, a higher score indicates more depression which also implies poorer 
mental health generally. Ten questions are included in the questionnaire on life 
satisfaction. The responses are “Yes” and “No”. The answer “Yes” is assigned 1 and 0, 
otherwise (see Table A-5). The scale for life satisfaction is between 0 and 10. Life 
satisfaction can also be regarded as a measure of happiness (Layard et al. 2008). The 
measure of depression focuses on the status at a specific point (the current mental 
status) whereas a longer time span (i.e. the comparison of current status with the past, 
the evaluation of the whole life, and the expectation of future) is concerned in the 
measure of life satisfaction in terms of time span.  
With respect to the income variable, it is an ordinal categorical variable in this 
dataset. However, the income scales in the 1989 and 1996 questionnaires are not 
identical. The income scale in the questionnaire of 1989 is monthly income whereas it 
is annual income in the questionnaire of 1996. In order to simplify the analysis and 
avoid the problem of income scales, interval regression is applied to obtain a 
continuous income variable. Before implementing interval regression, the sample is 
partitioned into two sub-groups. One is the working group and the other one is the 
non-working group. The explanatory variables in the working group include age, 
square of age, educational year, the number of children, dummy variables for marital 
status, dummy variables for job type, dummy variables for income source (from 
children and relations, from pension, and from  rent, gain of investment, and gain of 
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interest, and dummy variables for regions.  The explanatory variables in the non-
working group are the same as those in the working group but dummy variables for 
job type are dropped. The results of interval regression in 1989 and 1996 are shown in 
Table A-6 and Table A-7. The predicted income has been checked and no sample is 
outside of its interval. 
The regressors included in the estimations of semi-parametric estimations are 
gender, age, education year, and marital status.  
 
Table 4-1 Summary Statistics for Pooled SHLE 1989, 1996 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Self-Assessed Health (SAH) 0.623 0.485 
Depression (CES-D) 6.479 4.596 
Life Satisfaction (LS) 6.281 2.515 
Income (in thousand) 14.693 14.731   
Square of Income 432.848 1103.534 
Working 0.29 0.454 
Job Type   
Farming 0.306 0.461 
High Skill Worker 0.057 0.231 
Senior Manager 0.168 0.374 
Clerk 0.061 0.24 
Sales Clerk 0.047 0.212 
Craftsman 0.091 0.287 
Semi-skill Worker 0.07 0.254 
Service 0.129 0.336 
Non-skill worker 0.067 0.25 
Income Source   
From Children and Relations 0.670 0.610 
From Pension 0.354 0.724 
From Rent, Investment Gain, 
and Interest 0.168 0.374 
Number of Children 4.596 2.182 
Age 68.131 5.421 
Sex† 0.561 0.496 
Education Year 4.116 4.39 
Marital Status   
Married 0.683 0.465 
Divorced 0.027 0.162 
Widowed 0.264 0.441 
Single 0.025 0.158 
Region   
North 0.279 0.448 
Middle 0.333 0.471 
South  0.317 0.465 
East 0.072 0.258 
N=5405 
† The mean gender dummy variable presents the proportion of male.  
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Table 4-1 presents the summary statistics from which the variables are used in 
the estimations in this chapter. The mean of self-assessed health is 0.623 which means 
that 62.3% observers report their health status is excellent or very good. The average 
scale of depression and life satisfaction is 6.479 points and 6.281 points respectively. 
The monthly average income is NT$14,693 (New Taiwan Dollar)19. The proportion of 
working observations among the sample is 29%. The other dummies are transformed 
to variables in proportion. For instance, 67%, 35.4 %, and 16.8 % observations report 
respectively that their income source is from children and relations, from pension, and 
from rent, investment gain, and interest. However, the sum of these three variables is 
more than 1. Some observations report that their income source is from more than one 
source.   
 
Table 4-2 Sample Cross Tabulation  
           LS   
CES-D 0 1 2 3 4 5 
< 6.479 9 40 112 215 242 279 
>= 6.479 34 149 189 222 178 223 
Total 43 189 301 437 420 502 
       
           LS         
CES-D 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
< 6.479 381 589 625 627 234 3353 
>= 6.479 193 253 299 241 88 2069 
Total 574 842 924 868 322 5422 
Note: The mean scale of CES-D and LS is 6.479 and 6.281 respectively. 
 
Table 4-2 shows the cross-tabulation of sample in terms of CES-D and LS. In 
the table, the scale of 6.479 is the mean scale of CES-D. The relatively depressed 
group is defined by the score which is above or equal to mean. Below the scale 5 of 
life satisfaction, the relatively depressed observations are more than counterpart. 
When the scale of life satisfaction equals to 4 or more, the observations are more in 
the counterpart than in the relatively depressed group. When the scale of life 
                                                   
19
 In 1989 1GBP was equal to NT$43.032 and it was NT$42.822 in 1996. 
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satisfaction goes up, the number of observations in the relatively depressed group goes 
down whereas the number of observations in the counterpart goes up. This indicates 
that the relatively depressed people have lower life satisfaction.        
4.4 Econometric Frameworks 
4.4.1 Nonparametric Kernel Regression  
     Regression methods model the expected behaviour of the dependent 
variable y given by a vector of covariates denoted by x. They not only help researchers 
or policy makers to produce the predicted mean of y but also to know how the 
dependent variable responds to the change in one or more independent variables. The 
widely applied parametric regressions include some unknown parameters and the 
functional form of the conditional mean is given. For example, a model based on a 
conditional mean, g(x, β), may be posited to be a linear or nonlinear function such as 
OLS and Probit. The x is a vector of covariates and β is a finite number of unknown 
parameters. If the presumed function form is correct, the parametric regressions will 
produce precise estimators. However, in practice, the true functional form of 
regression is rarely known. These parametric estimations may lead to the 
inconsistence due to severe misspecification. Hence, nonparametric regression is an 
option to avoid this problem.  
Nonparametric estimations do not require the presumption of functional form 
but some other presumptions such as smoothness and moment conditions are 
necessary. However, this does not come without a cost. This method requires a larger 
sample size to achieve the same degree of precision as a correctly specified parametric 
regression. Choosing between parametric and nonparametric estimations entails a 
trade-off between large sample size and misspecification.  
This chapter begins by considering the nonparametric regression model as  
ε+= )()1.4( XgY    
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where ε is the random error term and defines E(ε|x)=0. The sample realizations (Y, X) 
are i.i.d. In this chapter Y and X are the measures of health status and income at 
individual level, respectively. The g(·) is the function of individual income which is 
unspecified. Nonparametric regression analysis avoids the restrictions of any 
parametric assumption on the regression function and the aim is to produce a 
reasonable approximation to the unknown response function g(·).  
4.4.1.1 Kernel Density Estimation 
     The general form of for the kernel density estimator of a q-dimensional 
variable x is 
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kernel function. Simplify Eq. (4.2) to univariate kernel density estimator and show in 
Eq. (4.3).  
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Eq. (4.3) reveals that the kernel density estimator evaluated at x for a given 
bandwidth h is simply a weighted average of the data and the weight is greater when 
the observations are close to the point at which the density is estimated.  
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4.4.1.2 An Application 
A Gaussian kernel with the bandwidth chosen according to Silverman’s rule 
of thumb (Silverman, 1986) for a density is used in Figure 4.120 It tells us that the 
difference exists between kernel density and normal density.   
 
4.4.1.3 Kernel Regression 
     The aim of kernel regression is to replace g(X) in Eq. (4.1) with a local 
estimator of the conditional mean 
      
(4.4)				8(9) = :;<|> = 9? = ≅
Α(
|9)Β
 
where f(y|x)=f(x,y)/f(x) is a conditional density of y. Hence, Eq. (4.4) can be rewritten 
as  
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 This figure is produced by R. The following estimations and figures are also produced by R. 
Figure 4.1 The Density Estimation of Log Income (Kernel: Gaussian, Bandwidth: 
0.2) 
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The estimator of g(x) is available if one knows how to estimate f (x,y) and f (x). 
The kernel regression uses the estimators based on locally weighted estimation to 
replace the numerator and denominator in Eq. (4.5). The kernel estimators of 
numerator and denominator are denoted by ∫ dyyxfy ),(
^
 and ),(
^
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 respectively. 
The Eq. (4.4) is rewritten as  
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 is the weight attached to Yi. The weights are 
positive and sum to one. 
4.4.1.4 Bandwidth Selection 
In the kernel regression models two factors will affect the estimations. One is 
the univariate kernel form and the other is the selection of bandwidth. The univariate 
kernel function occurs in several functional forms and the common choices are the 
Gaussian and the Epanechnikov. However, the choice of bandwidth is more sensitive 
to the results than that of kernel functional form. It determines the appearance and 
properties of the final density estimate. On the other hand, the selection of bandwidth 
entails the trade-off between the bias and variance of the estimates. Given the sample 
size n, the estimators will have a smaller bias but a larger variance when the 
bandwidth is small whereas the estimators will have a larger bias but a smaller 
variance if the bandwidth is large.  
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Silverman (1986) suggests the “normal reference rule-of-thumb” approach 
which generates the optimal bandwidth for a particular family of distributions. The 
bandwidth approximately equals to .06.1 51−nσ  
Another method, least square cross-validation, possessing the data-driven 
property is as Eq. (4.7).  
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kernel estimator of g(·) and the M(Xi) is a trimming function which ranges between 0 
and 1. 
4.4.1.5 An Application 
     The kernel regression function applied to health income relationship is as  
      ieiIgiH += )()8.4(  
where Hi represents the health indicators of individual i,  Ii is the income of individual 
i, ei is a random error term, and g(·) is a unspecified function.  
Figure 4.2 presents kernel regression, Probit regression, quadratic polynomial 
regression, and cubic polynomial regression for SAH, CES-D and LS, respectively. 
Table 4-3 shows the average derivative estimators of three indicators in different 
quartiles of income distribution. The meaning of average derivative estimators is 
similar to that of coefficients of parametric estimations to tell the changing magnitude 
of three indicators when income increases one unit but they are not directly 
comparable to the coefficients of parametric estimations. Only the average derivative 
estimators obtained from semi-parametric single index estimation are directly 
comparable (see section 4.4.4). 
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In the figure of SAH in Figure 4.2, differences between quadratic and cubic 
polynomial estimations are not obvious whereas there are big differences between two 
polynomial estimations and both Probit and nonparametric kernel estimations. A 
parabolic relationship is presented by polynomial estimations whereas a nearly linear 
relationship is presented by Probit estimation. The nonparametric kernel estimation 
presents more curvilinear relationship than two polynomial regressions. The figure of 
CES-D reveals no difference between two polynomial estimations but a big difference 
between parametric estimations and nonparametric kernel estimation is spotted.  
However, the figure of life satisfaction displays the difference between quadratic and 
cubic polynomial estimations in the top quartile of income distribution. The two 
polynomial estimations are also different from nonparametric kernel estimation.  
In general, the relationship between self-assessed health and income is 
negative whereas it is positive between life satisfaction and income. The relationship 
between depression and income is ambiguous.  The average scale of life satisfaction 
goes up with the increase of income whereas the average probability of reporting good 
health goes down when income increases one unit.        
In Figure 4.2, nonparametric estimation reveals more information of the 
health income relationship than parametric estimations. For instance, in the figure of 
self-assessed health, parametric estimations present the approximately fixed gradient 
of health status whereas nonparametric kernel estimation presents varied gradients of 
health status when income increases. 
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Figure 4.2 Nonparametric Kernel Estimation for SAH, CES-D, and LS 
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The slope is of interest to researchers because it represents the variation of 
magnitude of the dependent variable when the explanatory variable changes by one 
unit. The average derivative estimators of SAH, CES-D, and LS are -0.01, 0.072, and 
0.054, respectively (see Table 4-3). The average slope of the estimated line of SAH 
along income is negative which implies that SAH has a negative association with 
income in general. However, in the case of CES-D, the positive average slope implies 
that depression has a positive association with income generally and so does the case 
of LS. When income increases one unit, the average probability of reporting good 
self-assessed health decreases 1 percent as well as the average scale of depression and 
life satisfaction increases 0.072 and 0.054 point respectively.  
Furthermore, the average derivative estimators (ADEs) in different quartiles 
of income distribution are shown in Table 4-3. The ADEs of SAH are negative in all 
quartiles and it approximates to zero in the bottom quartile. The absolute value of 
ADE is greater in the middle quartiles than that in the top quartile. The average 
Notes: 1. The black line in the figures presents nonparametric regression.  
2. The red line presents the Probit regression. The blue line presents the polynomial 
quadratic regression, and the green line presents the polynomial cubic regression. 
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probability of reporting good health decreases 1.2% and 0.7% in the middle and top 
quartiles respectively. The ADEs of CES-D are positive in the bottom and top 
quartiles whereas the ADE is negative in the middle quartiles and its absolute value in 
the middle quartiles is greater than that in the other quartiles. The average scale of 
CES-D increases 0.13 point and falls 0.022 point in the bottom and top quartiles 
respectively when income increases one unit whereas it decreases 0.778 point in the 
middle quartiles. In respect of LS, the signs of ADE are consistent in three income 
levels. It is positive and the value of ADE is 0.069, 0.667, and 0.025 respectively. The 
average scale of life satisfaction in the bottom, middle, and top quartiles will increase 
0.069, 0.667, and 0.025 point respectively if income increases NT$1,000.  The ADE 
in the middle quartiles is greater than that in the bottom and top quartiles.  
In summary, in the middle quartiles of income distribution, the average 
gradients of self-assessed health, depression scale, and the scale of life satisfaction are 
the greatest. The depression and life satisfaction of the senior citizens have a great 
improvement after they escape from the bottom quartile to middle quartiles but the 
improvement reduces greatly after they move to the top income quartile. The possible 
explanation of the great improvement is that the family status and self-esteem of the 
senior citizens are raised after they escape from poverty and make a contribution to 
their family.    
 
Table 4-3 ADE of Nonparametric Kernel Estimation in Different Income Quartiles 
Health Indicators Bottom 25% 25% - 75% Upper 25% Overall 
SAH -1.06e-13 -0.012 -0.007 -0.01 
CES-D 0.13 -0.778 -0.022 0.072 
LS 0.069 0.667 0.025 0.054 
Note: Q1 represents the income below 25% of income ranking (approximate to NT$4,269) and 
Q3 represents the income above 75% of income ranking (approximate to NT$17,407). 
 
The pattern of relationship between income and health indicators for the four 
groups partitioned by gender and marital status is shown in Figure 4.3 and the average 
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derivative estimators are displayed in Table 4-4. Figure 4.3 reveals that sex and 
marital status appear to be of significance to SAH, CES-D, and LF. In the figure of 
self-assessed health, the relationship between self-assessed health and income in four 
groups appears negative in general and the relationship of the single female group is 
relatively linear. Males are less likely to report good health than females and married 
males have less probability to report good health than single males after marriage is 
controlled. Above the approximated income level of NT$58,000, the relationship in 
the single female group is negatively linear. It means that the likelihood of reporting 
good health in the single female group reduce constantly when income increases.  
In the figure of CES-D, the relationship between CES-D and income is 
ambiguous in general but it is distinct that the female groups report more depression 
than the male groups below the approximated NT$50,000. Single females report more 
depression than married females and it is also the case in males groups. Above that 
income level, in general, the order of reporting high depression is single females, 
single males, married males, and married females. However, the single female group 
reports more depression than other groups whether at high or low income levels and 
its relationship is linear and nearly horizontal. One interesting circumstance in this 
figure is gender seems to be a determinant of depression when income is below 
NT$50,000 whereas marriage is a likely determinant when income is above 
NT$50,000. In the figure of life satisfaction, the relationship between life satisfaction 
and income is positive in general. The married groups show more life satisfaction than 
the single groups.          
In summary, after controlling for gender, married people report more life 
satisfaction and less depression than single people at the same income level. After 
controlling for marital status, males report a lower probability of reporting good health 
status and less depression than females.  
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In Table 4-4, the average gradient in the estimation of SAH is negative for the 
4 groups. The male groups show a larger average gradient than the female groups. It 
implies that the probability for males to report good self-assessed health decreases 
more than females when income increases one unit. When income increases one unit, 
married males will be 0.8% less likely to report good health, which is on top of the list 
among four groups. The following order is single males and both female groups as 
well as the reducing probabilities are 0.65% and 0.5%, respectively.     
In the estimation of CES-D, CES-D has a negative relationship with income 
in four groups although the average derivative of single females approximates to zero. 
The married groups have a greater average gradient than the single groups and 
married females have a larger average gradient than married males. It means that 
married groups reduce more depression than single groups when income increases one 
unit. Meanwhile, married females reduce more depression than married males by 
more than six times when income increases one unit. However, the depression level of 
the single female group almost does not change with the change of income.  
 
Note: The blue and black lines represent married and single females, respectively. The red 
and green lines represent married and single males, respectively. 
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Life satisfaction shows a positive relationship with income in four groups. 
When income increases one unit, the life satisfaction of the married groups increases 
more than that of the single groups when gender is controlled and the life satisfaction 
of the married male group increases more than the married female group.  
 
Table 4-4 ADE of Nonparametric Regression 
Group SAH CES-D LS 
Married Female -0.005 -0.264 0.032 
Single Female -0.005 -1.53e-15 0.03 
Married Male -0.008 -0.042 0.049 
Single Male -0.007 -0.031 0.011 
 
4.4.2 Semi-parametric Partially Linear Regression 
Semi-parametric regression combines the properties of parametric and 
nonparametric estimations. It includes some parametric components and leaves some 
components unspecified in the regression. The parametric components are the control 
characters for obtaining a more precise association between the dependent variable 
and its covariates of interest. In the case of health and income, the main concern is the 
association between income and health. Although the association is presented when 
estimating using nonparametric regression, the individual’s other characteristics are 
not controlled in these estimations apart from the fact that the sample is partitioned 
according to the individual’s characteristics before estimating. The advantage of semi-
parametric estimation is it can control an individual’s characteristics in the estimation 
and need not partition sample into groups before estimation. 
4.4.2.1 Partially Linear model 
     A semi-parametric partially linear model with p dimensions is given by  
      
niiuiZgiXiY ,,1,)(
')9.4( L=++= β
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where Xi is a p × 1 vector, β is a p × 1 vector of unknown parameters, and .qiZ ℜ∈  
The functional form of g(·) is unspecified. This model combines the parametric vector, 
β, and the nonparametric part, g(·). Meanwhile, the covariate vector, X, has linear 
form in the model. In the example of health and income association, Zi is absolute 
income amount and the X vector is the other individual’s socioeconomic status such as 
education and occupation, etc. The semi-parametric model can make health income 
relationship clearer after controlling for an individual’s socioeconomic status.  
The first step in estimating a semi-parametric partially linear model is to estimate the 
unknown parametric vector, β. After obtaining the parametric vector, one can replace 
β with 
∧β
 to obtain the estimate of g(·), .)(
∧
⋅g
 In the semi-parametric partially linear 
model, the constant term must be excluded from the equation for reasons of 
identification.  
4.4.2.2 The estimates of parametric part 
Robinson (1988) proposes a method of estimating the coefficient β. 
Transform Eq. (4.9) by taking the conditional expectation and then subtracting Eq. 
(4.10) from Eq. (4.9). 
      )()'|()|()10.4( iZgiZiXEiZiYE += β  
      iuiZiXEiXiZiYEiY +−=− β))'|(()|()11.4(  
In order to implement the estimation, the expected values in Eq. (4.11) are 
replaced by their nonparametric estimates denoted by 
∧
iY and ,
∧
iX  respectively. 
Meanwhile, the density-weighted approach is used to avoid the problem caused by a 
random denominator )( iZf
∧
in the kernel estimator. Rewrite Eq. (4.11) and show in 
Eq. (4.12) 
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Regress )()( iZfiYiY
∧∧
−
 on )()'( iZfiXiX
∧∧
− by least squares method and 
finally β is obtained. 
4.4.3 The estimates of nonparametric part 
g(·) can be obtained from Eq. (4.10) and it is equal to ).|'( iZiXiYE β−  After 
obtaining the n -consistent estimator of β, 
∧β , a consistent estimator of g(·) is given 
by  
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The nonnegative second order kernel is used to estimate )( iZg
∧
and the 
bandwidth h is selected by the method of least square cross-validation.  
4.4.3.1 An Application 
The demographical characteristics of age, sex, education, and marital status 
are controlled in the regression when estimating the unknown functional form of 
income and the result is presented in Figure 4.4 and Table 4-5. The patterns of three 
indicators in Figure 4.4 are similar to those in Figure 4.2 but they move down slightly.  
Table 4-5 displays the ADEs in different income quartiles after controlling the 
demographical variables in the estimation. Comparing Table 4-5 with Table 4-3, the 
signs of ADE in Table 4-5 are consistent with those in Table 4-3 but the absolute 
values of ADE become smaller apart from the ADE of overall CES-D and the ADE of 
CES-D in the bottom quartile. In the bottom quartile of income distribution the 
average scale of depression becomes greater after controlling demographical variables, 
which causes the bigger ADE of overall CES-D. The average scale of depression 
increases 2.829 points in bottom quartile and 0.311 point overall when income 
increases one unit.  
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Figure 4.4 Semi-parametric Partially Linear Estimation for SAH, CES-D, and LS 
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Table 4-5 ADE of Semi-parametric Partially Linear Estimation in Different Income 
Quantiles 
Health Indicators Bottom 25% 25% - 75% Upper 25% Overall 
SAH -2.76e-14 -0.01 -0.001 -0.007 
CES-D 2.829 -0.537 -0.012 0.311 
LS 0.061 0.078 0.02 0.031 
Note: Q1 represents the income below 25% of income ranking (approximate to NT$4,269) and 
Q3 represents the income above 75% of income ranking (approximate to NT$17,407). 
 
Table 4-6 shows the ADEs of semi-parametric partially linear estimation in 
four groups partitioned by marital status and gender factor. Comparing Table 4-6 with 
Table 4-4, the absolute values of ADE are smaller than those in Table 4-4 apart from 
the case of CES-D in the single male group. The ADE of the single male group in the 
CES-D estimation is the same as that in Table 4-4. The signs of ADE are the same as 
those in Table 4-4 apart from the case of CES-D in the single female group where it 
becomes positive but it maintains a very small value.  
 
 
Notes:  1. The line in the figure presents semi-parametric regression. 
            2. The points in the figures present the polynomial quadratic regression. 
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In summary, after controlling age and education factors in the estimations of 
four groups, the results are similar to those before controlling the demographical 
variables. The average probability of the male groups to report good health decreases 
more than the female groups when income increases one unit and the married groups 
increase more life satisfaction than the single groups. In respect of CES-D, depression 
level in married females decreases the most among four groups when income 
increases one unit.   
  
Table 4-6 ADE of Semi-parametric Partially Linear Regression for Four Groups 
Group SAH CES-D LS 
Married Female -0.003 -0.19 0.022 
Single Female -0.003 0.001 0.015 
Married Male -0.006 -0.027 0.037 
Single Male -0.006 -0.031 0.009 
 
4.4.4 Semi-parametric Single index Regression 
The ADEs estimated beforehand are not directly comparable to the 
coefficients obtained from the parametric estimation. Thus, the semi-parametric single 
index model is introduced because the average derivative estimators produced by this 
model are directly comparable to the coefficients of parametric estimations (Blundell 
and Duncan, 1998). The form of the semi-parametric single index model (SIM) is  
      uXgY += )'()17.4( β  
where Y is the dependent variable, X is a vector of q explanatory variables, β is the q × 
1 vector with unknown parameters, and u is the error satisfying E(u|X) = 0. The 
function form of g(·) is still left unknown. Many studies concern the estimation of β, 
for example, Hardle and Stoker (1989), Powell et al. (1989), Rilstone (1991), 
Ichimura (1993), and Klein and Spady (1993). Once the β is obtained, the g(·) can be 
estimated.  
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4.4.4.1 An Application 
The purpose of implementing SIM is to compare the estimates of coefficients 
under two alternative assumptions: functional form known versus unknown. The 
estimation used in the case of CES-D and LS is proposed by Ichimura (1993) and the 
estimation used in the case of SAH is proposed by Klein and Spady (1993). The 
coefficients in three cases are obtained by estimating the average derivative estimators 
and the results are shown in Table 4-77. The signs of average derivative estimators are 
consistent with those obtained by parametric estimations whereas the absolute values 
of the average derivative estimator for three indicators are smaller than those in Probit 
and OLS apart from the case of CES-D. The income square in the case of CES-D is 
not significant at 5% level, which implies that the relationship between CES-D and 
income is not a quadratic form but it cannot mean that the linear form is correct. Even 
if the square term in the LS estimation is significant at 1% level, it cannot either say 
the quadratic form between life satisfaction and income is correct. The model 
specification test will answer these questions.  
 
Table 4-7 Probit, OLS, and SIM for SAH,CES-D, and LS 
SAH 
Probit SIM 
Var. Coef. St. Error Var. ADE. St. Error† 
Income -0.01*** 0.021 Income -0.003 0.0002 
 
CES-D 
OLS SIM 
Var. Coef. St. Error Var. ADE. St. Error† 
Income 0.002 0.981 Income 0.006 0.0006 
Squ. Income 0.0001 0.054 - - - 
 
LS 
OLS SIM 
Var. Coef. St. Error Var. ADE. St. Error† 
Income 0.038*** 0.525 Income 0.032 0.002 
Squ. Income -0.0002*** 0.029 - - - 
Note: 1. *** 1% significant level; ** 5% significant level; * 10% significant level 
          2. † represents the bootstrapped standard error. 
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4.5 Model Specification Test 
SAH is a binary variable so the Logit or Probit model is usually used in this 
estimation. Either the Logit or Probit model constitutes the nonlinear estimation with 
specified functional form. Thus, the regressors are presumed to have a nonlinear 
relationship with SAH. With respect to CES-D and LS, the two variables can be 
regarded as the continuous variables though the ranges of their scale are in 0-30 and 0-
10, respectively. OLS is usually the first try to estimate the continuous dependent 
variables. The square term is usually a regressor if one expects the explanatory 
variable to have a nonlinear relationship with the dependent variable. Thus, the square 
term of income is a regressor in the regressions of CES-D and LS. Table 4-7 shows 
that income has a nonlinear relationship with LS according to the significance of 
square term of income, but an ambiguous relationship with CES-D because the square 
term is not significant, which does not mean the cubic term or the higher-order terms 
are not significant.  
Is the quadratic parametric form a correct specification to interpret the health 
income relationship? The model specification tests will answer this question. In the 
parametric model specification test, it requires the user to specify a set of parametric 
alternatives to compare with null specification and the null hypothesis will be rejected 
if the data generating process indeed follows the alternative models. However, the 
parametric model specification test will be an inconsistent test because it lacks power 
in certain directions if there exist the alterative models which cannot be detected (Li 
and Racine, 2007, p.351). Nonparametric methods can overcome this problem and 
conduct a consistent test.  
  The test implemented here is proposed by Li and Racine (2007). They test 
the correct specification of a parametric model based on the value of integrated square 
difference between the parametric model and the nonparametric model. The null 
hypotheses here are E(D|9) = & + 9,  E(D|9) = & + 9 + 9,  and E(D|9) =
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& + 9 + 9 + 9,		where H is health outcome and x is income. If the null 
hypotheses are rejected respectively, it means the parametric linear, quadratic, and 
cubic forms of income are not a correct specification to interpret health income 
relationship. However, this test cannot be implemented if the dependent variable is a 
binary outcome. It is only applicable to continuous dependent variables. This test 
rejects the null models of CES-D and LS at 1% significant level.21 It means that the 
parametric forms mentioned above are a misspecification when depression, life 
satisfaction, and income variables are taken into account in the analysis.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The relationship between income and health in elderly group (those aged 
between 60 and 80) is of primary interest in this chapter. The analysis data are micro-
level data from the Survey of Health and Living Status of the Elderly. In the previous 
literature, many studies use the square term of income or even higher-order terms as 
the regressors to present the nonlinear relationship between health and income. In 
view of the potential problem of misspecification, the model specification test and 
nonparametric strategy are implemented in the present analysis. Nonparametric kernel 
and semi-parametric partially linear estimations all provide the evidence that there is a 
nonlinear relationship between three indicators and income. Meanwhile, these 
estimations also reveal the circumstance of health inequality related to income in 
detail. The model specification test rejects the parametric linear, quadratic, and cubic 
forms are not a correct specification. It makes the distinction between nonparametric 
estimation and three parametric forms when income is concerned.  
                                                   
21
 In the case of CES-D the test statistics of ‘Jn’ of parametric linear form, quadratic form, and 
cubic form are 33.138, 31.838, and 31.762, respectively, and P-values are less than 2.22e-16. 
In the case of LS the test statistics, ‘Jn’, are 4.323, 2.611, and 2.581 and each P-vale of ‘Jn’ is 
less than 2.22e-16. 
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Self-assessed health has a negative relationship with income and this is 
different from our prior expectation. The relationship between life satisfaction and 
income is positive, which is the same as expectation. However, the relationship 
between depression and income is ambiguous. One plausible reason is that age might 
replace income to become an influential determinant of self-assessed health for the 
population aged between 60 and 80 years.  According to average derivative estimators, 
the average scale of depression reduces in the middle quartiles (25%-75%) whereas in 
the other quartiles it increases when income increases. The average scale of life 
satisfaction increases substantially with the increase of income in the middle quartiles.  
After the sample is partitioned into several subgroups by using gender and 
marital status, single females have an approximately horizontal relationship between 
depression and income and a relatively linear relationship between self-assessed 
health and income whereas married males and females have a more curvilinear 
relationship in the cases of self-assessed health and life satisfaction. Thus, the self-
assessed health status and life satisfaction for married people is more sensitive to 
income than for single people.  
The curvilinear relationship implies that health status is more sensitive to 
income change and, further, it is able to reflect income-related health inequality. The 
social support or the social benefits for specified people at different income levels or 
in different groups would have more effects on reducing the depression and improving 
life satisfaction of the elderly. With respect to self-assessed health, the effect of the 
social support and the social benefits on self-assessed health is uncertain according to 
above empirical results which show that the negative health income relationship. If the 
social support and the social benefits are given, the probability for the elderly in low 
income level to report good health will decrease due to the increase of income so that 
the average self-assessed health will drop. One of the possible methods to improve 
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average self-assessed health is taking money from rich people to provide and support 
the health relevant public goods.   
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Chapter 5. Handling the endogeneity of income to health using a field 
experiment in Taiwan 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses quasi-experimental methods to examine the absolute income 
hypothesis. The absolute income and the relative income hypotheses are the 
mainstream of the discussion. Even if the conclusions are mixed, income is still a 
crucial factor for health, whether viewed in physical or psychological terms. From a 
physical perspective, for example, money can buy more nutritious food and better 
quality medical treatment whereas from a psychological perspective, for example, 
money offers the security and obviates financial stress. In the discussion of this topic, 
the endogeneity is another story apart from the health social gradient. Individuals with 
low income may have worse health either from physical causes or from a 
psychological perspective. Conversely, their low incomes may result from their poor 
health. Because of this argument, an alternative means of estimating the health income 
association is to find exogenous time variation in income, such as that provided by 
policy changes.  
In the endogenous scenario, econometric methods usually utilise instrumental 
variable estimation to deal with the income effect on health (Etter, 1996; Meer et al., 
2003). Another way to identify the effect is the quasi-experimental method (Gardner 
and Oswald, 2007). This chapter uses two quasi-experimental methods, difference-in-
differences (DiD) and regression discontinuity (RD), to evaluate the policy effect of 
the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation (SFWBIR) on health. Those 
farmers who are 65 years of age and have been members of Farmer Health Insurance 
(FHI) for at least 6 months are eligible to claim a specific amount benefit until they 
die.  
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The Farmer Health Insurance is the only occupational insurance that does not 
contain a retirement pension. The senior farmers are unable to receive any pension to 
secure their retirement whereas the other workers claim their retirement pension from 
their particular occupational insurance22. In 1995, the government implemented the 
Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation to compensate for absence of 
retirement pension in Farmer Health Insurance. This is a pure cash injection policy so 
it is a good instrument for evaluating the absolute income effect on health and 
happiness. Indirectly, it is a test for the absolute income hypothesis. 
The validity of a difference-in-differences strategy depends crucially on the 
comparability of control and treatment groups - whether the experiences of the control 
group accurately represents how the treatment group would have fared in the absence 
of legal intervention and on the common time trend (the time trends for two groups 
are parallel) which captures the wider changes in society which are unrelated to the 
particular policy we are interested in evaluating. However, regression discontinuity 
can avoid these defects because of its property of randomization around the cut-off 
point and its feasibility with one wave data after policy intervention. Hence, 
regression-discontinuity is used as an auxiliary to compare with the difference-in-
differences estimate.  
This chapter is organised as followings. Section 2 reviews the previous 
literature. Section 3 introduces the social welfare policies of the senior citizens in 
Taiwan and section 4 discusses the different-in-differences model and RD design. 
Section 5 introduces the data set from the Survey of Health and Living Status of the 
Elderly (SHLE) used in this chapter. Section 6 describes the empirical strategies. 
Section 7 shows the results of empirical results. Finally, section 8 is conclusion.  
                                                   
22
 Before the implementation of SFWBIR, councils in a few counties had provided similar 
benefits for their senior farmers, especially in agricultural counties. The amount differs from 
county to county. However, the proportion of those claiming the benefit was not high before 
1995. 
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5.2 Previous Research  
The vast majority of papers discuss the health income hypotheses based on 
the assumption of health social gradient – a negative relationship between health 
indicator and socioeconomic status. In this framework the health status at the left hand 
side of the equation and the other factors, such as demography and income, are at the 
other side.  
Smith (1999) describes the patterns of association between wealth and health 
from two data sets, HRS and the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old Survey. 
He finds the wealth is affected by health not only through the productivity of labour 
but also through other aspects, such as health anticipation and health insurance. He 
also makes the same description in health social gradient. However, these patterns 
cannot explain whether there is a causal link in the association between health and 
wealth or income if the researchers only take one of the associations into 
consideration. Hence, identification is needed in the discussion that one variable may 
have a structure effect on another variable.     
There are some methods to identify the causal relationship between health and 
income, including experiment, natural experiment, instrumental variables and 
econometric identification. Meer et al. (2003) use the data drawn from four waves, 
1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999, of a Panel Study of Income Dynamics and find an 
instrument, the inheritance, for the change in wealth to identify the association 
between health and wealth. Their results show that wealth has positive and statistically 
significant effects on health but its magnitude is very small. After implementing IV 
estimate they find that the results are approximately the same but the coefficient of 
wealth becomes nonsignificant. Finally, they conclude that short term change in 
wealth does not affect health status. The similar estimate has been done by Ettner 
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(1996). The author uses the combined data from National Survey of Families and 
Households, the Survey of Income and Program Participation and NHIS to estimate 
the structural impact of income on several measures of health. She compares the 
results of OLS with IV estimates and finds both of the estimates show that an increase 
in income significantly improves mental and physical health but it also increases the 
prevalence of alcohol consumption.    
An alternative method is as Adams et al. (2003). The authors test for the 
absence of effect of socioeconomic status on innovations in health. They hypothesize 
there is no causality. If this hypothesis is accepted, it implies that there is no causal 
link and no persistent hidden factors moulding initial status and subsequent 
innovations. They find that the significantly positive association between health and 
socioeconomic status at the initial stage; however, the change of wealth has no 
significant effects on innovations of health. Hence, they conclude that there is no 
causal link from wealth to mortality or the sudden onset of health conditions.  
Gardner and Oswald (2007) ask a question of whether money makes people 
happy. They adopt the data between 1996 and 2003 from BHPS and use lottery wins 
as a natural experiment to investigate the relationship between innovations of money 
and health. The sample is partitioned into two groups, one with no wins and the other 
with small wins and their results show that the individuals with small wins go on to 
eventually exhibit better mental health. After two years, the average GHQ score of 
winners improves by 1.4 points.   
In summary, the relationship between income or wealth and health is still 
inconsistent whether considering health social gradient or the causal link between 
health and income. In this chapter, a policy of social welfare for senior farmers is used 
to identify the causal link. Before the identification, the general situation of elderly 
welfare in Taiwan is introduced in next section. 
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5.3 Background and Investigating Motivation     
5.3.1 Social schemes 
Social schemes are a crucial component of the social security system. The 
purpose of such social schemes is not only to secure the economic wellbeing of senior 
citizens but also to lighten somewhat the burden of the younger generation in the 
family. To date the social schemes in Taiwan include Labour Insurance (LI), 
Government Employee Insurance (GEI), Farmer Health Insurance, National Pension 
Scheme (NPS), the Military Insurance (MI) and National Health Insurance (NHI). 
Each of these schemes is supervised by a different government department. Apart 
from National Pension Scheme and National Health Insurance, these compulsory 
schemes are specific to particular occupations. National Health Insurance applies to 
all Taiwanese citizens regardless of age and occupation whereas National Pension 
Scheme applies to all adults who are over 25 and under 65 years of age and are not 
covered by any one of the compulsory occupational schemes.  
Among these schemes, Farmer Health Insurance and National Health 
Insurance are health insurances. Hence they mainly cover medical utilization instead 
of offering retirement pension. However, Farmer Health Insurance is the only social 
scheme specific to a particular occupation without the retirement pension comparing 
with Labour Insurance, Government Employee Insurance and Military Insurance. 
Hence the government implemented the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim 
Regulation in 1995 to redress the lack of the retirement pension in the Farmer Health 
Insurance. 
Although the occupational schemes cover most Taiwanese citizens, there are 
still 4.7 million people between 25-65 years of age who are not covered. In order to 
cover this population, the government implemented National Pension Scheme in 2008. 
It is a compulsory scheme for Taiwanese citizens at 25-65 years of age and not 
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covered by any occupational scheme. Before the implementation of the National 
Pension Scheme, the government considered the people not covered under any 
occupational schemes have no retirement pension so the Senior Welfare Benefit 
Interim Regulation (SWBIR) was implemented in 2003. It benefits the senior citizens 
aforementioned and the other senior citizens meeting the criteria even if they are 
covered by a particular occupational insurance. However, this regulation is a 
transitional stage of the National Pension Scheme. It was abolished after the National 
Pension Scheme was implemented.  
Apart from the social benefits cited above, the government implements other 
social welfare benefits to complement the social schemes in order to make the social 
security system more comprehensive. 
5.3.2 The elderly welfare in Taiwan  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Taiwanese people brought about a well-
documented economic miracle within East Asia and the whole society moved away 
from poverty and into an affluent stage. At the same time, thanks to the progress of 
medical treatment, the life span of Taiwanese people was prolonged.     
 
Table 5-1 Statistics for population and life span 
Year Total 
population 
The elderly population Prop. of  
elderly 
citizens 
Life expectancy 
Sum Male Female Male Female 
1995 21357431 1631054 892767 738287 7.64% 71.85 77.74 
1996 21525433 1691608 923139 768469 7.86% 71.89 77.77 
1997 21742815 1752056 949880 802176 8.06% 71.93 77.81 
1998 21928591 1810231 973455 836776 8.26% 72.20 77.96 
1999 22092387 1865472 992852 872620 8.44% 72.46 78.12 
2000 22276672 1921308 1011023 910285 8.62% 72.67 78.44 
2001 22405568 1973357 1026591 946766 8.81% 72.87 78.75 
2002 22520776 2031300 1045154 986146 9.02% 73.22 78.94 
2003 22604550 2087734 1063368 1024366 9.24% 73.40 79.31 
2004 22689122 2150475 1083496 1066979 9.48% 73.47 79.70 
2005 22770383 2216804 1105422 1111382 9.74% 74.50 80.80 
Source: Statistics of the Ministry of the Interior  
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Table 5-1 shows that the life expectancy for males and females was 74.5 and 
80.8 years respectively in 2005. It increases 3 years for both genders over a decade 
though the gap between two genders maintains at about 5 years. 
According to the statistics of the Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior, in 1993 
1,490,801 people were 65 years old and over, approximately 7.1 percent of the 
population. It had achieved the definition of an aging population according to the 
World Health Organization23. In 2001, the proportion went up to 8.81 percent and, in 
2003, the proportion increased to 9.24 percent. By 2007, it was 10.04 percent. With 
the onset of an aging society, elderly welfare policies gradually become an issue. The 
first Elderly Welfare Act (EWA) was enacted in 1980 and amended in 1997. After the 
1997 amendment, the Elderly Welfare Act covered almost all the needs of senior 
citizens, such as benefits, pension, accommodation, and other protection. The 
guarantee of economic security is a crucial aim in this Act. Economic security 
comprises three regulations: first, financial benefits for senior citizens in households 
with low income; second, financial benefits for senior citizens in middle income 
households; third, additional care benefits for senior citizens in households with low 
and middle income. The amount of benefits depends on the economic status of their 
households. For example, senior citizens can receive NT$6,000 (New Taiwan 
Dollar)24 if the income per head in the household is lower than 1.5 times of the 
announced lowest living expense. The amount is NT$3,000 if the income per head in 
the household is higher than 1.5 times but less than 2.5 times of the government’s 
announced lowest living expense. The announced lowest living expense is different in 
Taiwan province, Taipei city, Kaohsiung city, Kinmen county and Lienchiang county 
because of urbanization. Table 5-2 shows the lowest living expense in each area. 
                                                   
23The criterion of an aging society for WHO is tone where he proportion of the elderly 
population is more that 7% for the country as a whole.     
24
 The average current exchange rate to U.S. Dollars in 1995 was US$1 exchanged NT$27.27. 
NT$3000 is approximately US$110. This amount was approximate to half of the lowest living 
expenses in Taiwan province in 1996.   
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Overall, the purpose is to protect those senior citizens whose economic position 
occurs to the left extreme of income distribution to suffer from the risk of poverty. 
In 1995 the government enacted a benefit regulation for the senior farmer 
citizens called the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation (SFWBIR). The 
definition of a senior farmer was an individual who was aged 65 years or older and 
had participated in the Farmer Health Insurance25 for at least 6 months. The people 
who were defined as senior farmers and did not claim the old-age pension from any 
other social schemes or other benefits from government were eligible to claim the 
senior farmer welfare benefit. In 1998 the first amendment was made. First, the 
definition of a senior farmer included the fishermen who had been the first categorical 
member of fishermen union and had participated in the labour insurance scheme for 6 
months before 13th November 1998 without interruption. Meanwhile, they had to start 
to claim the retirement pension from the Labour Insurance before 13th November 1998. 
The fishermen meeting the above criteria are eligible to claim the benefit. Second, a 
senior farmer who has claimed the old-age pension from any other social schemes or 
other benefits from government can choose the benefit of SFWBIR or the original 
benefit. Third, those senior citizens who have claimed the pension from other social 
schemes but participated in Farmer Health Insurance or the membership of the first 
category of fishermen unit which is covered by Labour Insurance after the amendment 
are ineligible to claim SFWBIR benefit.  
To date, the SEWBIR benefit increases from NT$3,000 per month in 1995 to 
NT$4,000 per month in 2004 and, further, to NT$6,000 per month in 2007.  
 
                                                   
25
 There are five criteria to participate in famer health insurance: 1. Age of participants is  15 
and older; 2. The participants have to perform  agricultural work for 90 days or more every 
year; 3. No other full time jobs; 4. If the participants are landowners or land tenants, they have 
to work in agriculture consecutively for one year; 5. The output of products of agriculture, 
forestry, and animal husbandry achieves NT$30,600 per head in one year or the input of 
equipment achieves 20,400 per head in one year; 6. No reception of other benefits or pension 
from social insurance.       
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Table 5-2 Lowest living expense in each area     
    Area 
 
 
Year 
Taiwan 
province 
Taipei 
city 
Kao-
hsiung 
city 
Kin-
men 
county 
Lien-
chiang 
county 
Exchange 
Rate GDP per 
capita 
(USD) USD/NTD 
GBP/
USD 
1985 1,950 2,100 2,000 ------- ------- 39.85 1.29 ------- 
1986 2,000 2,250 2,000 ------- ------- 37.82 1.46 ------- 
1987 2,100 2,250 2,100 ------- ------- 31.77 1.63 ------- 
1988 2,200 2,350 2,200 ------- ------- 28.59 1.78 ------- 
1989 2,400 3,000 2,400 ------- ------- 26.4 1.63 7,520 
1990 2,700 3,588 2,700 ------- ------- 26.89 1.78 8,086 
1991 3,200 4,050 3,200 ------- ------- 26.80 1.76 8,973 
1992 3,800 4,465 3,800 2,400 2,400 25.16 1.76 10,572 
1993 4,300 4,920 4,300 3,000 3,000 26.38 1.5 11,028 
1994 4,650 5,730 4,650 4,000 3,500 26.45 1.53 11,932 
1995 5,000 6,290 5,000 4,400 4,000 26.47 1.57 12,865 
1996 5,400 6,640 5,400 4,400 4,400 27.45 1.56 13,376 
1997 6,000 6,720 6,000 4,700 4,700 28.66 1.63 13,739 
1998 6,700 7,750 6,700 5,800 5,800 33.44 1.65 12,546 
1999 7,110 11,443 8,828 5,800 5,800 32.26 1.61 13,534 
2000 7,598 11,625 9,152 5,900 5,900 31.22 1.51 14,641 
2001 8,276 12,977 9,814 5,900 5,900 33.8 1.44 13,107 
2002 8,433 13,288 9,559 6,000 6,000 34.57 1.5 13,369 
2003 8,426 13,313 9,712 6,000 6,000 34.41 1.63 13,737 
2004 8,529 13,797 9,102 6,300 6,300 33.42 1.83 14,985 
2005 8,770 13,562 9,711 6,300 6,300 32.16 1.82 16,022 
Source: 1. Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan National 
Statistics, Taiwan. 2. Central Bank of Taiwan. 3. IMF. Unit: New Taiwan Dollar (NTD) 
 
In 2002 the government launched another benefit regulation named the Senior 
Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation for the senior citizens who are excluded from the 
aforementioned regulations. Each eligible senior citizen can receive NT$3,000 every 
month. However, a few senior citizens are still excluded such as: 1. those who have 
been in receipt of government care; 2. those who have received their retirement 
pension from the public sector; 3. those who have received other benefits from the 
government26; 4. those whose total personal income was more than NT$500,000 in the 
last tax year; 5. those whose entire property in terms of land and building exceeds 5 
million NTD; 6. those who are in the jail. Criteria 2, 4, and 5 exclude the affluent and 
criterion 3 excludes those people who have claimed other benefits from the 
government under the terms of to social justice. However, this regulation was 
                                                   
26
 This criterion excludes those senior citizens who have received benefits from the second 
regulations of EWA, SFWBIR, and the regulations for senior veterans. 
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abolished in 2008 after the start of the National Pension Scheme. The time scale of the 
regulations is shown as Table 5-3. 
 
Table 5-3 Time table of welfare regulations of senior citizens 
Welfare regulation Date of launch Final amendment Remark 
Elderly Welfare Act 26th January 1980 31st January 2007 ------- 
Farmer health Insurance 23rd June 1989 26th June 2002 ------- 
Senior Farmer Welfare 
Benefit Interim Regulation 19th May 1995 20th July 2007 ------- 
Senior Welfare Benefit 
Interim Regulation 22nd May 2002 18th June 2003 
Were abolished on 
30th September 2008 
National Pension Scheme 8th August 2007 ------- Were implemented 
on 1st October 2008 
 
Table 5-4 reveals that the proportion of senior citizens claiming benefits 
increases over time. After the Senior Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation was 
implemented, the proportion rose to over 50 percent. In 2003 the proportion of senior 
citizens was 12.33 percent covered by Elderly Welfare Act, 32.43 percent by the 
Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation, and 30.49 percent by the Senior Welfare 
Benefit Interim Regulation. 
The total proportion covered by the above regulations is 71.2 percent. Given 
that government policies tend to increase certain senior-citizen benefit, the income 
structure of senior citizens changes over time as displayed in Table 5-5. In 1993 the 
most crucial income source for senior citizens was from their children, followed by, in 
importance, payment of interest or capital, retirement pension, wages, government 
benefits, and transfers from relatives or friends. In 2003 and 2005 the top three 
sources became children, government benefits, and retirement pension. Income from 
children becomes the main source from 1993 to 2005. However, government benefits 
become the second income source for senior citizens after 2002.  
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Table 5-4 Statistics of benefits (Unit: NT$1,000) 
EWA 
SFWBIR SWBIR 
Total 
population 
ages at 65 or 
older 
Percentage of 
people getting 
these benefits Low income household 
Middle income 
household 
Year Persons Amount Persons Amount Persons Amount Persons Amount Persons % 
1995 ------- ------- ------- ------- 315192 5,627,721 ------- ------- 1,631,054 19.32 
1996 19,788 1,491,603 253,090 14,076,108 366,059 12,426,828 ------- ------- 1,691,608 37.77 
1997 19,158 1,371,896 137,919 7,609,775 425,947 12,426,828 ------- ------- 1,752,056 33.28 
1998 19,575 1,368,339 172,277 7,609,775 441,665 14,210,445 ------- ------- 1,810,231 35 
1999 19,366 1,377,131 172,117 8,617,172 588,429 15,742,716 ------- ------- 1,865,472 41.81 
2000 19,602 1,383,558 185,362 9,042,202 635,838 24,327,396 ------- ------- 1,921,308 43.76 
2001 18,699 1,335,955 162,512 8,487,905 656,460 23,188,599 ------- ------- 1,973,357 42.45 
2002 18,233 1,299,330 164,159 8,693,324 669,779 23,761,377 424,966 15,066,420 2,031,300 62.87 
2003 17,798 1,273,324 156,153 8,606,150 677,048 24,129,852 636,583 19,104,373 2,087,734 71.25 
2004 15,653 1,127,580 140,793 8,132,419 688,840 32,107,394 692,950 24,190,000 2,150,475 71.53 
2005 15,327 1,093,639 132,746 7,835,611 696,808 33,198,715 746410 26222000 2216804 71.78 
Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of the Interior
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Table 5-5 Income sources of senior citizens 
The economical source of senior citizens  (unit: degree of importance) 
Survey 
year 
Children Retired 
pension 
Wage Benefits Interest 
gain 
Relations, 
friends 
1993 52.3 14.76 6.60 1.61 17.25 0.86 
1996 48.28 17.55 7.30 6.37 13.15 0.40 
2000 47.13 15.39 13.72 12.33 9.26 0.53 
2002 51.72 17.35 11.81 22.58 12.23 0.55 
2005 53.37 14.15 11.78 33.34 10.79 0.56 
Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of the Interior 
 
5.3.3 Motivation for Investigation 
The retired workers in Taiwan are usually eligible for two pensions. One is 
the retirement pension from the specified occupational scheme. The other is the 
contributing retirement pension financed by employees and employers. However, not 
all retired people are eligible to receive the retirement pension from their company if 
they do not fulfil the retirement criteria even if they have paid into the pension every 
month 27 . The pensions secure economic independence for retired people and, 
additionally, can lighten the economic burden of their offspring. Economic 
independence for retired people not only secures their status in the family but also 
implies a certain freedom and self-respect. For a poor family, pensions can secure 
their basic living.  
Each of the social welfare schemes specific to a particular occupation usually 
includes the retirement pension. However, Farmer Health Insurance is the only 
occupational scheme without a retirement pension. This is the reason for the 
government implementing the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation. 
Though SFWBIR is a social welfare benefit, it can also be regarded as the retirement 
pension for the senior farmers. The difference between SFWBIR benefit and 
                                                   
27
 There are two kinds of retirement in the company. One is voluntary retirement. The other 
one is forced retirement. The criteria of former one are as follows: 1. 55 years old or older and 
have worked in a company for at least 15 years; 2. Have worked in a company for at least 25 
years; 3. 60 years old or older and have worked in a company for at least 10 years. The criteria 
of latter one are as follows: 1. Achieve 65 years old; 2. 55 years old or older and physical or 
mental problem is too severe to work.   
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retirement pension in occupational schemes is that the amount of former one is fixed, 
whereas the latter one depends on their contribution. 
The interest of this chapter is to investigate whether or not the intervention of 
SFWBIR benefit improves the health status and happiness of the senior farmers 
compared with the workers in other occupations whose insurance includes a 
retirement pension. The hypothesis in this chapter is that SFWBIR improves the 
health status and happiness of the senior farmers. In other words, the absolute income 
improves the health status and happiness of the senior farmers. 
Using SFWBIR benefit as an instrument possesses several advantages. First, 
it is easy to use the criteria of SFWBIR to partition samples to treatment group and 
control group. Second, it covers approximate one third of senior citizens. Third, the 
retired age of covered individuals is more flexible than other occupations because 
there is no legally retired age for farmers. Thus, the retirement effects can be excluded 
from the analysis of SFWBIR benefit. Accordingly, the Senior Farmer Welfare 
Benefit Interim Regulation can be a good quasi-experimental instrument. If it has a 
significant impact on the health status and happiness of the senior farmer, indirectly, it 
can be postulated that the gain in absolute income affects the health status and 
happiness of the senior farmers. 
The quasi-experimental methods applied in this chapter are difference-in-
differences, difference-in-difference-in-differences (DiDiD) and regression-
discontinuity. Difference-in-differences and regression-discontinuity are popular 
methods to identify a causal relationship. In the difference-in-differences design, how 
to select treatment group and control group randomly influences the result of the 
estimates. However, in the regression-discontinuity design, the individuals around the 
cut-off point are assumed to be identical. Thus, the problem of randomization is 
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negligible. In order to achieve more robust estimates, more control groups are 
included in the analysis which is difference-indifference-in-differences estimation.    
 
5.4 Identification strategy  
     The central issue in the evaluation of public policies is to separate their 
causal effect from the confounding effect of other factors influencing the outcome of 
interest. Random assignment of units to the intervention defines the treatment and 
control groups that are equivalent in all respects, except for their treatment status. 
Thus, the policy effects can be acquired in a straight way. However, in practice, 
random assignment is not always practicable. Experimental methods may reveal the 
causality between two variables because they assign the treatment and control groups 
randomly through the experimental design. It makes these two groups more 
comparable. Nevertheless, randomized field experiments are usually costly and 
sample size is usually small. Moreover, there are still some potential problems for 
experimental data in practice, such as failure to randomize, failure to follow the 
treatment protocol, and so on. The sample size of non-experimental data set, such as 
household survey or health status survey, is usually large but it is difficult to assign 
the observations into the appropriately comparable groups due to the lack of 
randomization. Thus, the quasi-experimental design becomes a good method to 
identify the casual effect between two variables when the researchers use non-
experimental data. It is the one that looks similar to experimental design though it 
lacks the randomization which is the key issue in experimental design. However, the 
advantages are that it is not as costly as experimental design and, on the other hand, it 
can offer more precise interpretation of causality than the traditionally econometric 
methods. Difference-in-differences and regression-discontinuity designs are two 
methods that are used frequently. The following sections introduce these two designs.   
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5.4.1 Difference-in-differences (DiD) 
     The quasi-experimental method commonly used in social science is 
difference-in-differences. It compares the outcomes between treatment and control 
groups. Thus, the assumption needed on their context is that there is no 
contemporaneous shock to health and happiness of the treatment group during 1989 to 
1996. Due to non-random assignment, there may be differences between two groups 
prior to programme. Comparing the changes between differences before and after 
intervention can eliminate confounding factors and isolate the treatment. The 
evaluation of policy in difference-in-differences design is defined as Eq. (5.1): 
      )()()1.5( policybeforecontrolpolicyaftercontrolpolicybeforetreatmentpolicyaftertreatmentpolicy YYYY −−−=∆  
where policy∆  presents the effect of policy on variables. The term in the two brackets 
presents the difference before and after the policy intervention in treatment and 
control groups respectively.  
There is a strong assumption in the difference-in-differences design which 
presumes that treatment group and control group have a common time trend (the time 
trends for two groups are parallel) which captures the wider changes in society which 
are unrelated to the particular policy we are interested in evaluating. The common 
time trend can be subtracted in the Eq. (5.1). However, the estimated policy impact 
would be bias if this assumption did not hold. The estimate of intervention impact 
would not only present the effect of intervention but also include the difference in 
trend between the control and treatment group. 
The assumption is more likely verified when we look at the small time periods. 
However, in this chapter the time period is 7 years between two waves employed to 
estimation. It is doubted that treatment group (senior farmers) and control group (non-
senior farmers) have the common trend during 7 years. The common time trend 
assumption can be tested by implementing “placebo” difference-in-differences 
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estimation, which is defined as using the data of two waves before to intervention 
implement a difference-in-differences estimate, however, in this chapter the placebo 
difference-in-differences robustness check is not feasible because of the limitation of 
data. Thus, regression discontinuity method is employed as a robust check because 
regression discontinuity is feasible with one wave data after intervention and only the 
sample around the cut-off point, a threshold of treatment group selection, is selected 
into the regression. Thus, it avoids the common time trend assumption. If the results 
obtained from difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity are consistent, 
we can deduce that the common trend assumption is held in this study. 
         
5.4.2 Regression-Discontinuity Design (RD) 
     Although it is not an experimental process, Regression discontinuity 
possesses the advantage of the property of randomization near the cut-off point. It 
defines the characteristic that the probability of receiving treatment changes 
discontinuously as a function of one or more underlying variables.  
The original notion is to measure the gap before and after the policy or event. 
Let (Y1, Y0) be the potential outcomes when the individual does and does not 
participate in the programme, respectively. The treatment effect of programme is β 
defined by the difference between these two potential outcomes, Y1-Y0. However, it is 
not possible to observe Y1 and Y0 for the same individual at the same time because 
each individual is only exposed to one situation, either in programme or not. Let I be 
the binary variables for the treatment status, which I = 1 for participants and I = 0 for 
non-participants.  
If the assignment is a random process, the following condition in Eq. (5.2) 
holds 
      
IYY ⊥),()2.5( 01  
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where Y1 and Y0 are independent of I. The attractive characteristic of randomization is 
that the difference between the mean outcomes for participation and non-participation 
identifies the mean impact of programme  
      
)0|()1|()3.5( 01 =−== IYEIYEβ  
The regression-discontinuity design arises when the status of participation 
depends on an observable individual characteristic s and the probability of 
participation is known to be discontinuous at a point of s. However, a continuous 
random variable s on the real line is required. If s  is the discontinuity point, then a 
regression-discontinuity design is expressed as Eq.(5.4) 
     
]|1Pr[]|1Pr[)4.5( −+ =≠= sIsI
 
where the +s and −s  refer to those individuals marginally above and below s , 
respectively. In order to simplify the presentation, but without loss of generality, only 
the case in which the probability of participation increases as S crosses the threshold 
s
 is considered. Thus, Eq. (5.5) can be inferred from Eq. (5.4). 
     
0]|1Pr[]|1Pr[)5.5( >=−= −+ sIsI
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Moreover, there are two types of regression-discontinuity design, sharp and 
fuzzy regression-discontinuity designs. Trochim (1984) distinguishes the difference 
between shape regression-discontinuity and fuzzy regression-discontinuity according 
to the size of discontinuity shown in Eq. (5.5). If the probability of participation 
conditional on s increases from zero to one when the s crosses the threshold s , it is a 
sharp regression-discontinuity design. The variable s is the only one determinant for 
individuals to decide whether or not to enter in the programme. However, the fuzzy 
regression-discontinuity occurs when the size of the discontinuity at s is smaller than 
one and it implies that s is no longer the only one determinant of assignment to the 
treatment group. The assignment to treatment group may be affected by the 
observable and unobservable characteristics of individuals. The sharp regression-
discontinuity design is a special case of fuzzy regression-discontinuity design. Figure 
Figure 5.1 Assignment in the sharp (dashing) and fuzzy (solid) RD designs 
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5.128 illustrates the idea of regression-discontinuity design.  
There is a growing literature using this method to analyse the impact of 
policies. Van Der Klaauw (2002) applies regression-discontinuity design to 
investigate the impact of financial aid on the college enrolment. Hahn et al. (1999) 
evaluate the effects of an antidiscrimination law on the employment of a minority 
using sharp regression-discontinuity design. Blundell et al. (2002) also use regression-
discontinuity model to evaluate the employment impact of a mandatory job searcher 
programme. McCrary and Royer (2006) apply the regression-discontinuity method to 
investigate the relationship between maternal date of birth and infant health through 
the education route. Overall, the regression-discontinuity design has been used in 
many topics. It can circumvent the problems of randomization and endogeneity. The 
fuzzy regression-discontinuity model also can overcome the problem of self-selection 
if the information is available. Another advantage is that cross-sectional data can be 
used in this method if the data are limited.   
Two types of regression-discontinuity designs can be expressed by using 
regression equations. The following expression is following Hahn et al. (2001). 
Consider the following equation under the absence of endogenous problem. The i 
denotes individual i, ii Y0≡α , a function of si , and iii YY 01 −≡β . αi equals to α(si)+εi. 
iiii uIY ++= βα)6.5(  
With a sharp design, treatment Ii depends in a deterministic way on some 
observable variable si, }{1)( 0sssfI iii ≥== , where si is a continuum of values and 
the point s0 and it is assumed to be known that )(sf is discontinuous at s0. In the 
empirical work of section 5.6.4, the sharp design is used due to the property of policy 
intervention. 
                                                   
28
 Figure 5.1 is cited from Van Der Klaauw (2002). 
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As for a fuzzy design, Ii is a random variable given si, hence, the determinant 
function is defined as ]|1Pr[]|[)( ssIssIEsf iiii ==≡=≡ , and the conditional 
probability is known to be discontinuous at s0. The common feature is both designs 
view the probability of joining treatment group, ]|1Pr[ ii sI = , as a function of si and 
it is discontinuous at s0. The treatment effect, β, can be obtained by Eq. (5.7) 
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They (Hahn et al., 2001) make some assumptions to rationalize the 
regression-discontinuity design on identifying causal effects.  
   Assumption (5.1): ]|[ sE iα is continuous in s at s0. 
   Assumption (5.2): The conditional mean function ]|[ suE is continuous at s0. 
Thus, the Eq. (5.7) can be expressed as Eq. (5.8) 
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In the sharp regression-discontinuity design the term 
1]|[lim]|[lim
00
=−
↑↓
sIEsIE i
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i
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 so that the treatment effect simplifies to 
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 However, in the fuzzy regression-discontinuity design 
another assumption is imposed. 
   Assumption (5.3): The limits ]|[lim
0
sIEI i
ss↓
+
≡
 and ]|[lim
0
sIEI i
ss↑
−
≡ exist and 
−+ ≠ II . 
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This assumption implies that the discontinuity of f(s) exists at point s0.  
The treatment effects can be re-expressed as Eq. (5.9) for sharp regression-
discontinuity design and Eq. (5.10) for fuzzy design. 
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−= YYβ)9.5(
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The treatment effect identified above is the case of constant treatment effect 
(β instead of βi). It assumes everyone receives the same effect when exposed in the 
programme. However, it is a strong assumption. An alternative assumption is the 
variable treatment effect. Assumption (5.4) is needed in order to define the average 
treatment effects. 
    Assumption (5.4): The average treatment effect function ]|[ sE iβ  is continuous 
at s0. 
Suppose Ii is independent of βi conditional on si being near s0 and assumptions 
(5.1), (5.3), and (5.4) hold. The mean of treatment effects is as Eq. (5.11). 
      
−+
−+
−
−
=
II
YY
sE i ]|[)11.5( β   
With a sharp design, .]|[ −+ −= YYsE iβ  
The above inferences build on a strong assumption that the decision of participation of 
individuals is not affected by the treatment effect. It may be unrealistic that 
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individuals do not take the future treatment gain into consideration when they make 
the decision whether or not to participate in the programme.  
The Eq. (5.11) is biased without that strong assumption. However, another 
assumption is necessary. 
 Assumption (5.5): (i) (βi, Ii(s)) is jointly independent of si near s0.  
                   (ii) There exists ε > 0 such that Ii(s0 + e) ≥ Ii(s0 - e) for all 0 < e < ε. 
Under the assumptions (5.1), (5.3), and (5.5), Eq. (5.12) is obtained and it can 
identify the local average treatment effect (LATE) at s0. 
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Now consider the case of endogenous circumstance. The assignment variable 
s correlated with the outcome Y. Rewrite Eq. (5.6) and get Eq. (5.13) 
      iiiii skIY ωβα +++= )()13.5(  
where ].,|[ iiiii sIYEY −=ω  k(si) is a control function in the outcome equation and 
it is a conditional mean function E[u|I,s] (Heckman and Robb, 1985). This approach 
requires the correct specification k(s) of control function; otherwise, it is likely to 
produce inconsistent estimates. Van Der Klaauw (2002) suggests two estimation 
approaches to circumvent this problem. The first approach is to adopt a semi-
parametric specification for the control function or use local or nonparametric 
regression around the cut-off point s0. The second approach is to estimate the one-
sided limits such as Eq. (5.10) and Eq. (5.11). McCrary and Royer (2006) document 
the four one-side limits estimate supposed by Hahn et al. (2001) can circumvent the 
problem of endogeneity. 
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An important attraction of the regression-discontinuity design is that, by only 
exploiting its relationship with a single variable, one does not have to choose a 
functional form for the way in which other variables affect the dependent variable. 
Meanwhile, it also possesses the property of randomization but this property only 
exists near the cut-off point. Increasing the interval around the cut-off point is likely to 
produce a bias in the effect estimation, especially when the assignment variable itself 
is related to the outcome variable conditional on treatment status. Thus, its 
extrapolation is a drawback in this design.    
 
5.5 Data     
The data used in this chapter is also taken from the Survey of Health and 
Living Status of the Elderly which has been introduced in last chapter. Due to the 
policy intervention implemented in 1995, the first wave (1989) and third wave (1996) 
which are before and after policy intervention are selected whereas the second wave 
(1993) is not used because the number of observation younger than 65 years old is not 
enough for the estimations. The observations used in this chapter are at the age 
between 50 and 75 years old. The first wave and third wave comprise 3564 
observations and 4484 observations respectively.  
The dependent variables used in this chapter are self-assessed health, 
depression measurement of CES-D, and life satisfaction which are the same as those 
in chapter 5. The absolute income hypothesis will be supportive if the policy 
intervention has a significant effect on self-assessed health and depression 
measurement of CES-D and, at once, income increasing happiness will also be 
supportive if the policy intervention has a significant effect on life satisfaction. 
This data set comprises a number of detailed histories such as marital status, 
employment and retirement, and living arrangements/residence. The occupational 
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history provides comprehensive information to assign observations to treatment and 
control groups according to the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation.  
With the respect to the questionnaire of economic/financial well-being, the 
information of residence status, income, and expenditure is included. On the one hand, 
it is useful for distinguishing whether or not the individuals claim other government 
benefits. On the other hand, it can also reveal how the individuals utilize their benefits 
if they are eligible.  
The other explanatory variables used in this chapter are age, gender, number 
of children, and dummies for education levels, marital status, family scales, regions, 
and job types. The observations in the treatment group in first wave number 486 and 
in the third wave number 216. Table 5-6 shows the detailed sample size in each group 
and Table 5-7 depicts the sample statistics. The sample statistics of two separate years 
(1989 and 1996) are shown in Table A-6.  
 
 
Table 5-6 The sample size in each group 
 1989 1996 
            Group 
Age 
Farmer 
Non-
farmer 
Labour 
Manu-
facturing 
Labour 
Farmer 
Non-
farmer 
Labour 
Manu-
facturing 
Labour 
65-75 years 486 1345 165 216 1853 55 
Under 65 
years 292 1094 182 343 1698 319 
 
 
In Table 5-7, the treatment is the sub-group of elder farmer (age is 65 or older) 
and control 1 is the sub-group of farmer whose age is less than 65. In the non-farmer 
worker group and the manufacturing worker group, control 2 means the sub-group of 
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elder non-farmer worker and elder manufacturing worker (age is 65 or older) 
respectively and control 3 means the sub-group of non-farmer worker and 
manufacturing worker (age is less than 65) respectively.  
In each group, the mean of self-assessed health and life satisfaction of the 
elder sub-group is lower than its counterpart. It implies that the elder people in each 
group have lower likelihood to report good health and have lower mean of life 
satisfaction. As for depression scale, the elder observations in farmer group and in the 
manufacturing worker group report lower mean of depression scale than its 
counterpart (5.991 vs. 6.561 and 5.528 vs. 5.956)  whereas it is contrary in the non-
farmer worker group (6.982 vs. 6.439). 
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Table 5-7 Sample statistics (pooling 1989 and 1996) 
 Farmer Group Non-Farmer Worker Group29 Manufacturing Worker Group 
 Treatment Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Control 2 Control 3 
 Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) 
Health 
Indicators       
SAH 0.355  (0.479) 0.398  (0.49) 0.342  (0.475) 0.441  (0.497) 0.376  (0.485) 0.505  (0.5) 
CES-D 5.991  (4.313) 6.561  (4.578) 6.982  (4.774) 6.439  (4.267) 5.528  (4.425) 5.956  (3.824) 
LS 6.352  (2.426) 6.549  (2.389) 6.184  (2.566) 6.334  (2.498) 6.092  (2.316) 6.183  (2.429) 
Educational 
dummy       
Illiteracy 0.481  (0.5) 0.376  (0.485) 0.382  (0.486) 0.26  (0.439) 0.373  (0.485) 0.204  (0.403) 
Primary S. 0.466  (0.499) 0.57  (0.495) 0.409  (0.492) 0.502  (0.5) 0.464  (0.5) 0.645  (0.479) 
Junior H.S. 0.037  (0.189) 0.033  (0.179) 0.096  (0.295) 0.112  (0.315) 0.118  (0.324) 0.088  (0.283) 
Senior H.S. 0.01  (0.099) 0.017  (0.131) 0.062  (0.242) 0.077  (0.267) 0.032  (0.176) 0.048  (0.214) 
University 0.004  (0.065) 0.003  (0.056) 0.049  (0.215) 0.048  (0.213) 0.014  (0.116) 0.016  (0.125) 
Postgraduate - - 0.001  (0.025) 0.001  (0.038) - - 
Marital status 
dummy       
Married  0.728  (0.445) 0.841  (0.366) 0.633  (0.482) 0.803  (0.398) 0.632  (0.483) 0.832  (0.374) 
Divorce 0.02  (0.14) 0.008  (0.088) 0.026  (0.159) 0.035  (0.183) 0.055  (0.228) 0.048  (0.214) 
                                                   
29
 This group excludes the government employees, teachers, military men and three specialist groups, namely doctors, lawyers and certificated public 
accountant. The government employees, teachers and military employees receive a stable and substantial occupational benefit. However, the three specialists 
are usually at the top of the income distribution. Their observable characteristics are different from those of the other employees.     
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Widow 0.244  (0.43) 0.140  (0.347) 0.296  (0.457) 0.127  (0.333) 0.255  (0.437) 0.078  (0.268) 
Single 0.006  (0.075) 0.011  (0.104) 0.045  (0.207) 0.035  (0.184) 0.059  (0.236) 0.042  (0.201) 
Age 69.43 (3.069) 59.98  (3.593) 69.66  (2.98) 58.78  (4.244) 68.92  (2.769) 57.66  (4.497) 
Squire of age 4830.6 (422.12) 3610.8 (418.47) 4861.1 (416.75) 3472.7  (488.3) 4758  (384.8) 3345.4  (514.2) 
Male 0.694  (0.461) 0.624  (0.485) 0.522  (0.5) 0.512  (0.5) 0.673  (0.47) 0.747  (0.435) 
Family scale 
dummy       
1-4 people 0.439  (0.497) 0.422  (0.494) 0.513  (0.5) 0.479  (0.5) 0.477  (0.501) 0.437  (0.497) 
5-10 people 0.496  (0.5) 0.517  (0.5) 0.449  (0.497) 0.479  (0.5) 0.486  (0.501) 0.521  (0.5) 
Over 10 people 0.066  (0.248) 0.061  (0.24) 0.038  (0.191) 0.042  (0.2) 0.036  (0.188) 0.042  (0.201) 
Regional 
dummy       
North 0.11  (0.313) 0.09  (0.286) 0.316  (0.465) 0.305  (0.461) 0.395  (0.49) 0.291  (0.455) 
Middle 0.439  (0.497) 0.45  (0.498) 0.314  (0.464) 0.308  (0.462) 0.323  (0.469) 0.321  (0.476) 
South 0.352  (0.478) 0.389  (0.488) 0.304  (0.46) 0.328  (0.47) 0.241  (0.429) 0.341  (0.475) 
East 0.1 (0.3) 0.071  (0.257) 0.066  (0.248) 0.058  (0.234) 0.041  (0.199) 0.046  (0.209) 
Job type 
dummy       
Self-employed 0.363  (0.481) 0.503  (0.5) 0.08  (0.271) 0.159  (0.366) 0.041  (0.199) 0.129  (0.335) 
Family 
Business 0.009  (0.092) 0.014  (0.119) 0.009  (0.096) 0.013  (0.112) 0.005  (0.067) 0.026  (0.16) 
Employee 0.044  (0.206) 0.07  (0.255) 0.092  (0.288) 0.286  (0.452) 0.286  (0.453) 0.666  (0.472) 
Retire 0.011  (0.106) 0.009  (0.097) 0.127  (0.333) 0.052  (0.221) 0.118  (0.324) 0.05  (0.219) 
Others30 0.573  (0.5) 0.403  (0.491) 0.693  (0.461) 0.49  (0.5) 0.55  (0.499) 0.129  (0.335) 
                                                   
30
 The observations in this group are the one who is not included in self-employed, family business, employed, and retired groups.   
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No. of children 5.422  (2.129) 4.678  (1.742) 4.498  (2.226) 3.992  (1.76) 4.365  (2.161) 3.759  (1.723) 
Sample size 702 635 3198 2792 220 501 
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5.6 Empirical framework       
The information on benefit claim from the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit 
Interim Regulation is unavailable in this data set so it is necessary to assume that all 
the eligible individuals claim the benefit from the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit 
Interim Regulation. Nevertheless, this is not a strong assumption though it ignores the 
problem of self-selection bias. However, there are some reasons to believe that this 
problem negligible here. Recall the criterion of claiming the benefit from the Senior 
Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation in 1996. The criterion is that the senior 
citizens who have participated in farmer scheme for at least 6 months and do not claim 
any pensions from other social schemes or any benefits from government. The other 
social schemes which had been implemented in 1996 are government employee and 
labour schemes. People who are senior farmers and have claimed pensions from these 
two social schemes are not eligible to claim benefit from the Senior Farmer Welfare 
Benefit Interim Regulation. Otherwise, they have to forego the pensions. If the 
intention to forego the pensions from other social schemes exists, then self-selection 
bias will be generated. However, the nature of pensions and benefits are different. 
Pensions represent the rewards of previous payment. It is a form of contribution rather 
than a gift whereas benefits are cost free. Thus, it is not rational to forego the pensions 
for benefits because of the opportunity cost of benefits. The information of claiming 
the pensions from other social schemes is available from occupational history. 
Similarly, self-selection bias would be negligible because the senior citizens are less 
prone to forego other government benefits to achieve the criterion of the Senior 
Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation because the amount of this benefit was not 
more than other benefits in 1996. However, the only reason for individuals to change 
their benefit tendency would be if the amount of specified benefit is more than the 
other benefits. The benefit of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation in 
 123 
 
1996 was NT$3,00031. It was less than other government benefits, for example, the 
veteran benefit and disability benefit. Hence, changing the benefit is not rational 
because of the change cost.  
Two quasi-experimental designs are employed in this chapter. One is 
difference-in-differences and its extension, difference-in-difference-in-differences. 
The other one is regression-discontinuity.   
5.6.1 Difference-in-differences estimation  
To estimate the effect of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim 
Regulation on senior farmer’ health status, the farmer group is selected into the 
estimation and partitioned into two subgroups according to age. The farmers at the age 
of 65 years or older are assigned to the treatment group; the others are assigned to the 
control group. The DiD analysis assumes that the path of health outcome for both 
groups would not be systematically different in the absence of intervention. The 
observed characteristics between these two groups are similar apart from the mean age.  
The test of Eq. (5.14) > 0 implies that the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit 
Interim Regulation improves the senior farmer’s health status and life satisfaction. 
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Thus, the pooling sample observed in 1989 and 1996 is used to estimate the effect of 
Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation. The equation is as Eq. (5.15): 
ititititititit XSCSFWBIRSCSFWBIRH ναδδδα +++++= 13210 *)15.5(  
                                                   
31
 In the same year, the lowest living expense in Taiwan province, Taipei city, and Kaohsiung 
city was 5,400, 6,640, and 5,400 NTD respectively. The exchange rate was 1 USD=27.45 NTD 
and 1GBP=1.56 USD. The GDP per capita was 13,376 USD. 
 124 
 
where i indexes individuals and t indexes year. Hi is the response of self-assessed 
health status, the score of depression or life satisfaction, SFWBIR is a dummy for the 
period after implementation of Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation, SC 
is a dummy for senior citizens, X is a vector of observable individual characteristics, 
and ν is a random error term. The effect of intervention Eq. (5.15) can be expressed as: 
.]0[])[( 312321 δδδδδδ =−−−++=∆SFWBIR  The coefficient δ3 measures the 
difference-in-differences defined in Eq. (5.14). 
5.6.2 Difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation (DiDiD) 
In order to obtain a more robust analysis, difference-in-difference-in-
differences approach is used. DiDiD includes more compared groups in the estimation 
than DiD. The advantage of DiDiD approach is the ability to eliminate one more 
systematic influence than DiD during the estimating period. For example, systematic 
influence on farmer and on senior citizens, DiD approach only excludes the former 
systematic influence whereas it is unable to eliminate the latter one. DiDiD approach 
is able to eliminate two systematic influences to acquire more precise results.  
In DiDiD estimation, the sample is partitioned into two groups according to 
occupation. The farmer group is compared with the non-farmer group. In addition, the 
farmer group is also compared with the group of manufacturing workers because 
manufacturing workers have a similar socioeconomic background to farmers.  In the 
non-farmer group several occupations are excluded, for example, government 
employees, teachers, military personnel and three specialist occupations, namely 
doctors, lawyers and certified public accountants (CPA). The welfare of the 
government employees, teachers and military personnel is secured by the government 
and their jobs are more stable than other occupations. The three specialists usually 
have a higher educational level and higher socioeconomic status.  
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Each group can obtain the effect of The Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit 
Interim Regulation by using difference-in-differences design shown in Eq. (5.16) and 
Eq. (5.17). Further, the effect from the farmer group subtracts the effect from non-
farmer group, which is shown in Eq. (5.18). DiDiD and DiD share the same idea and 
DiDiD can be regarded as the extension of DiD. The purpose of aDiDing multiple 
control groups is to isolate the treatment effects from potential factors unrelated to 
Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation. 
)()()16.5( SFWBIRBeforeSCNonSFWBIRAfter SCNonSFWBIRBeforeSCSFWBIRAfterSCSFWBIRFarmer HHHH −− −−−=∆       
)()(()17.5( SFWBIRBeforeSCNonSFWBIRAfterSCNonSFWBIRBeforeSCSFWBIRAfterSCSFWBIRFarmerNon HHHH −−− −−−=∆    
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where SFWBIR∆  and H has been defined above. The indicators of sub- and superscripts 
present the senior citizens and non-senior citizens before and after Senior Farmer 
Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation. The difference-indifference-indifferences 
estimator can be expressed within a regression framework with the pooling data 
observed in 1989 and 1996. The regression is as Eq. (5.19): 
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where FHI is an indicator variable for the group of farmer, ε is a random error term 
and other variables have been defined in Eq. (5.15). The effect of The Senior Farmer 
Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation in Eq. (5.19) can be expressed as ∆SFWBIR = 
{[(γ1+γ2+γ3+γ4+γ5+γ6+γ7)-(γ2+γ3+γ5)]-[(γ1+γ3+γ6)-γ3]}-{[(γ1+γ2+γ4)-γ2]-[γ1-0]} = γ7. The 
coefficient γ7 measures the difference-in-difference-in-differences defined in Eq. 
(5.18).  
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5.6.3 Dependent and explanatory variables 
Three dependent variables are specified: (1) individual self-assessed health 
status, (2) individual scale of depression and (3) individual scale of life satisfaction. 
The first dependent variable is a dichotomous variable with good and poor self-
assessed health status. The original variable has five categorical responses: very good, 
good, fair, poor and very poor. The value of 1 is assigned to the responses of very 
good and good and otherwise 0. Owing to the binary response model, the observed 
variable, Hit, in Eq. (5.19) is dominated by a latent variable, Hit*, which can be 
regarded as the health stock of the individuals. The individuals would report their 
health status as being very good or good when their health stock is above 0; otherwise 
fair, poor and very poor. Thus, a binary variable indicating the sign of Hit* is observed: 
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The second dependent variable is the scale of CES-D. Its range is between 0 
and 30. The third dependent variable is the scale of LS and its scale is between 0 and 
10. Xit is a vector of demographic and economic characteristics of the individual: age, 
square of age, gender, number of children, and dummies for education level, marital 
status, family scales, regions, and job types, respectively. 
With respect to estimation, Probit model is used in SAH analysis and ordinary 
least square estimate (OLS) are used in CES-D and LF analyses.    
5.6.4 Regression discontinuity design  
 In the regression-discontinuity design only the data of 1996 is needed and, at 
that time, the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation had been 
implemented for one year. The treatment is assigned based on individual’s age and 65 
years old is a threshold: 
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}65{1 ≥= ii sI  
and estimation equation is as Eq. (5.21): 
     iiiiii sIH ςλβα +++= )()21.5(  
where λ(.) is a control function to correct endogeneity (si and ςi). The specific 
functional form of λ(.) depends on distribution of assumption. Meanwhile, αi equals to 
α(si)+ εi. On the one hand, substitute α(si)+ εi into Eq. (5.21). Under general conditions, 
on the other hand, λ(.) is continuous. Eq. (5.21) is rewritten as Eq. (5.22). 
     iiii IsH µβα ++= )(~)22.5(  
where )()(~ ii ss λαα +≡ and .iii ςεµ +≡ The sharp regression-discontinuity design 
is used to estimate the treatment effect. The average treatment effect of the Senior 
Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation is defined as  
     
−+
−= HHsE i ]|[)23.5( β  
The two one-sided limits are estimated by using local linear regression (LLR) 
in Eq. (5.11) which is the average treatment effect. Local linear regression has better 
boundary property than the traditional kernel regression estimator and its bias does not 
depend on the design density of the data (Hahn et al., 2001). The estimator for H+ in 
Eq. (5.23) is given by aˆ  in Eq. (5.24).  
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where, K(.) is a kernel function and h > 0 is a suitable bandwidth.       
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5.7 Empirical Results         
5.7.1 Difference-in-differences estimates 
The top columns (labelled baseline model) of Table 5-8 report the effect of 
the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on self-assessed health status 
without controlling the other characteristics in the difference-in-differences estimate. 
The baseline model shows that the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation 
has no statistically significant effects on treatment group. In the bottom columns of 
Table 5-8, the other control variables identified in Eq. (5.15) are included. In the full 
specification model, the coefficient of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim 
Regulation on the treatment group is negative but it is not statistically significant at 
5%. Education, but only the junior high school level, contributes the self-assessed 
health status. People whose education level is at junior high school level have a higher 
probability of reporting good self-assessed health status compared with illiterate 
subjects, holding other characteristics constant. The dummies of marital status do not 
have statistically significant effects on self-assessed health status. 
Age has a non-significantly negative effect on self-assessed health status, 
holding other characters constant. However, the gender dummy has a significantly 
positive effect on self-assessed health. The probability of males to report good self-
assessed health is higher than that of females, holding other characteristics constant.  
With respect to regional dummies, the north and the south have positive and 
significant effects on self-assessed health compared with the east and they are 
significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. The self-employed and retired people have a 
higher probability of reporting good self-assessed health than those who are defined as 
the category of others.  
Table 5-9 shows the results of estimates replacing the dependent variable with 
CES-D. The Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation has negative effects 
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on CES-D of treatment group in the baseline model. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant.  
In the full specification estimate, the effect of Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit 
Interim Regulation on treatment group has similar results to the baseline estimate. It is 
negative but not significant at 5%. With respect to other control variables, median 
family type, and self-employed job type have significant effects on depression and 
these variables are all significant at 1%. With respect to family size and job type, 
median families (5-10 people) report significantly (0.85 point) lower depression 
compared with small families (1-4 people). Self-employed people report 1.068 units 
lower depression score compared with people who are classed group others. 
Table 5-10 presents the results of estimating life satisfaction. In the baseline 
model the effect of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on the 
treatment group is positive but not significant at 5%. In the full specification model it 
is also positive and not statistically significant. The education dummies are positive 
apart from the university dummy but only the primary school and senior high school 
dummies are significant. The people whose education is at primary school and senior 
high school levels report 0.335 point and 1.301 points higher for life satisfaction, 
respectively, compared with illiterate subjects, holding other characteristics constant.  
With respect to marital status, the marriage and widowhood have the same 
and significant effects on the life satisfaction. Married people report higher scores of 
life satisfaction than single people by 2.675 points, holding other characteristics 
constant. However, widows also report 1.925 higher scores for life satisfaction than 
single people, holding other variables constant. Self-employed and retired people 
report higher life satisfaction and their coefficients are 0.64 and 1.687, respectively. 
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Table 5-8 Difference-in-differences Estimate of SFWBIR on SAH 
Baseline Model 
 Coef.  Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 0.018   0.102 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.124   0.096 
SFWBIR*SC 0.046   0.147 
Full Specification 
 Coef.  Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) -0.020 0.127 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.025 0.138 
SFWBIR*SC -0.051 0.171 
Other Characteristics   
Education   
Primary school 0.061 0.085 
Junior high school 0.560** 0.211 
Senior high school 0.069 0.317 
University 0.493 0.583 
Postgraduate - - 
Marital Status   
Marriage 0.833 0.631 
Divorce 1.145 0.695 
Widow 0.784 0.636 
Age -0.138 0.129 
Age2 0.001 0.001 
Gender 0.211* 0.091 
Family size   
5-10 persons 0.055 0.078 
More than 10 persons 0.071 0.156 
Regional Dummy   
North 0.573** 0.180 
Middle 0.232 0.147 
South 0.363* 0.148 
Job type   
Self-employed 0.570** 0.083 
Family business 0.517 0.337 
Employed 0.290 0.165 
Retire 1.100** 0.363 
No. of children 0.035 0.020 
   
Sample Size 1295 
LR Chi2 121.41 
Pseudo R2 0.071 
**  Statistically significant at the 1% level   *   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
 
 
 
 131 
 
 
Table 5-9 Difference-in-differences Estimate of SFWBIR on CES-D 
Baseline Model 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 1.732** 0.359 
SC (Senior Citizen) 0.033 0.316 
SFWBIR*SC -0.623 0.512 
Full Specification 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 1.882** 0.420 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.198 0.454 
SFWBIR*SC -0.566 0.560 
Other Characteristics   
Education   
Primary school -0.235 0.281 
Junior high school 0.104 0.687 
Senior high school -0.896 1.055 
University 0.977 1.966 
Postgraduate - - 
Marital Status   
Marriage -2.710 1.562 
Divorce -2.591 1.856 
Widow -1.761 1.583 
Age 0.145 0.426 
Age2 -0.001 0.003 
Gender -0.401 0.298 
Family size   
5-10 persons -0.854** 0.257 
More than 10 persons -0.736 0.518 
Regional Dummy   
North -0.627 0.581 
Middle 0.261 0.459 
South 0.362 0.466 
Job type   
Self-employed -1.068** 0.275 
Family business 0.381 1.142 
Employed -0.320 0.540 
Retire -0.105 1.181 
No. of children 0.012 0.065 
   
Sample Size 1282 
F-statistics 4.56 
R2 0.077 
**  Statistically significant at the 1% level   *   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5-10 Difference-in-differences Estimate of SFWBIR on LS 
Baseline Model 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 0.021 0.198 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.247 0.184 
SFWBIR*SC 0.189 0.291 
Full Specification 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) -0.017 0.233 
SC (Senior Citizen) 0.061 0.248 
SFWBIR*SC 0.071 0.312 
Other Characteristics   
Education   
Primary school 0.335* 0.155 
Junior high school 0.560 0.376 
Senior high school 1.290* 0.602 
University -0.085 1.059 
Postgraduate - - 
Marital Status   
Marriage 2.675** 0.842 
Divorce 1.143 1.020 
Widow 1.925* 0.853 
Age 0.005 0.236 
Age2 -0.0001 0.002 
Gender 0.039 0.165 
Family size   
5-10 persons 0.268 0.142 
More than 10 persons 0.496 0.283 
Regional Dummy   
North -0.053 0.320 
Middle 0.146 0.254 
South 0.415 0.259 
Job type   
Self-employed 0.640** 0.152 
Family business 0.547 0.636 
Employed -0.216 0.297 
Retire 1.687* 0.660 
No. of children 0.056 0.036 
   
Sample Size 1219 
F-statistics 5.02 
R2 0.088 
**  Statistically significant at the 1% level   *   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
5.7.2 Difference-in-difference-in-differences estimates 
     In order to get more robust results, more comparison groups are included 
in the estimate and the results are shown in Table 5-11 to Table 5-16. The extra 
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comparison groups in Table 5-11 to Table 5-13 are the non-farmer group. In Table 
5-14 to Table 5-16, the extra comparison groups are the manufacturing group.  
5.7.2.1 Farmer group vs. Non-farmer group 
In Table 5-11 the baseline estimate presents the effect of the Senior Farmer 
Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on self-assessed health of treatment group is 
positive but not statistically significant at 5% level.  
In the full specification of farmers and non-farmer groups case, the effect of 
the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on self-assessed health of 
treatment group is similar to that in baseline estimate, positive but not statistically 
significant at 5% level.  
With respect to other characteristics, the estimates of education dummies are 
all positive and statistically significant at 1% to self-assessed health compared with 
illiteracy. The estimates are 0.233, 0.478, 0.623 and 0.673, respectively. The age 
variable has a negative effect which is significant at 1% level on self-assessed health. 
It reduces the probability of reporting good self-assessed health and the association is 
nonlinear. The gender dummy, all the regional dummies, and job type dummies apart 
from family business are significant at 1% level. The dummy of family business and 
the number of children are significant at 5% level. The probability for males to report 
good self-assessed health is higher than that of females, holding other characteristics 
constant. Finally, the regional dummies are all positive and significant at 1% level. 
The people in north, middle and south areas have higher probability to report good 
health status than those in east, respectively. As for the job type, self-employed, 
family business, employed, and retired people have higher probability to report good 
self-assessed health compared with others, respectively. The number of children also 
increases the probability to report good SAH.  
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Table 5-12 presents the results of the effects of the Senior Farmer Welfare 
Benefit Interim Regulation on CES-D of treatment group. In the baseline model, the 
effect of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on CES-D of 
treatment group is negative and significant at 5% level. In the full specification of 
farmers and non-farmer groups, it maintains negative but not significant at 5% level. 
The effect of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation reduces 0.992 
point of depression of senior farmers compared with the non-farmer group.  
With respect to other control variables, all education dummies are negative 
and are significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively, apart from postgraduate dummy. 
People whose education is at primary school, junior high school, senior high school, 
and university levels report lower score of depression compared with the illiteracy. 
The estimates are -0.572, -0.712, -1.122, and -1.352, respectively. The higher 
education level people achieve the lower depression score people report. The other 
significant dummies, either at 1% or 5% level, are gender, family scales with 5-10 
people and more than 10 people, all the dummies of job type except for family 
business, and number of children. Males have less depression than females by 0.699, 
holding other variables constant, respective. People in the medium family (5-10 
people) and large family (more than 10 people) have less depression than those in the 
small family by 0.589 point and 0.992 point, respectively, holding other variables 
constant. The people who are self-employed, employed, and retired have less 
depression than others by 0.777 point, 0.709 point, and 0.506 point, respectively. The 
number of children also reduces the depression. When a family increases one child, 
the depression score of the household members drops 0.109 point on average. 
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Table 5-11 Difference-in-difference-in-differences Estimate of SFWBIR on SAH 
(Farmer group vs. Non-Farmer group) 
Baseline Model 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) -0.102* 0.05 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.252** 0.052 
FHI -0.181* 0.084 
FHI*SC 0.128 0.109 
FHI*SFWBIR 0.12 0.113 
SFWBIR*SC -0.015 0.068 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR 0.062 0.162 
Full Specification 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) -0.227** 0.063 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.002 0.067 
FHI -0.125 0.090 
FHI*SC 0.056 0.113 
FHI*SFWBIR 0.130 0.117 
SFWBIR*SC 0.030 0.082 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR 0.024 0.168 
Other Characteristics   
Education   
Primary school 0.233** 0.04 
Junior high school 0.478** 0.062 
Senior high school 0.623** 0.075 
University 0.673** 0.089 
Postgraduate - - 
Marital Status   
Marriage -0.027 0.125 
Divorce -0.142 0.152 
Widow -0.055 0.129 
Age -0.167** 0.050 
Age2 0.001** 0.0004 
Gender 0.131** 0.039 
Family size   
5-10 persons 0.038 0.034 
More than 10 persons 0.065 0.08 
Regional Dummy   
North 0.337** 0.072 
Middle 0.226** 0.070 
South 0.282** 0.070 
Job type   
Self-employed 0.377** 0.047 
Family business 0.324* 0.146 
Employed 0.397** 0.049 
Retire 0.201** 0.064 
No. of children 0.018* 0.009 
   
Sample Size 6819 
LR Chi2 565.46 
Pseudo R2 0.062 
**  Statistically significant at the 1% level   *   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5-12 Difference-in-difference-in-differences Estimate of SFWBIR on CES-D 
(Farmer group vs. Non-Farmer group) 
Baseline Model 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 1.479* 0.165 
SC (Senior Citizen) 0.239 0.176 
FHI 0.061 0.278 
FHI*SC -0.206 0.361 
FHI*SFWBIR 0.253 0.395 
SFWBIR*SC 0.593* 0.236 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR -1.217* 0.564 
Full Specification 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 1.645** 0.212 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.571* 0.223 
FHI 0.17 0.303 
FHI*SC -0.050 0.378 
FHI*SFWBIR 0.199 0.394 
SFWBIR*SC 0.497 0.271 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR -0.992 0.561 
Other Characteristics   
Education   
Primary school -0.572** 0.13 
Junior high school -0.712** 0.210 
Senior high school -1.122** 0.250 
University -1.352** 0.299 
Postgraduate -4.366 2.501 
Marital Status   
Married -0.582 0.409 
Divorce 0.464 0.503 
Widow -0.025 0.422 
Age -0.019 0.166 
Age2 0.0006 0.001 
Gender -0.699** 0.131 
Family size   
5-10 persons -0.589** 0.111 
More than 10 persons -0.992** 0.265 
Regional Dummy   
North -0.264 0.231 
Middle 0.134 0.225 
South -0.033 0.226 
Job type   
Self-employed -0.776** 0.160 
Family business -0.685 0.495 
Employed -0.709** 0.164 
Retire -0.506* 0.217 
No. of children -0.109** 0.029 
   
Sample Size 6782 
F-Statistics 23.84 
R2 0.090 
**  Statistically significant at the 1% level   *   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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The last part in this section is the estimate of life satisfaction. Table 5-13 
provides the results of the effect of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim 
Regulation on life satisfaction of the treatment group. In the baseline model, the 
estimates of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on life satisfaction 
of treatment group are positive but not significant at 5% level. However, in the full 
specification, it turns to negative and still not significant at 5% level.     
With the respect to other variables, the education dummies apart from 
postgraduate dummy, married and divorced dummies, and two dummies of family 
size, regional dummies of middle and south, self-employed and retired dummies, and 
the number of children are significant either at 1% or 5% level. People with the 
education at primary school, junior high school, senior high school and university 
levels have higher life satisfaction than those who are illiteracy by 0.669 point, 1.259 
points, 1.487 points and 1.415 points, respectively, holding other variables constant. 
Married people have higher life satisfaction and divorced people have lower life 
satisfaction than single people by 0.763 point and 0.615 point, respectively, holding 
other variables constant. People in the medium family (5-10 people) and large family 
(more than 10 people) have higher life satisfaction than in small family (1-4 people) 
by 0.243 point and 0.576 point, respectively, holding other variables constant. The 
people living in the middle and south have higher life satisfaction than those living in 
the east area by 0.266 point and 0.405 point. As for the job type, the self-employed 
and retired people usually have higher life satisfaction than those categorized in others 
by 0.494 point and 0.506 point, respectively. The number of children in the family 
also increases the life satisfaction of individuals by 0.106 point 
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Table 5-13 Difference-in-difference-in-differences Estimate of SFWBIR on LS 
(Farmer group vs. Non-Farmer group) 
Baseline Model 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 0.065 0.101 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.238* 0.104 
FHI 0.242 0.164 
FHI*SC -0.009 0.211 
FHI*SFWBIR -0.044 0.222 
SFWBIR*SC 0.16 0.139 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR 0.028 0.322 
Full Specification 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) -0.158 0.12 
SC (Senior Citizen) 0.165 0.126 
FHI 0.079 0.17 
FHI*SC -0.027 0.212 
FHI*SFWBIR 0.074 0.223 
SFWBIR*SC 0.244 0.154 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR -0.094 0.32 
Other Characteristics   
Education   
Primary school 0.669** 0.074 
Junior high school 1.259** 0.120 
Senior high school 1.487** 0.143 
University 1.415** 0.170 
Postgraduate -1.660 1.696 
Marital Status   
Marriage 0.763** 0.236 
Divorce -0.615* 0.289 
Widow 0.293 0.243 
Age -0.063 0.095 
Age2 0.0003 0.0007 
Gender -0.117 0.075 
Family size   
5-10 persons 0.243** 0.063 
More than 10 persons 0.576** 0.149 
Regional Dummy   
North -0.070 0.135 
Middle 0.266* 0.131 
South 0.405** 0.132 
Job type   
Self-employed 0.494** 0.092 
Family business 0.520 0.288 
Employed 0.181 0.093 
Retire 0.506** 0.125 
No. of children 0.106** 0.017 
   
Sample Size 6422 
F-Statistics 20.84 
R2 0.084 
**  Statistically significant at the 1% level   *   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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5.7.2.2 Farmer group vs. Manufacturing group 
     The baseline model in Table 5-14 shows the effect of the Senior Farmer 
Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on self-assessed health of treatment group is 
negative and non-significant at 5% level. In the full specification, it maintains 
negative and statistically non-significant. The significant variables are the dummies of 
junior high school, senior high school, gender, regional dummies, and the self-
employed and employed dummies. These dummies are all significant at 1% level 
apart from the dummy of middle region. People with the education at junior high 
school and senior high school levels have higher probability to report good health 
status than those who are illiteracy, holding other variables constant. Males have 
higher probability to report good health status than females. People in the north, 
middle, and south areas have higher probability to report good health status compared 
with those in the east.  Finally, the self-employed and retired people have higher 
probability to report good health status compared with those categorized in others, 
respectively. 
The baseline model in Table 5-15 shows that the Senior Farmer Welfare 
Benefit Interim Regulation reduces the depression of treatment group and it is 
significant at 5% level. In the full specification model, the effect of the Senior Farmer 
Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on CES-D of treatment group maintains negative 
and significant at 5% level. The Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation 
reduces the depression of treatment group by 1.923 points. 
With respect to the control variables, only the dummy of family size of 5-10 
persons, and the dummies of self-employed and employed job types are significant 
either at 1% or 5% level. Finally, people in the middle family (5-10 persons) report 
less depression than those in small family size (1-4 persons) by 0.679 point, holding 
other variables constant. The self-employed and employed people have less 
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depression than those categorized in others by 1.066 points and 0.677 point, 
respectively.  
The baseline model in Table 5-16 shows the effect of the Senior Farmer 
Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on life satisfaction of treatment group is positive 
but not significant at 5% level. In the full specification model, it maintains positive 
and not significant at 5% level.  
With respect to other variables, the significant dummies are primary school, 
junior high school, senior high school, large family size, self-employed job type, 
retirement, and the number of children at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. People 
whose education is at primary school, junior high school, and senior high school 
levels report higher life satisfaction than those with illiteracy by 0.349 point, 0.871 
point, and 1.352 points, respectively, holding other variables constant. People report 
higher life satisfaction in large family size than in small family by 0.608 point. Self-
employed and retired people have higher life satisfaction than those categorized in 
others by 0.64 point and 0.768 point, respectively. Finally, the number of children also 
increases individual’s life satisfaction and its coefficient is 0.069. 
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Table 5-14 Difference-in-difference-in-differences Estimate of SFWBIR on SAH 
(Farmer group vs. Manufacturing group) 
Baseline Model 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 0.091 0.12 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.302* 0.141 
FHI -0.239 0.122 
FHI*SC 0.78 0.17 
FHI*SFWBIR -0.073 0.157 
SFWBIR*SC 0.047 0.236 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR -0.0002 0.278 
Full Specification 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) -0.110 0.154 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.181 0.169 
FHI -0.096 0.142 
FHI*SC 0.150 0.181 
FHI*SFWBIR 0.071 0.171 
SFWBIR*SC 0.116 0.262 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR -0.142 0.293 
Other Characteristics   
Education   
Primary school 0.096 0.072 
Junior high school 0.599** 0.143 
Senior high school 0.579** 0.206 
University 0.597 0.344 
Postgraduate - - 
Marital Status   
Marriage 0.005 0.276 
Divorce -0.108 0.323 
Widow 0.020 0.285 
Age -0.138 0.097 
Age2 0.001 0.001 
Gender 0.197** 0.075 
Family size   
5-10 persons 0.033 0.063 
More than 10 persons 0.067 0.133 
Regional Dummy   
North 0.569** 0.141 
Middle 0.263* 0.128 
South 0.377** 0.129 
Job type   
Self-employed 0.552** 0.077 
Family business 0.363 0.245 
Employed 0.458** 0.102 
Retire 0.291 0.178 
No. of children 0.010 0.017 
   
Sample Size 1958 
LR Chi2 181.35 
Pseudo R2 0.069 
**  Statistically significant at the 1% level   *   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5-15 Difference-in-difference-in-differences Estimate of SFWBIR on CES-D 
(Farmer group vs. Manufacturing group) 
Baseline Model 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 1.119** 0.379 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.344 0.459 
FHI 0.414 0.407 
FHI*SC 0.377 0.557 
FHI*SFWBIR 0.613 0.522 
SFWBIR*SC 1.505 0.839 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR -2.129* 0.983 
Full Specification 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 1.549** 0.498 
SC (Senior Citizen) -0.995 0.540 
FHI 0.269 0.459 
FHI*SC 0.620 0.578 
FHI*SFWBIR 0.373 0.554 
SFWBIR*SC 1.363 0.833 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR -1.923* 0.933 
Other Characteristics   
Education   
Primary school -0.339 0.230 
Junior high school -0.670 0.451 
Senior high school -0.931 0.648 
University -1.400 1.100 
Postgraduate - - 
Marital Status   
Marriage -0.627 0.868 
Divorce 0.243 1.020 
Widow 0.202 0.896 
Age 0.202 0.309 
Age2 -0.001 0.002 
Gender -0.442 0.237 
Family size   
5-10 persons -0.679** 0.200 
More than 10 persons -0.810 0.429 
Regional Dummy   
North -0.573 0.436 
Middle 0.044 0.389 
South 0.026 0.395 
Job type   
Self-employed -1.067** 0.244 
Family business 0.494 0.799 
Employed -0.667* 0.325 
Retire -0.290 0.576 
No. of children -0.048 0.053 
   
Sample Size 1941 
F-Statistics 6.09 
R2 0.079 
**  Statistically significant at the 1% level   *   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5-16 Difference-in-difference-in-differences Estimate of SFWBIR on LS 
(Farmer group vs. Manufacturing group) 
Baseline Model 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) 0.321 0.242 
SC (Senior Citizen) 0.038 0.269 
FHI 0.562* 0.245 
FHI*SC -0.285 0.326 
FHI*SFWBIR -0.3 0.313 
SFWBIR*SC -0.154 0.47 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR 0.343 0.553 
Full Specification 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
SFWBIR (post 1995) -0.023 0.287 
SC (Senior Citizen) 0.355 0.308 
FHI 0.337 0.262 
FHI*SC -0.316 0.329 
FHI*SFWBIR -0.002 0.318 
SFWBIR*SC 0.042 0.477 
FHI*SC*SFWBIR 0.016 0.535 
Other Characteristics   
Education   
Primary school 0.349** 0.132 
Junior high school 0.871** 0.258 
Senior high school 1.352** 0.373 
University 0.311 0.618 
Postgraduate - - 
Marital Status   
Marriage 0.817 0.488 
Divorce -0.508 0.583 
Widow 0.057 0.505 
Age -0.018 0.177 
Age2 0.0001 0.001 
Gender -0.041 0.137 
Family size   
5-10 persons 0.167 0.115 
More than 10 persons 0.608* 0.243 
Regional Dummy   
North -0.041 0.251 
Middle 0.201 0.224 
South 0.333 0.228 
Job type   
Self-employed 0.640** 0.141 
Family business 0.452 0.464 
Employed 0.311 0.187 
Retire 0.768* 0.329 
No. of children 0.069* 0.03 
   
Sample Size 1849 
F-Statistics 5.61 
R2 0.077 
**  Statistically significant at the 1% level   *   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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5.7.3 Regression-discontinuity estimates 
     The conditional mean is estimated nonparametrically by means of local 
linear regression when choosing both kernel and bandwidth. The Gaussian kernel is 
used and several alternative choices of the bandwidth are considered to check the 
robustness of the findings.  
 
Table 5-17 Estimate of SFWBIR on Health Indicators and Life Satisfaction 
( boostrap standard errors reported in parentheses) 
Bandwidth SAH CES-D LS 
1.1 -0.165 (0.244) 
-0.471 
(1.849) 
1.518 
(1.114) 
1.766 -0.15 (0.177) 
-1.184 
(1.472) 
1.28 
(0.743) 
3.532 -0.082 (0.09) 
-1.299 
(1.089) 
0.999 
(0.605) 
1.766 is the bandwidth obtained from “normal reference rule-of-thumb” 
 
Figure 5.2 The impact of SFWBIR on SAH, CES-D, and LS (bandwidth=1.766) 
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Figure 5.2 shows that the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation 
has a positive impact on life satisfaction but a negative impact on self-assessed health 
and CES-D. However, Table 5-1717 reveals that the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit 
Interim Regulation does not have a statistically significant impact on the self-assessed 
health, CES-D and life satisfaction. Meanwhile, the estimates are not sensitive to the 
choice of bandwidth. The findings from regression-discontinuity design are consistent 
with the results of difference-in-differences which uses the same sample as that in 
regression-discontinuity design. The Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim 
Regulation has no significant effects on self-assessed health, CES-D, and life 
satisfaction when the farmer group is the only sample for estimation. However, the 
result changes in the difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation which includes 
more comparison sub-groups. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter uses two quasi-experimental methods, difference-in-differences 
and regression discontinuity, to identify the effect of the Senior Farmer Welfare 
Benefit Interim Regulation on self-assessed health status, depression, and life 
satisfaction of the treatment group, the senior farmers. However, regression 
discontinuity is only examined as robustness test instead of being the main analysis in 
this chapter because it has a strong assumption of a single discrete cut-off point (at age 
65 in this chapter). It presumes that policy intervention is the only factor causing the 
health status change at 65 years old. But there may be other potential factors which 
cause the health status change at age 65, for example, retirement and the 
implementation of other social benefits for senior citizens. Though the two example 
factors are excluded from analysis in this chapter, there may have other potential 
factors which are not considered in this chapter.  In this aspect, DiD provides a more 
precise estimate.  
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Some signs of the estimators of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim 
Regulation on self-assessed health status and life satisfaction are not as expected but 
they are not statistically significant at 5% level. However, the sign of effect of the 
Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on depression within the treatment 
group is always negative and it is statistically significant at 5% level when farmers are 
compared with manufacturing workers. On the other hand, the regression 
discontinuity estimation provides the consistent results with those of difference-in-
differences. The Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation has no significant 
effect on the three indicators within the treatment group.  
In summary, the pure cash injection policy has no significant effect on self-
assessed health status and life satisfaction but has a significant effect on depression. It 
provides evidence indirectly that the absolute income hypothesis holds in terms of 
mental health. It also shows that absolute income is not a determinant of happiness.  
People with education at high school level are usually healthier and happier 
compared with those who are illiterate. Males report better health status than females. 
Median family size (5-10 persons) decreases the depression. As for region, people in 
the north and south are healthier than those in east whereas the region is not a 
determinant of depression and life satisfaction. The urbanization of the east is less 
than that of the other regions, especially the north and the south. Two municipalities 
directly under the jurisdiction of the central Government are located in the north 
(Taipei city) and in the south (Kaohsiung city). It implies that people living in these 
two areas benefit from the greater resource allocation, especially health service. Thus, 
this finding that people in the north and south are healthier than those in the east is 
convincing. With respect to job type, self-employed people have better self-assessed 
health status, less depression, and more life satisfaction and employed people are 
healthier. Retirement improves self-assessed health status and life satisfaction only 
when the treatment and control groups are all farmers.  
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The purpose of the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation is to 
complete the old-age pension of the occupational insurance because the Farmer Health 
Insurance is the only occupational scheme without an old-age pension. The results 
provide the evidence that the absolute income hypothesis holds partially in Taiwanese 
society. The government still needs to make further efforts to investigate other 
auxiliary policies to make the senior welfare more comprehensive. 
Gardner and Oswald (2007) find that income innovation of lottery has 
significant effects on improving mental wellbeing after two years. Comparing their 
finding to that in this chapter, it is partially consistent. The consistency is the 
exogenous income innovation has a significant effect on mental health but 
inconsistent part is that this effect is observed after one year in this thesis. Two 
reasons might explain this difference. First, the instruments of income innovation are 
different. Policy intervention is permanent and anticipated whereas lottery wins are a 
short-term and unanticipated impact. Secondly, the population concerned in this 
chapter is senior farmers whose socioeconomic status is relatively low. For those 
people, financial embarrassment likely causes depression.  Income injection can 
immediately relieve somewhat stress. The security of economic status also raises self-
esteem and family status of senior farmers. On the other hand, the anticipated effect 
after policy announcement might start to reduce somewhat stress. Thus, the observed 
policy effect in terms of depression is shorter than that in Gardner and Oswald (2007)   
With respect to self-assessed health and life satisfaction, income might have 
lagged effects on both indicators whereas this chapter cannot reveal any information 
about lagged effects of two years or later. Only the first year after policy implement 
can be detected due to the limitation of data. For the population at low social strata, 
improving financial embarrassment will relieve living stress first and raise life 
satisfaction afterwards. On the other hand, look at the questionnaire of CES-D and life 
satisfaction in terms of time span (see Table A-4 and Table A-5). The questions of 
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CES-D focus on current mental status whereas the questions of life satisfaction focus 
not only on current status but also on the comparison of current status with the past, 
the evaluation of the whole life, and the expectation of future.  Life satisfaction is an 
evaluation of a longer time span. Thus, the policy effect on life satisfaction might be 
ambiguous or be observed more slowly than that on depression. Thus, it is plausible 
that the policy might have a significant effect on life satisfaction after improving 
depression in this group. As for self-assessed health, income likely has a lagged effect 
on it due to the health investment after income increases.  
Finally, this chapter provides the consistent results produced by difference-in-
differences and regression discontinuity approaches which have different assumptions. 
However, the difference-in-difference-in-differences would provide more precise 
results when more comparison groups, particularly, with a similar background, are 
included because it is able to eliminate more systematic influence which is unrelated 
to the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation on the treatment group.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
The type of data is a determinant which causes the debates of health income 
hypotheses. Many previous studies use cross-national data to analyse and obtained the 
evidence to support the relative income hypothesis or income inequality hypothesis. 
However, the relative income hypothesis or income inequality hypothesis holding 
does not mean the absolute income hypothesis is false.  Recently, more and more 
studies used micro-level survey data to investigate the same question. However, they 
did not find much evidence as aforementioned studies to support the relative 
hypothesis or the income inequality hypothesis. Table 2-1 presents this circumstance. 
Gravelle et al. (2002) remind the researchers to be careful if one wants to use 
aggregate data to analyse the individual mortality risk-income relationship. Unbiased 
estimators mainly build on linear individual health income relationship when 
aggregate data are used to infer individual health income relationship. Using micro-
level data is able to avoid this problem and find more precise evidence.  
This thesis is based on the argument of Gravelle et al. (2002). The nonlinear 
relationship between self-assessed health, depression, life satisfaction, respectively, 
and income is found in chapter 4. This finding implies that in Taiwanese studies the 
aggregate bias needs to be considered when aggregate data are used to infer individual 
health income relationship and it is consistent with the motivation of the proposed 
approach of combining aggregate data and individual data in Chapter 3. The 
difference between parametric estimations and nonparametric estimations is not only 
shown in the figures but the model specification test also shows that the parametric 
linear, quadratic, and cubic forms in terms of income are a misspecification in the 
estimations of depression and life satisfaction.  
The absolute income hypothesis and the income inequality hypothesis are 
supportive in this thesis when long-run income and long-run Gini coefficient are the 
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regressors under the assumption of health social gradient. This finding shows that 
health income hypotheses are not contradictory. Chapter 5 also provides the evidence 
to support that long-run income has a significant effect on mental health. Thus, the 
absolute income hypothesis is also supported after taking causality into consideration. 
Though nonlinear relationships between three indicators and income are 
presented in chapter 4, a linearly horizontal relationship and a relatively linear 
relationship are found in the single female group in the case of depression and self-
assessed health respectively. The policies relevant to social aids or social benefit for 
low income group might have ambiguous influence on depression relief for the other 
groups but it will not influence single females. The other social aids which are not 
relevant to income, for example, mental support and a regular visit by social workers, 
might improve their mental health. Taking money from high income population to 
provide public goods or other health services would raise the average probability to 
report good self-assessed health status when the single senior females are concerned. 
On the other hand, the policies for improving the wellbeing of the married population 
are more complicated because of their curvilinear health income relationship.      
The policy intervention in chapter 5 is a long-run pure cash injection which is 
different from the intervention in the previous studies, for example, lottery wins or the 
Nobel Prizes. This thesis provides the evidence that long-run income can improve 
mental health one year after policy intervention even if it is just a small monthly 
amount (₤70, this is approximately US$ 110). Gardner and Oswald (2007) conclude in 
their study that two years after lottery wins, medium-size lottery wins (₤1000-
₤120,000, this is, up to approximately US$ 200,000) improves 1.4 GHQ points of 
mental wellbeing. Thus, the anticipated policy reform with small amount has a faster 
effect on mental wellbeing than unanticipated medium lottery wins.           
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This thesis focuses on testing the absolute income and the income inequality 
hypotheses. Above conclusion suggests that increasing absolute income and reducing 
income inequality are able to raise the average health status. When income increases, 
people can buy better health services and nutritious food, and meanwhile the financial 
pressure is also somewhat relieved which in turn is able to improve mental health and 
reduces suicide rates. When income inequality reduces, the potentially unstable 
factors influencing a society will decrease. It improves health status through the 
accumulation of social capital, the decrease of living stress from unstable society, and 
the increase of public investments such as education and health service.     
Finally, this thesis is the study in Taiwanese case. Strictly speaking, policy 
implications are only directly applicable to Taiwan. One should always be careful of 
generalizing single-country studies to other countries, especially when they are very 
different. Considering the case of Taiwan, one might reasonably think that there is 
some chance that similar health income relationships might also hold in other areas in 
Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, but the mentioned note of caution should always 
be borne in mind.  
Economic growth may not necessarily bring the improvements of economic 
circumstance uniformly across the population. Inappropriate design and 
implementation of income distribution will benefit the upper-income quantiles much 
more than the lower to the bottom income quantiles. The latter groups receive less 
benefit of economic growth and usually suffer worse health conditions. Hence, back 
to the original goodwill policies concerning income distributions and redistributions, a 
social assistant should ensure that the disadvantaged groups can enjoy the fruit of 
economic growth to increase the lower boundary of health standard, which ultimately 
raises the level of average health status of whole society. 
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What we know from this thesis is that it is too hasty to use the 
economic development as a watershed of the income hypotheses because the 
income hypotheses might coexist instead of being exclusionary. The 
prospectively relevant research needs to consider the aggregate bias when 
using Taiwanese data. With respect to income influence, a policy with long-run 
and small income is observed faster than medium income shock because the 
policy is anticipated. For the consequent directions for future research, it is 
worth to know how long the policy effect will last and there has any effect 
when the benefit increases.          
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Appendix 
Table A-1 The definition of variables 
Variables Description 
Deaths per 1000 
people 
The original mortality rate (the range is between 0 and 
1)*1000 
Mean of log disposable 
income 1 
Mean of individual log disposable income equivalised by 
scale 1 within the county  
Mean of square log 
disposable income 1 
Mean of square of individual log disposable income 
equivalised by scale 1 at county level 
Gini coefficient 1 Calculated from individual disposable income equivalised 
by scale 1 within the county 
Mean of log disposable 
income 2 
Mean of individual log disposable income equivalised by 
scale 2 within the county 
Mean of square log 
disposable income 2 
Mean of square of individual log disposable income 
equivalised by scale 2 within the county 
Gini coefficient 2 Calculated from individual disposable income equivalised 
by scale 2 within the county 
Age  Numerical variable 
Gender Dummy variable which assigns male to 1 and 0, otherwise 
Edu 1 Education attendant is less than 1 year (illiteracy) 
Edu 2 Education attendant is between 1 and 6 years (primary 
school) 
Edu 3 Education attendant is between 7 and 9 years (junior high 
school) 
Edu 4 Education attendant is between 10 and 12 years (senior high 
school) 
Edu 5 Education attendant is more than 12 years (university, 
postgraduate, and equivalent degree) 
Occu1 Professionals 
Occu2 Clerks 
Occu3 Technicians and associate professionals 
Occu4 Service workers, shop and market sales labours 
Occu5 Agricultural, animal, husbandry, forestry, and fishing 
labours 
Occu6 Product machine operators and related labours 
Occu7 Unemployment 
Long-run mean of log 
disposable income 1 
Mean of log disposable income (aggregated from individual 
disposable income which is equivalised by scale 1) of the 
county across time dimension 
Long-run mean of log 
disposable income 2 
Mean of log disposable income (aggregated from individual 
disposable income which is equivalised by scale 2) of the 
county across time dimension 
Long-run mean of Gini 
coefficient 1 
Mean of Gini coefficient (computed from individual 
disposable income which is equivalised by scale 1) of the 
county across time dimension 
Long-run mean of Gini 
coefficient 2 
Mean Gini coefficient (computed from individual 
disposable income which is equivalised by scale 2) of the 
county across time dimension 
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Table A-2 Robust estimation with income equivalent scale 1† 
 (original crude mortality rate) 
 
Fixed Effects Population Averaged 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. 
Mean of log disposable 
income -0.001591 0.001254 -0.0016389 0.0012418 
Mean of square log 
disposable income 0.0000885 0.0000631 0.0000917 0.0000625 
Gini coefficient 0.0002455 0.0009992 0.0001932 0.0009565 
     
Age  -0.0003938 0.0002096 -0.0003933 0.0002038 
Square of age  6.88e-06* 2.72e-06 6.95e-06** 2.65e-06 
Gender 0.0016168 0.0024541 0.0016271 0.0024818 
Education     
Edu 2(1 - 6 years) -0.0016458 0.0012558 -0.0015518 0.0011873 
Edu 3(7 – 9 years) 0.0010489 0.0023551 0.0013359 0.0011873 
Edu 4(10 – 12 years) -0.0003456 0.001935 -0.0001038 0.0018775 
Edu 5(More than 12 years) 
-0.005729** 0.0017743 -0.0060443** 0.0017615 
Occupation††     
Occu1 0.0065123 0.0032373 0.0067065* 0.0031488 
Occu2 -0.0009155 0.0025416 -0.001351 0.002527 
Occu3 0.0001453 0.0030895 -0.0004164 0.0030503 
Occu4 -0.0016155 0.0017407 -0.0018865 0.0017255 
Occu5 -0.00103 0.0013154 -0.0005855 0.001292 
Occu6 0.0023784 0.0020123 0.0016698 0.0018712 
     
Constant 0.0148407 0.0072587 0.0148962 0.0072295 
† The equivalent scale is the number of household members. 
†† Occu1: professionals; Occu2: clerks; Occu3: technicians and associate professionals; 
Occu4: service workers, shop and market sales workers; Occu5: agricultural, animal, 
husbandry, forestry, and fishing workers; Occu6: product machine operators and related 
workers. The comparative group is unemployment. 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table A-3 Robust estimation with income equivalent scale 2†  
(original crude mortality rate) 
 
Fixed Effects Population Averaged 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. 
Mean of log disposable income -0.0012512 0.0013653 -0.0012915 .0013543 
Mean of square log disposable 
income 0.0000707 0.000066 0.0000734 0.0000655 
Gini coefficient 0.000036 0.0010365 -6.97e-06 0.0009914 
     
Age  -0.0003939 0.0002103 -0.0003932 0.0002044 
Square of age  6.95e-06* 2.73e-06 7.01e-06** 2.66e-06 
Gender 0.0017026 0.0024419 0.0017137 0.00247 
Education     
Edu 2(1 - 6 years) -0.0016267 0.0012899 -0.0015343 0.0012199 
Edu 3(7 – 9 years) 0.0010285 0.0023536 0.0013086 0.0022269 
Edu 4(10 – 12 years) -0.0003098 0.0019827 -0.0000658 0.0019271 
Edu 5(More than 12 years) -
0.0055624* 0.0017924 
-
0.0058742** 0.0017782 
Occupation††     
Occu1 0.0065736 0.0032614 0.0067673* 0.0031708 
Occu2 -0.0005251 0.0025207 -0.0009481 0.0025132 
Occu3 0.0001945 0.0030714 -0.0003657 0.0030324 
Occu4 -0.0015179 0.0017234 -0.0017889 0.0017107 
Occu5 -0.0009908 0.0013121 -0.0005457 0.0012915 
Occu6 0.0023116 0.0020294 0.0016069 0.0018826 
     
Constant 0.0130812 0.0079782 0.0130868 0.0079693 
† The formula of equivalent scale is (number of adult + 0.5* number of children)0.9. 
†† Occu1: professionals; Occu2: clerks; Occu3: technicians and associate professionals; 
Occu4: service workers, shop and market sales workers; Occu5: agricultural, animal, 
husbandry, forestry, and fishing workers; Occu6: product machine operators and related 
workers. The comparative group is unemployment. 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table A-4 Questionnaire of CES-D 
Do you have following feelings in 
the past one week?  No 
            Yes 
Rare 
(1 day) 
Sometimes 
(2-3 days) 
Often 
(more than 3 
days) 
Have little desire to eat 0 1 2 3 
Feel laborious when doing 
everything 0 1 2 3 
Do not sleep well 0 1 2 3 
Feel depressed 0 1 2 3 
Feel lonely 0 1 2 3 
Feel being treated unfriendly 0 1 2 3 
Feel sad 0 1 2 3 
Cannot be spirited up to do 
anything 0 1 2 3 
Feel happy 3 2 1 0 
Enjoy life 3 2 1 0 
Note: the number in the table is the score of response 
 
 
Table A-5 Questionnaire of Life Satisfaction 
 Yes No 
Get a smoother life than other people 1 0 
Satisfied with life 1 0 
My life could be happier 1 0 
I would not like to change my life if I 
could 1 0 
These years are the best years in my life 1 0 
Most things I do are boring 0 1 
Interested in things which I have done 1 0 
Expect pleasant things in the future 1 0 
I feel old and somewhat tired 0 1 
Most things are the same as my 
expectation in my life 1 0 
Note: the number in the table is the score of response 
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Table A-6 Interval Regression 1989 
Group Working Non-working 
Coef. Std Coef. Std 
Sex 2013.233 (726.491)*** -1490.71078 (439.873)*** 
Age -1723.785 (1202.820) -1623.45042 (511.354)*** 
Age Squ. 10.097 (8.608) 10.34213 (3.563)*** 
Edu. Year 775.869 (114.203)*** 640.65312 (60.242)*** 
Farmer -1443.02 (1190.290) 
High skill 
Worker 10240.94 (3363.786)*** 
Senior Manager 6576.856 (1691.838)*** 
Clerk 8287.575 (2332.314)*** 
Sales clerk 1809.391 (1795.268) 
Craftsman 1153.099 (1619.475) 
Semi-skill 
Worker -193.214 (1510.209) 
Service 2179.95 (1265.587)* 
Marital Status 
Married -474.744 (3381.818) 4734.039 (2283.951)** 
Divorced -3934.085 (3833.716) -1556.362 (2340.622) 
Widowed -4388.701 (3427.470) 1031.539 (2281.297) 
Region 
North 2377.499 (1373.114)* 2902.954 (530.560)*** 
Middle -144.198 (1203.862) 1804.294 (511.408)*** 
South -719.727 (1233.906) 2827.215 (536.000)*** 
No. of Children 65.05 (170.801) 149.274 (92.729) 
Income Source 
From Children 
and relations -692.782 (710.094) -272.531 (604.218) 
From Pension 2149.43 (1284.864)* 3741.221 (561.745)*** 
From Gain 11920.482 (2876.544)*** 6984.424 (982.967)*** 
cons 78882.69 (41678.413)* 63584.875 (18436.379)*** 
N 967 2408 
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Table A-7 Interval Regression 1996 
Group Working Non-working 
Coef. Std Coef. Std 
sex -18235.69 (21365.115) -53564.773 (13688.371)*** 
Age -28546.59 (22367.795) -29822.525 (10549.584)*** 
Age Squ. 177.698 (182.778) 198.122 (77.827)** 
Edu. Year 30218.494 (4573.722)*** 17675.448 (1753.999)*** 
Farmer -12700.007 (29132.901) 
High skill Worker 215969.819 (58605.807)*** 
Senior Manager 223502.226 (57215.526)*** 
Clerk 59289.063 (49251.289) 
Sales clerk 26192.595 (46308.001) 
Craftsman 73213.628 (37370.357)* 
Semi-skill Worker -4402.212 (30453.651) 
Service 23156.402 (32036.611) 
Marital Status 
Married 154496.179 (60268.586)** 53930.980 (25860.172)** 
Divorced 65927.068 (80302.280) -4851.654 (33420.738) 
Widowed 40334.831 (65786.444) -3596.146 (26686.401) 
Region 
North 160665.600 (48327.423)*** 68666.817 (19411.943)*** 
Middle 28501.447 (37279.625) 27282.182 (16144.820)* 
South 60553.706 (38917.507) 61215.785 (18965.591)*** 
No. of Children 1455.235 (7322.508) 2617.644 (2930.179) 
Income Source 
From Children 
and relations -41297.926 (13158.402)*** -8516.926 (21737.701) 
From Pension -29123.671 (13586.273)** 22134.676 (12169.700)* 
From Gain 56430.996 (16918.066)*** 14837.925 (9349.783) 
cons 1049505.415 (678719.277) 1147374.240 (351452.562)*** 
N 890 1862 
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Table A-8 Sample statistics (1989 only)  
 Farmer Group Non-Farmer Worker Group Manufacturing Worker Group 
 Treatment Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Control 2 Control 3 
 Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) 
Health 
Indicators       
SAH 0.347  (0.477) 0.394  (0.49) 0.367  (0.482) 0.465  (0.499) 0.36  (0.482) 0.472  (0.501) 
CES-D 5.647  (4.198) 5.614  (4.169) 5.793  (4.446) 5.553  (4.088) 4.894  (4.082) 5.337  (4.26) 
LS 6.291  (2.4) 6.538  (2.411) 6.058  (2.489) 6.296  (2.507) 6.064  (2.239) 5.994  (2.512) 
Educational 
Dummy       
Illiteracy 0.525  (0.5) 0.404  (0.492) 0.471  (0.499) 0.271  (0.445) 0.388  (0.489) 0.258  (0.439) 
Primary S. 0.428  (0.495) 0.555  (0.498) 0.366  (0.482) 0.463  (0.499) 0.455  (0.499) 0.621  (0.487) 
Junior H.S. 0.031  (0.173) 0.031  (0.173) 0.074  (0.21) 0.121  (0.326) 0.103  (0.305) 0.093  (0.292) 
Senior H.S. 0.012  (0.111) 0.007  (0.083) 0.048  (0.215) 0.077  (0.266) 0.042  (0.202) 0.016  (0.128) 
University 0.002  (0.045) 0.003  (0.059) 0.038  (0.191) 0.068  (0.251) 0.012  (0.11) 0.011  (0.105) 
Postgraduate - - 0.001  (0.039) - - - 
Marital Status 
Dummy       
Married  0.691  (0.462) 0.821  (0.383) 0.601  (0.49) 0.746  (0.436) 0.606  (0.49) 0.731  (0.445) 
Divorce 0.019  (0.135) - 0.032  (0.176) 0.042  (0.201) 0.067  (0.25) 0.071  (0.258) 
Widow 0.28  (0.449) 0.171  (0.377) 0.325  (0.469) 0.157  (0.364) 0.267  (0.444) 0.132  (0.339) 
Single 0.006  (0.078) 0.007  (0.083) 0.042  (0.202) 0.055  (0.228) 0.061  (0.239) 0.066  (0.249) 
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Age 69.54 (3.171) 62.16  (1.3) 68.97  (3.051) 62.03  (1.346) 68.91  (2.932) 61.98  (1.368) 
Squire of age 4845.4 (422.2) 3865.7 (161.5) 4799.3 (424.8) 3849.3  (16.9) 4757  (408.1) 3843.8  (169.6) 
Male 0.669  (0.471) 0.688  (0.464) 0.471  (0.499) 0.581  (0.494) 0.679  (0.468) 0.769  (0.422) 
Family Scale 
Dummy       
1-4 people 0.387  (0.488) 0.445  (0.498) 0.47  (0.499) 0.517  (0.5) 0.467  (0.5) 0.478  (0.501) 
5-10 people 0.535  (0.499) 0.476  (0.5) 0.472  (0.499) 0.43  (0.495) 0.491  (0.501) 0.456  (0.499) 
Over 10 people 0.078  (0.269) 0.079  (0.27) 0.058  (0.234) 0.053  (0.224) 0.042  (0.202) 0.066  (0.249) 
Regional 
Dummy       
North 0.113  (0.317) 0.89  (0.285) 0.335  (0.472) 0.359  (0.48) 0.388  (0.489) 0.407  (0.493) 
Middle 0.414  (0.493) 0.455  (0.499) 0.315  (0.465) 0.282  (0.45) 0.321  (0.468) 0.264  (0.442) 
South 0.364  (0.482) 0.37  (0.484) 0.283  (0.450) 0.289  (0.453) 0.248  (0.433) 0.258  (0.439) 
East 0.109 (0.312) 0.086  (0.28) 0.067  (0.25) 0.07  (0.256) 0.042  (0.202) 0.071  (0.258) 
Job Type 
Dummy       
Self-employed 0.309  (0.462) 0.479  (0.5) 0.087  (0.281) 0.119  (0.324) 0.03  (0.172) 0.055  (0.229) 
Family Business 0.002  (0.045) 0.01  (0.101) 0.007  (0.082) 0.007  (0.086) - 0.027  (0.164) 
Employee 0.039  (0.194) 0.079  (0.271) 0.104  (0.305) 0.3  (0.458) 0.188  (0.392) 0.473  (0.501) 
Retire 0.008  (0.09) 0.01  (0.101) 0.091  (0.288) 0.088  (0.283) 0.145  (0.354) 0.132  (0.339) 
Others 0.642  (0.48) 0.421  (0.495) 0.711  (0.453) 0.485  (0.5) 0.636  (0.483) 0.313  (0.465) 
No. of Children 5.549  (2.185) 5.19  (1.757) 4.319  (2.159) 4.397  (2.038) 4.558  (2.15) 4.167  (2.175) 
Sample size 486 292 1345 1094 165 182 
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Sample statistics (1993 only) (continued) 
 Farmer Group Non-Farmer Worker Group Manufacturing Worker Group 
 Treatment Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Control 2 Control 3 
 Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) 
Mean (Std. 
dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) 
Health 
Indicators       
SAH 0.402  (0.491) 0.241  (0.435) 0.433  (0.49) 0.477  (0.501) 0.391  (0.489) 0.517  (0.509) 
CES-D 7.03  (5.206) 7.138  (3.777) 7.195  (5.176) 7.51  (4.757) 6.66  (5.532) 6.966  (4.204) 
LS - - - - - - 
Educational 
Dummy       
Illiteracy 0.437  (0.496) 0.483  (0.509) 0.359  (0.48) 0.237  (0.427) 0.326  (0.47) 0.138  (0.351) 
Primary S. 0.517  (0.5) 0.483  (0.509) 0.418  (0.493) 0.538  (0.5) 0.533  (0.5) 0.759  (0.453) 
Junior H.S. 0.037  (0.189) - 0.105  (0.306) 0.115  (0.321) 0.11  (0.314) 0.103  (0.31) 
Senior H.S. 0.01  (0.098) - 0.061  (0.24) 0.058  (0.234) 0.026  (0.161) - 
University - 0.034  (0.186) 0.057  (0.232) 0.051  (0.221) 0.004  (0.066) - 
Postgraduate - - - - - - 
Marital Status 
Dummy       
Married  0.719  (0.45) 0.724  (0.455) 0.653  (0.47) 0.769  (0.423) 0.648  (0.479) 0.793  (0.412) 
Divorce 0.006  (0.076) - 0.011  (0.103) 0.026  (0.159) 0.009  (0.094) 0.034  (0.186) 
Widow 0.267  (0.443) 0.276  (0.455) 0.291  (0.454) 0.16  (0.368) 0.278  (0.449) 0.138  (0.351) 
Single 0.008  (0.088) - 0.045  (0.208) 0.049  (0.208) 0.066  (0.249) 0.034  (0.186) 
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Age 69.35 (3.125) 64  (0) 69.03  (2.941) 64  (0) 68.75  (3.031) 64  (0) 
Squire of age 4819.3 (436.2) 4096 (0) 4773.3 (409.1) 4096  (0) 4736.2  (421.7) 4096  (0) 
Male 0.7  (0.459) 0.621  (0.494) 0.518  (0.5) 0.571  (0.497) 0.709  (0.455) 0.793  (0.412) 
Family Scale 
Dummy       
1-4 people 0.485  (0.5) 0.483  (0.509) 0.509  (0.5) 0.481  (0.501) 0.463  (0.5) 0.414  (0.501) 
5-10 people 0.46  (0.499) 0.483  (0.509) 0.455  (0.498) 0.481  (0.501) 0.498  (0.501) 0.586  (0.501) 
Over 10 people 0.055  (0.227) 0.034  (0.186) 0.036  (0.18) 0.038  (0.193) 0.04  (0.196) - 
Regional 
Dummy       
North 0.094  (0.292) 0.069  (0.258) 0.325  (0.469) 0.282  (0.451) 0.343  (0.476) 0.552  (0.506) 
Middle 0.444  (0.497) 0.448  (0.506) 0.318  (0.466) 0.276  (0.448) 0.322  (0.468) 0.172  (0.384) 
South 0.364  (0.482) 0.379  (0.494) 0.289  (0.453) 0.34  (0.477) 0.273  (0.447) 0.207  (0.412) 
East 0.097 (0.297) 0.103  (0.31) 0.068  (0.252) 0.096  (0.296) 0.062  (0.241) 0.069  (0.258) 
Job Type 
Dummy       
Self-employed 0.327  (0.47) 0.413  (0.501) 0.077  (0.267) 0.096  (0.296) 0.062  (0.242) 0.069  (0.258) 
Family Business 0.012  (0.108) 0.07  (0.258) 0.009  (0.097) 0.013  (0.113) 0.004  (0.067) 0.034  (0.186) 
Employee 0.055  (0.227) 0.034  (0.186) 0.106  (0.308) 0.199  (0.4) 0.212  (0.41) 0.207  (0.412) 
Retire 0.033  (0.179) 0.034  (0.186) 0.142  (0.35) 0.128  (0.335) 0.137  (0.345) 0.207  (0.412) 
Others 0.573  (0.495) 0.448  (0.506) 0.665  (0.472) 0.564  (0.497) 0.584  (0.494) 0.483  (0.509) 
No. of Children 5.355  (1.985) 4.448  (1.938) 4.504  (3.897) 4.853  (7.007) 4.066  (2.224) 4.276  (2.562) 
Sample size 513 29 1583 156 227 29 
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Sample statistics (1996 only) (continued) 
 Farmer Group Non-Farmer Worker Group Manufacturing Worker Group 
 Treatment Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Control 2 Control 3 
 Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) 
Health Indicators       
SAH 0.371  (0.484) 0.401  (0.491) 0.324  (0.468) 0.425  (0.494) 0.423  (0.499) 0.525  (0.5) 
CES-D 6.756  (4.476) 7.346  (4.757) 7.865  (4.818) 7.033  (4.282) 7.481  (4.889) 6.319  (3.5) 
LS 6.5  (2.488) 6.558  (2.372) 6.283  (2.622) 6.361  (2.492) 6.18  (2.561) 6.296  (2.375) 
Educational 
Dummy       
Illiteracy 0.384  (0.488) 0.353  (0.479) 0.318  (0.46) 0.252  (0.434) 0.327  (0.474) 0.172  (0.378) 
Primary S. 0.551  (0.499) 0.583  (0.494) 0.44  (0.497) 0.528  (0.499) 0.49  (0.505) 0.658  (0.475) 
Junior H.S. 0.051  (0.22) 0.035  (0.184) 0.113  (0.316) 0.106  (0.308) 0.164  (0.373) 0.085  (0.279) 
Senior H.S. 0.005  (0.068) 0.026  (0.16) 0.072  (0.259) 0.077  (0.267) - 0.06  (0.248) 
University 0.009  (0.096) 0.003  (0.054) 0.057  (0.231) 0.034  (0.183) 0.018  (0.135) 0.019  (0.136) 
Postgraduate - - - 0.002  (0.048) - - 
Marital Status 
Dummy       
Married  0.81  (0.393) 0.857  (0.35) 0.656  (0.475) 0.84  (0.367) 0.709  (0.458) 0.89  (0.313) 
Divorce 0.023  (0.151) 0.015  (0.12) 0.022  (0.145) 0.03  (0.171) 0.018  (0.135) 0.034  (0.183) 
Widow 0.162  (0.369) 0.114  (0.318) 0.276  (0.447) 0.108  (0.31) 0.218  (0.419) 0.047  (0.212) 
Single 0.005  (0.068) 0.015  (0.12) 0.047  (0.212) 0.022  (0.148) 0.055  (0.229) 0.028  (0.166) 
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Age 69.2 (2.819) 58.13  (3.872) 70.17  (2.82) 56.68  (4.153) 68.96  (2.236) 55.2  (3.736) 
Squire of age 4797.1  (392.7) 3393.8  (447) 4931.3  (396.7) 3230.1  (473.1) 4760.9  (307.8) 3061  (419.6) 
Male 0.75  (0.434) 0.569  (0.496) 0.559  (0.497) 0.468  (0.499) 0.655  (0.48) 0.734  (0.443) 
Family Scale 
Dummy       
1-4 people 0.556  (0.498) 0.402  (0.491) 0.545  (0.498) 0.454  (0.498) 0.509  (0.505) 0.414  (0.493) 
5-10 people 0.407  (0.492) 0.551  (0.498) 0.432  (0.495) 0.511  (0.5) 0.473  (0.504) 0.558  (0.497) 
Over 10 people 0.037  (0.189) 0.047  (0.211) 0.023  (0.151) 0.035  (0.183) 0.018  (0.135) 0.028  (0.166) 
Regional Dummy       
North 0.102  (0.303) 0.09  (0.287) 0.303  (0.46) 0.27  (0.444) 0.418  (0.498) 0.226  (0.419) 
Middle 0.495  (0.501) 0.446  (0.498) 0.313  (0.464) 0.32  (0.469) 0.327  (0.474) 0.354  (0.479) 
South 0.324  (0.469) 0.405  (0.492) 0.318  (0.466) 0.354  (0.478) 0.218  (0.417) 0.389  (0.488) 
East 0.079 (0.27) 0.058  (0.235) 0.065  (0.247) 0.05  (0.218) 0.036  (0.189) 0.031  (0.175) 
Job Type Dummy       
Self-employed 0.486  (0.501) 0.524  (0.5) 0.074  (0.262) 0.186  (0.388) 0.073  (0.262) 0.171  (0.377) 
Family Business 0.023  (0.151) 0.018  (0.131) 0.011  (0.106) 0.016  (0.126) 0.018  (0.135) 0.025  (0.158) 
Employee 0.056  (0.231) 0.061  (0.24) 0.082  (0.275) 0.276  (0.447) 0.581  (0.498) 0.778  (0.416) 
Retire 0.019  (0.136) 0.009  (0.093) 0.153  (0.36) 0.028  (0.166) 0.036  (0.189) 0.003  (0.056) 
Others 0.416  (0.494) 0.389  (0.488) 0.679  (0.467) 0.494  (0.5) 0.291  (0.458) 0.022  (0.148) 
No. of Children 5.139  (1.974) 4.245  (1.609) 4.319  (2.159) 3.744  (1.513) 3.818  (2.118) 3.536  (1.371) 
Sample size 216 343 1853 1698 55 319 
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